true dignity of reason, to gratify her propensity to fashion. The sons, never trained to conceive it the highest of all accomplishments to be gentlemen, or to desire that elegant discipline of character, by which they may shine in the walks of literature and public action, must yet be something, and what can they be so well as exquisites of ton and fashion? To conceive the idea of a gentleman, requires no small cultivation of mind, but this requires none. Their family, which had begun to rise in wealth, or was nearly risen, is laughed at, and not seldom crushed by the fashionable extravagance. Then follows a sad chapter of history. There is no capacity to rise, none to adorn or enjoy a humbler estate, no family affections have survived the dissipation, to aid them in bearing their adversitythe only alternative is to suffer a total wreck of character and happi

ness.

And if no such consequences followed, we still must pity the miserable poverty of understanding, the very essential vulgarity of character displayed by so many persons of only moderate wealth, in their ambition to copy the style, and shine in the equipage of fashion. This class of persons have all sufficient means, using proper economy, to provide houses and grounds and libraries, and surround themselves with all that is beautiful, and enjoy a life of elegant ease. But alas! they have no capacity to conceive or relish a style of life so truly refined, so proper to their estate.

Would now that we could bring this subject near to all our country. men, and fill their minds with the beautiful spectacle our country ought to exhibit. We would show them the inherent repugnance of fashion to our state of equal society. We would declare to them the universal possibility of taste, and show them how it would soften our asperities, if all classes were thus engaged to add ornament and grace to life. To the poor man we would reveal by what method he can cer tainly command the respect of the rich, and multiply a thousand-fold the innocent joys of life. Upon the Christian, rich or poor, we would urge the great honor he will bring to his profession, by showing how it adds an outward grace of ornament to his dwelling and his person. We would speak of the inherent dignity of living within our means. we would say, dare to be republicans. And as you love your country, study in all things the severe simplicity of taste. Live towards this mark, and reason towards it, and, if you please, sharpen your argument with ridicule. Look, what a spectacle this great nation will exhibit, when it is occupied as a realm of taste-when the neat cottages sprinkled over the hills, and blended with the elegant mansions of the rich-when the graceful dress of our people, their fine truthful manners, the genial glow of their society, their high-toned liberty and tasteful piety, combine to show the dignity of our institutions.

To all

THESE very talented men were the most active and successful advocates of infidelity during the last century; and a concise, impartial, and authentic account of their lives, and their assaults upon Christianity, is deemed worthy of a place in this journal.

HUME.

DAVID HUME, Esq., was born at Edinburgh, April 26th, 1711, and was of a good family, but not opus lent. His father died while he was an infant, and his education devolved on his mother. After the usual preparation, his friends wished him to pursue the study of law; but he was displeased with that pursuit, preferring poets and orators before the dry and thorny jurists. He next tried merchandise, but found that also irksome. In 1734 he removed to France, in order to pursue his favorite studies with less expense. At Rheims and at La Fleche in Anjou, he spent three years very agreeably. Returning to London, in 1737, he the next year published his Treatise of Human Nature; which, he says, "fell dead-born from the press," or attracted no notice. In 1742 he published the first part of his Essays, which was favorably received. In 1745 he spent a year in the family of the Marquis of Annandale; afterwards, during two years, he was private secretary to General St. Clair, on the coast of France, and at the courts of Vienna and Turin. While at Turin he rewrote his Treatise of Human Nature, and had it published at London in 1749, with the new title, an Inquiry concerning Human Understanding. But it was not much bet ter received than before. The same year, he retired to the family estate in Scotland, and there composed the second part of his Essays, which he Vol. I.

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His

entitled Political Discourses. works now began to receive attention, and to afford him a good income. In 1751 he removed to Edinburgh, and the next year he published his Political Discourses. He also published the same year, at London, his Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, which he esteemed "incomparably the best of all his works," but which was little noticed by the public. In 1752, he became librarian to the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and commenced writing his History of England, which was published 17541761. It was but indifferently received, in consequence of its partiality to the Stuart dynasty, and some other defects. He also published during this period, his Natural History of Religion, and some smaller pieces. In 1763, he went to France as secretary of embassy to the Earl of Hertford; was much caressed at Paris, was Chargé d'Affaires at that court in 1765; and returned to Edinburgh in 1766. The next year he was made undersecretary under General Conway; but in 1769 he returned again to Edinburgh, with a fortune of £1000 a year. In 1775, he was attacked with a bowel-complaint; and, after languishing a year and a half, he expired on the 25th of August, 1776. According to his autobiography and the eulogy of Dr. Adam Smith, he was aware of his approaching dissolution, and met the event with stoic indifference. Amusing himself a few days before his death with reading Lucian's Dialogues, and, with jests, about passing the Styx, he described the dialogue he might hold with Charon, the infernal ferryman. After his death were published his Dialogue on Natural Religion, and his Essay on Suicide; the former in 1778, and the latter in 1783.

Mr. Hume was a decided infidel, or a disbeliever in revealed religion; and he held that the evidence for natural religion has no scientific basis, but is derived merely from our instinctive apprehensions. In moral and mental philosophy, he held to what he calls mitigated skepticism; that is, he believed it impossible to prove, by metaphysical or speculative reasoning, the existence of a material world around us, of a God, a providence, a future state of rewards and punishments, &c. He did not deny the truth of these important facts; but he held that the truth of them rests upon probable grounds only, or upon moral evidence, and not upon evidence which is scientific and demonstrative. In his Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, (sec. xii, p. 173, 174,) he says: "It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration, are quantity and number; and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds, are mere sophistry and illusion." "All other inquiries of man regard only matter of fact and existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration."-" The existence therefore of any being, can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded entirely on experience.""It is only experience which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from another. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action and behavior." In another place, (sec. i, p. 10,) he says: "Here lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a sci

ence."

Mr. Hume has been taxed with denying, altogether, the connection

between cause and effect, and consequently, the validity of all our reasoning from such connection. But this is a false charge. He only denied the solidity of all metaphysi cal proofs of such connection, not the reality of the connection. In the work above cited, (sec. iv, p. 38,) he declares expressly: "None but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of erperience, or to reject that great guide of human life." And in closing his argument on the subject, he says, (sec. v, p. 50,) "What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one; though it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence, is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object."-"This belief is the neces sary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an ope-. ration of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable, as to feel the passion of love when we receive benefits, or hatred when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of thought and understanding is able either to PRODUCE, or to PREVENT." Mr. Hume's skepticism, therefore, did not call in question the conclusions we derive from experience and common sense, but merely the validity of all metaphysical or philosophical reasoning in regard to matters of fact and real existence in the natural and the spiritual worlds. In the work already named, (sec. xi, p. 144, &c.) where he introduces a disputant defending Epicurus's idea, (viz. that we have no evidence of a particular providence, or of a future state of rewards and punishments,) he makes the person say, that by reasoning from effects to their cause, we may indeed prove the existence of an intelligent Cre

ator of the world; but we can not ascribe to him any attributes or perfections beyond what he has visibly displayed, for we can only infer a first cause adequate to produce the world before us. And on this ground, we can not infer that God has any other and ulterior designs in regard to men, than what we now see. To this reasoning of his friend, Mr. Hume makes the objection, that when we see an unfinished building surrounded with materials, we infer that the building is to be completed, and is to become a very different thing from what it now is; and why may we not argue in a. similar manner with regard to the world, as being God's unfinished building? The friend replies: We can not do so, for this reason, that men are a class of beings with whom we are acquainted, so that we can judge from their incipient acts, what they are about to do; but that God is a solitary being in the universe, whom we know only from his works, and therefore we can never argue from his known character or attri butes, what he is about to do, because we do not know him to possess any other attributes than he has already displayed. To this, Mr. Hume rejoins, that he doubts whether God is so unlike to all other rational beings, men, for example, as to forbid our reasoning from analogy, that, as a rational being, he must have such and such designs. He moreover says, that his friend's principles are injurious to society, because the belief of a future state of retribution has a salutary influence on human conduct; so that, allowing Epicureans to be good reasoners, they can not be regarded as good citizens and politicians.

In regard to natural theology, Mr. Hume's mitigated skepticism consisted in denying the validity and certainty of all philosophical reasoning in this department of knowledge, and generally throughout the range of metaphysical dis

cussions, because we have no certain and scientific knowledge of causation, or of the necessary connection between cause and effect.

But in regard to revealed religion, or the religion of the Bible, Mr. Hume was not a mere skeptic; he was a decided infidel or disbeliever in supernatural revelation. In his Inquiry, so often quoted, (sec. x, of Miracles, p. 118,) he tells us, that he flattered himself he had discovered an argument, which would forever silence all reasoning from miracles in support of any religion. The argument is this. Experience is our only guide in judging of all matters of fact. We give credit to testimony, because we have found it generally to accord with facts; and we estimate the credibility of alleged facts, by their accordance or disagreement with the experience of mankind. The incredibility of a fact, may be such as to invalidate any testimony. And in all cases of doubt or uncertainty, we weigh the probabilities on both sides, strike a balance, and then yield assent strong or weak, according to the preponderating evidence. After these preliminary remarks, he proceeds thus, (p. 122, 123,) "Let us suppose, that the fact which the witnesses affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entíre as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."-" The plain consequence is, (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention,) that no testimony is sufficient to estab

lish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact which it endeavors to establish: and even in that case, there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior."

The fallacy of this argument appears to consist in confounding two things which have not the least connection. The argument supposes the uniform experience of mankind respecting the mere course of nature, to be a uniform experience against the occurrence of miracles. Whereas the objects of experience, in the two cases, are altogether different. In the one case, the experience relates to the mere course of nature, or to those events which occur under and in obedience to the laws of nature; but in the other case, it relates to supernatural events, to occurrences altogether out of the course of nature, events produced immediately by the almighty power of God; for it is in this sense, and in this sense only, that "a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature." Now it is admitted on all sides, that the experience of the world, so far as it has gone, has ever found nature to be uniform in her operations, or to work according to permanent and unchangeable laws. But what has this to do with miracles? The regular operations of nature, and the supernatural works of God, are totally distinct things; and, of course, human experience in regard to the former, has no bearing what ever on the credibility or incredibility of the latter. The vaunted argument, in reality, amounts only to this:

A miracle in the course of nature, is contrary to all human experience. And therefore, a miracle out of the course of nature, is contrary to all human experience.

Such reasoning is what logicians call sophisma a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter; or, assuming that what is true, in some special cases, must be true in all possible cases, or be simply and universally true.

That this is a fair statement of Mr. Hume's sophistical argument, will perhaps appear more evident, if we repeat it in his own words, with the necessary explanations of ambiguous terms, thus: "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, (or an event entirely out of the course of nature, and not produced by her laws,) and as a fixed and unalterable experience has established (the uniformity of) these laws, (throughout the course of nature,) the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, (that a miracle is out of the course of nature,) is as entire, as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."

But, although this appears to be the true import of Mr. Hume's ar gument, provided we give any con. sistent meaning to his language, yet when read cursorily and superficially, the argument scems to be simply this: "The uniform experience of the world, is directly op posed to all occurrence of miracles; and therefore, their occurrence is utterly incredible." To this form of the argument the obvious reply is, that the voice of history contradicts this broad assertion respecting the experience of the world. For history, both sacred and profane, testifies that vast numbers of persons, in different ages and countries, have witnessed, or at least, have believed that they witnessed the occurrence of miracles; and it must first be proved, that all these persons were deceived, that not a single one of them ever witnessed what they all say they witnessed. Until this is proved satisfactorily, the broad assertion, that the expe rience of the world is opposed to