1919 of the Province of Manitoba and the administration of Judgment. justice, and also to raise discontent and disaffection against His Majesty's subjects and to promote feelings of CAMERON, ill-will and hostility between different classes of such subjects, and were thereby guilty of a seditious conspiracy."

J.A.

After taking evidence at length at the preliminary hearing the Police Magistrate committed the accused for trial. An application is now made to me for an order to admit them to bail.

*

*

By sec. 14 of the Criminal Code the distinction between felony and misdemeanour is abolished "and proceedings in respect of all indictable offences * shall be conducted in the same manner." By sec. 698, "In case of any offence where the accused has been finally committed

*

**

*

any judge of any superior or county court having jurisdiction** may, in his discretion, on application made to him for that purpose, order the accused to be admitted to bail, &c."

It is contended that in this case the charge is one of misdemeanour and not of felony and that, therefore, the accused are entitled to bail as of right. The argument is based on the judgment in R. v. Fortier, 6 Can. Cr. Cas. 191, where Mr. Justice Wurtele held that as respects indictable offences which were felonies before the enacting of the Code it is within the discretion of the judge to allow or refuse the application for bail, while, with respect to indictable offences, which were formerly misdemeanours, bail must be allowed as the accused is entitled to it as a matter of right. On the argument before Mr. Justice Wurtele the private prosecutor was represented by counsel who, while not acquiescing in, did not object to, the bail being granted. The Crown was not represented by counsel. The learned justice in his judg ment does not refer to the above cited provisions of the Code, which, so far as we can judge, were not pressed on his attention.

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Now it seems to me that these provisions are clear and explicit. By sec. 14 proceedings in respect of all indict Judgment. able offences are to be conducted in the same manner, CAMERON, without reference to the former distinction between J.A. felonies and misdemeanours. Yet Mr. Justice Wurtele held that this distinction still subsisted in applications for bail which are, beyond doubt, proceedings in respect of indictable offences. And, in an application for bail, in case of an offence as specified in sec. 698, the judge is given the fullest discretion. He "may, in his discretion" make or refuse to make the order. With every appreciation of the weight to be attached to the decisions of Mr. Justice Wurtele, I am convinced that the plain intention of Parliament was to confer the widest possible discretion upon the judge saving the exceptions stated in sec. 698, which are dealt with in the subsequent section.

Some of the grounds on which bail may be properly refused are set forth in the judgment in the Fortier case, but they are not, nor are they intended to be, exclusive. I must here consider the nature and gravity of the charge; recent events in the history of this community and its present circumstances; the character of the evidence brought out at the preliminary hearing, and the conduct of the accused from the time they were released from custody after their arrest. No undertaking is now offered that the accused will refrain from continuing to make public utterances which may be essentially repetitions or elaborations of those under the investigation of the magistrate at the preliminary hearing and which are to be placed before a jury in due course. It is the fact that such an undertaking was previously given by the accused and not adhered to. The reason or excuse assigned for this repudiation of a solemn obligation cannot be entertained.

On consideration of the whole matter as it is presented to me, in view of the vitally important issues from the

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standpoint of the public that are involved and having in Judgment. mind the attitude and conduct of the accused throughout, I am of the opinion that I must decline to make the order CAMERON, J.A. sought on this application.

The case of Re Frost, 4 L.T.R. 757, was cited as an authority favoring the contention put forward on behalf of the accused. But, as I see it, the express provisions of our Code supersede the state of law as it existed at the time of that decision, and the judge before whom such an application as this is made has now full discretion in all the offences mentioned in sec. 698 of which this is one.

Application refused.

A DIGEST

ALL THE CASES REPORTED IN THIS VOLUME

BEING DECISIONS IN

THE COURT OF APPEAL

AND

THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH
FOR MANITOBA