If our principles are sound, a representative may not pledge himself beforehand to a particular course, nor promise to obey instructions, nor actually obey them when given, unless they are intrinsically right. We do not say,-and we beg those who may read what we write in a captious spirit to notice this,-that instructions may not be given and ought not to be respected. If they are regarded only in the light of advice and of an expression of opinion, they may be useful. If they are looked on as mere wishes, they are not to be thrown away; for it is one part of legislation, though a minor one, to gratify the wishes of particular sections, when they interfere with no greater good. But assuredly an honest man ought never to promise to vote in one way, when the result of deliberation may be to convince him that the very opposite is the right one. Still less ought he to bind himself in a general way to obey his constituents, for he thus multiplies the probabilities that he will give a wrong vote, and admits a most hurtful principle. It becomes all good men to resist the spread of the doctrine of instruction, which was formerly confined to our southern states, but which has of late begun to travel northward during these times of shifting majorities and of party bitterness, owing to the facility with which it enables each newly victorious party to obliterate the traces of its fallen rival, We admired the course of a distinguished lawyer of New York, when held up for the state senate a year and a half ago. He was called upon to pledge himself to vote, if elected, in favor of the system pursued by the public school society, and against that which the Catholics desired. He replied that his present opinion accorded with the proposed pledge, but that as he would be, if chosen, a member of a deliberative body, where he might hear reasons that would alter his persuasion, he could

take no pledge whatever. He was we believe dropped for this answer; being too good now to serve a party that heard him nominated with applause.

Gentlemen who hold to the duty of obeying instructions, often resign rather than perform it. But upon their principles such conduct is very strange and inconsistent. Why should they resign? Ought they to avoid doing what they own to be right, because it is unpleasant? Can there be any thing dishonorable in doing one's duty, in acting on principles which one has received long since, and perhaps used much to the annoyance of an antagonist? Such a representative too, should bethink himself of the wide range of the services he may render to his constituents: he has a larger sphere to act in, than a man has who feels that he must look at the public good in his vote. He can represent all parties and all combinations of opinion as they happen to be uppermost. He can be the "jack on both sides," and stay with the strongest until its game is out; and all this in obedi ence to a principle that binds his conscience. Happy man, in whom the love of office and duty thus har moniously unite, and permit him, in the course of "one revolving moon" perhaps, to say aye and no upon any proposition whatsoever. But we fear that those who resign rather than obey, have an obscure feeling that they thus avoid a degrading situa tion, or entertain a suspicion that they can not obey without losing the respect of upright men. They now begin to be sensible that a man of far-reaching views and long experience is not wanted where any one who can vote would do just as well; and that a man of great talent is meanly employed in doing that to which a man of no talent is equal. If so, we respect them for their honorable feeling, and we receive with thankfulness the light their conduct throws on the subject before us; but

we also maintain that they are most inconsistent and most unjustifiable in declining to do an admitted duty. The tendency of the doctrine of instruction must now appear to be, even in its most qualified forms, that of degrading a legislative assembly. It is not easy to see why men of ability should wish to sit in a body upon which eloquence and argument are wasted; where they can not expect to persuade and ought not themselves to be persuaded. Upright men, again, will not be returned, if they hold the principle for which we have been contending. There remain then only the second rate politicians, with a part of the weaker sort of honest men, to compose a house, the proceedings of which may affect the civil interests of millions and the relations of a country to the world beside. And is this the place from which intelligence or uprightness ought to be driven? Such a body would not probably long have the power to do great good or evil. There is an inconsistency between its capacity and the constitutional powers left to it, which would make itself felt. Or penalties might reasonably come in to prevent disobedience to instructions; for surely the judge is no more justly impeached and punished for a breach of his main duty, to decide according to law, than the representative would be for violating his chief obligation to express by his vote the popular will for the present time. with this, clear specific instructions must be written out to guide the whole course of the representative. He certainly would have a right to demand them, lest he might be punished for mistakes as if they were misdemeanors. Freighted with documents which revealed to him his duty, his great aim would be to make himself master of their contents; and if doubts or new cases arose, the constituents must again be consulted and relieve him from his embarrassment. If he venture to sug

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gest views which they oppose, or argue with them in his communications, they will suspect him of a disobedient spirit, and perhaps remove him to put a more pliant man in his place. Thus the few honest men that might remain in such an assembly would leave it, and be succeeded by those who would not dare to rebuke or give advice, who would sit quiet spectators of the mistakes of their employers, anxious only to avoid their wrath. It would be idle to speculate upon the ultimate effect on political institutions, when this principle had had its perfect work: the probability is that a new wheel would be added to the machine, rendering it only more complex; that a body constituting itself the people's representatives, would meet in caucus to decide what measures the people should approve and what condemn; and that thus, in the place of one body gathered in the center with the ability to compare and adjust the interests of the whole nation, would arise in every quarter knots of local politicians, who, if honest, could not have looked beyond the bounds of their own horizons.

And how widely do the two theories separate from one another, when viewed with reference to a whole country. To the man who feels bound to pursue the public good, it is no matter who elects him; he feels that his duties have a permanent form. It is the same to him, whether he is chosen by a district or by a general ticket, or whether the whole union should choose all its representatives in a body. In all cases, he regards himself as the representative of the whole nation; appointed indeed to take care of the interests of a certain section, but still bound-as the section itself is bound-to make those interests yield to more important ones, when they are inconsistent. He perceives that in his person and that of his fellow representatives, the country virtually meets together;

that there is no other place where the interests of all can be compared and adjusted; and that to make so sacred a body, created to promote the common good, powerless it may be in that respect, and only powerful to carry out the selfish plans of a petty district, is to poison legislation at its source. This being his temper, his ear is not closed to any suggestions that may come from any quarter, east, west, or south; and as his pledge is not given to oppose the best measures, he can view every proposition with candor and accept of it freely. The people too, feeling that this is the aim of legislation, will select men who can best secure the public weal, men who have looked abroad over the whole of the country, who understand every interest, and most clearly those of their constituents. They will be confident that such men will not deceive them, nor basely sacrifice their substantial welfare. And they will soon find out that the good of all the parts is so linked together, that their representative, who seeks that good and secures it, will secure their own.

But upon the other theory, unless the interests of all the districts shall be seen obviously to coincide, there can be no broad or generous legislation. Until the selfish interests of the parts, by some magical system of balances, shall turn into the good of the whole; until then will a country under such lawgivers, fail of prosperity and true progress. A kind of feudal principle will prevail over the principles of free republics, to keep the parts in a state of isolation, and split that into fragments whose excellence consists in being undivided. The nearest approach to an enlarged system possible under such a theory, is that of log-rolling, as it is significantly called; which has tended to burden some of the United States with useless public works, ruinous expenses, and disgrace; or the still worse

system of parties as at present carried out in practice; under which the majority who choose the representative, are his only constituents; the party arrange the measures for the state or country; the members of the party in the district are dragged into those measures by force; and the representative himself is like the men in some armies, who are chained together to fight for their masters.

Nor is it of any use to say, that by the doctrine of instruction you obtain representatives who will not be faithless to the interests of their constituents. For whether they are pledged or not, the fact still continues the same, that they can vote on which side they please, and under the influence of any kind of motives. The impulse to follow the wishes of one's constituents, is surely stronger in ordinary cases than any other; and many a man, who has discarded the doctrines of obedience to them, has obeyed them in practice even against the convictions of his own judgment. The possibility now remains on the one hand, that men professing to have the highest interests of the whole country in view, will act from base motives, when they disregard the interests of their constituents; and on the other, that men who promise to mind their constituents in all things, will desert their cause for the sake of filthy lucre or of office. If what we have said above is true respecting the kind of representa tives which the two theories in question would bring into legislative as semblies, there can not be much doubt on which side the greater evil would lie.

The principle which we have been advocating, but not the opposite one, can be reconciled with the provis ions of the Constitution. This instrument does not indeed, in express words, set forth the relation which it regards the representative as hold. ing. Our argument from it can only

reach the point of showing, that the practice of obedience to constituents tends to results certainly not looked for by the constitution, and is opposed to its spirit, so far as can be argued from the analogies of other provisions. We will give the considerations which have occurred to us, without much regard to order. It is expressly provided, that the members of neither house shall be questioned in any other place for any speech or debate. (Art. I, sect. 6.) But if so plain a thing as obedience to the express will of constituents is a duty, resulting from the only true theory of government, the opposite is a crime and ought to be punished as such by statutes, and not, as now, simply by the loss of public favor. Such a course tends too, to change the term of office allowed under the constitu tion. And this it does the more effectually, because the same reason which requires obedience from the representative during his office, will more imperatively call on him to lay down his office if the people of his district should so wish. And And hence, every oscillation of the majority, every change of a few voices, which in these days, like the clouds, are banked up and scattered by alternate blasts of wind, must require a resignation and a new election. The constitution again allows the two houses to place themselves in a situation where they can neither consult or guess at the will of the people, by permitting secret ses sions and the suppression of such parts of their journals, as in their judgments may require secrecy. (Art. I, sect. 5.) Why should it increase or even make insurmountable, the difficulty of finding out that, upon which the duties of legislators depend? It gives Congress also the power to "provide for the general welfare of the United States," (Art. I, 8,) within certain limits, which it attempts distinctly to mark out. May it not be fairly Vol. I.

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argued, that they who receive such a power become obligated to use it; that, as it requires the highest judg ment and oftentimes a disregard of local interests, they are bound to act accordingly? And which is most consistent with the spirit of an instrument which was framed for union and for the general welfare, to keep that welfare in view as the most important thing in every vote, or to keep it in view only when the selfish wishes of the parts do not oppose? Our position again receives some support, from the discretionary and advisory power of the President. This officer being chosen by a majority of the people, is bound according to the princi ples of the doctrine of instruction, so far as his relations to legislation are concerned,* equally with the representatives, to obey the voice of the people in every measure. But when he is required "to recom. mend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," it is no doubt presumed, that he will afterwards also judge concerning the necessity and expediency of measures, when they are presented to him for his sanction; that is, that he will accept or reject them, as he shall think the public good demands. (Art. I, sect. 7.) And so much weight is given to his objections, that he has the questionable power of impeding legislation by his veto; nay, in most cases, of preventing it altogether.

We believe that this principle is distinctly recognized in the constitutions of some of the states, but we have no leisure to enquire whether this is really the case. It is rather amusing, that when one party in one of the houses of the legislature

of Georgia was lately endeavoring to instruct one of the state senators in Congress out of his seat, and the minority seceded so as to prevent a quorum, the seceding members were charged with a breach of their oath, which required them on all questions and measures, so to give their vote and conduct themselves, as should in their judgment appear most conducive to the interest and prosperity of the state. A very

proper oath, and one which originated in a clear perception of the principles which ought to govern the representative. But if the oath was founded in reason and was taken merely to confirm a previous duty, was not their senator also in a very similar relation, and had he not like duties? Nay, does not every consideration subordinate to the main one of the principle, which is the same in both cases, press with far greater weight on the senator in Congress, than on the representative in the state legislature? And yet-such is the effect of politicians giving in to false principles-these very men, who call a representative at home perjured for not voting as his judgment dictates, call the representative in the senate of the United States all but a knave, for doing just the contrary.

We will add but one thought more, and that is, that the doctrine of instruction tends to prevent one of the chief good results of the representative system. The main uses of this system which now occur to us, are the following: 1. It tends to equalize the parts of a country, and to enlarge the borders of freedom. When the assembly was composed of all the citizens, those on the outskirts could not attend to their civil duties with the same regularity as the inhabitants of the center. Hence, a central power would arise, into whose hands the management of the state would fall, while the borderers would suffer a loss of their civil rights. But the

system of representation renders perfect equality possible, over an unlimited extent of country. It is also, almost essential to free insti tutions, when they are brought into contact with despotism. For as long as free states could not grow beyond the limits of vicinity to some capital, while despotism could enclose any bounds whatsoever, the contest between the two principles was unequal. 2. It tends to check the occasional excesses of freedom, and to promote that control of rea son in government, without which government becomes an evil. A volume of illustrations of this remark, might be drawn from the history of unrepresented democra cies. But it is presumed that they will not be needed by those who know by what means great crowds are often swayed, and with what speed feeling passes from man to man, increasing as it goes, until it may rise to phrenzy. Of this, Athens, the freest among the ancient states, was well aware; the citizens of that fierce democratie,' in order to check themselves, prevented the passage of laws, properly so called, in the ordinary assemblies of the people; and required that every bill should have been previously subjected to the debates of the senate.

Now it is this last object of a representative government, which the doctrine of instruction defeats. It creeps into the legislature, carry. ing there every prejudice which should have died in its native soil, every partial view which the reason of the whole community, if it could have been collected together, would have discarded. The fortress which reason the reason of a people— built for itself, is seized upon by discordant passions. Every agita tion of the mass is perpetuated, and they who were withdrawn from home that they might deliberate in quiet, are put into a great whispering gallery, where the multitude of