ery.

Under such an arrangement, the following advantages would be realized. First, instead of news papers being put into the mails wet from the press, they would be dried at the printing-office, and the mails would no longer groan with a superfluous weight of water. Next, newspapers, designed for circulation by mail, would be printed on a smaller and lighter sheet than at present; and thus the weight to be transported would be farther diminished. Then, again, the privilege of diminished postage being confined to those copies of the work which come regularly in bundles from the publishing office, the mails would be rid of all those papers and pamphlets sent by individuals, which are generally substituted for letters, cheaper indeed to the receiver than letters, under the present system, but more expensive to the department, in the cost of transportation. And, finally, the postoffices would be no longer filled with newspapers and pamphlets, which the persons to whom they are directed, refuse to receive, and which are therefore a dead loss to the department. These considerations make it probable that men practically familiar with the business, would easily arrange a system, by which periodicals might be conveyed in the mails at no greater cost on the whole, to the purchaser, than now. If this is so, the interest of even the great newspaper publishers, against reform, is for the most part immediate and apparent, rather than ultimate and real.

We commend this great public

interest to the attention of our coun trymen, of every party, of every employment, in every part of the Union. We commend it especially to the consideration of those whom it immediately concerns-such as all sorts of business men in the commercial cities-manufacturers every where-banking and insurance companies-literary and scientific men, whose postage taxes are the more onerous to them, inasmuch as their correspondence, bringing them no pecuniary returns, is less for their own benefit than for that of learning and science, and thus of their country and of mankind at large-teachers and students in colleges and professional schools

directors and executive agents of benevolent societies-ministers of the Gospel, who are burthened, more perhaps than any other class of men, with the payment of postage out of a small income, for that which concerns other people as much as them. We ask that this necessary reform may be discussed. Let others who think with us, do as we have done, commending the matter, as they have opportunity, to the attention of the public. And, on the other hand, if the scheme is essentially chimerical-if there is some necessity in the nature of things for taxing the correspondence of the whole country, in order to aid a few metropolitan newspapers, and to enlarge the compensation of members of Congress and of other government functionaries, let some man who understands the principles and the details of the subject, make that necessity appear.

We have here a pamphlet containing three discourses on Capital Punishment, delivered by the author during the session of the Legislature of Connecticut at New Haven in May, 1842. A bill for the abolition of capital punishment had passed the lower branch of the Legislature in 1841; and it was feared by many of the friends of good government, that the measure would now be carried through both houses, it having received for the first time, the recommendation of the Governor. At this critical juncture, Mr. Thompson, who had previously delivered a single discourse on the subject to his own people, was prevailed upon by the solicitations of several of his fellow citizens to bring the subject in three successive evenings before the whole community. Many gentlemen of the Legislature were present, and it would be an aspersion on their understandings to suppose, that the views of such as had previously leaned to the abolition of capital punishment, were not materially modified. The result was, that the vote in the House of Representatives, stood about two to one in favor of the existing laws, in opposition to the views of his Excellency.

We do not however consider the question as put to rest. There is a class of men intent on this change from motives of misguided philanthropy, who of course are not easily to be diverted from their purpose; and there is another class still more numerous and determined, men of dissolute habits and violent passions, and far more hostile to punishments than crimes. What prospect have

*The Right and Necessity of inflicting the Punishment of Death for Murder. By JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, pastor of the Chapel Street Congregational Church,

New Haven, Conn.

we that such men will ever desist from their attempts to break down the power of the State to restrain their licentiousness?

In the first of these classes are comprehended those insane men, who have method enough in their madness, to carry out their principles consistently to their legitimate results. They accordingly denounce all punishments as unauthorized and barbarous. They do not punish their children for filial disobedience; nor allow their schoolmasters to use the rod. They believe in no other divine punishments than such as conscience and the laws of nature inflict on the disobedient. Hence, it is in perfect keeping with their whole system, to regard the laws of the State as unwarrantable restrictions on human liberty. The abolition of capital punishment is a dear object to them, for they have the sagacity to perceive, what some of their coadjutors overlook, that if they can succeed in convincing the people that this mode of punishment is unlawful, in other words, that human life is inviolable, the total subversion of civil government must follow as a consequenee.

Were we to go into a philosophic inquiry into the causes of this hostility to capital punishment, we should have to refer to all these classes of men. But as persons of their views and character have never been wanting, we must look deeper for the exciting causes, into the spirit of the age, which has brought persons of such opposite principles into this strange alliance. This peculiar spirit of the age is change; let us say, reform. In obedience to this spirit, the most surprising improvements have been made in the penal codes of many countries, particularly in Europe. Numerous barbarous punishments have been wholly abolish

ed; and others which were once inflicted for many trivial offenses are now confined to the higher class of crimes. This mitigation of the penalties for crime, it is acknowledged on all hands, has been attended by a corresponding diminution of offenses, and by a far more intelligent respect in the public mind for the laws of the land. It is not wonderful that such facts should bring under discussion the policy of every institution and regulation of human society. Time-honored abuses and wrongs are fated in this age to be summoned into the light of day; and with them must come forth for examination the fundamental principles of all good order and social happiness. With eager inquisitiveness every thing is questioned-every thing is made to answer why it was made and what it is. So prominent a feature of the penal code as capital punishment, it was not to be expected, would escape this general inquisition. There are too many who would gladly slip their necks from danger, and too many who are earnest for every possible alleviation of human suffering, to leave this penalty any chance of slumbering among usages of unquestionable propriety.

This country has reason to thank Mr. Thompson for the promptness and ability with which he met and answered this question at a time of peril. Wherever his discourses may be read, we have little apprehension

The extent of the recent changes in mitigation of the criminal laws of England and Wales, is strikingly exhibited by the fact that had the offenses tried in 1841, been tried under the laws of 1831, instead

of eighty capital sentences, the number would have amounted to two thousand one hundred and seventy two. By an act passed in the first session of Parliament in 1841, but which did not take ef

fect until after the conclusion of the assi

zes, at which the above eighty sentences were passed, capital punishment was abol ished for rape and felonious riots, which, it is calculated, will have the effect of reducing the number of capital sentences annually to between forty and fifty.

that men of virtuous principles will continue to advocate the abolition of capital punishment. The subject, however, needs a more extended and thorough discussion than it can properly receive from the pulpit. And we are therefore happy in be ing able to promise in a future number such a discussion, from the pen of a distinguished member of the legal profession. In that article the question of a gradation of punishments, and all that bears on the policy of capital punishment, are to be considered. In the mean time, we take this opportunity to make a few observations on the moral and religious aspects of the subject.

The position is boldly taken by many persons, that no man or body of men has a moral right to deprive a human being of life. This denial is made on various grounds.

Some maintain that the right to life is a reserved right, a right which we did not surrender to society when the civil compact was formed. Thus, Mr. Rantoul, in a report to the Legislature of Massachusetts, January, 1837, says: "When we surrendered to society the smallest possible portion of our liberty, to enable us the better to retain the aggregate of rights which we did not surrender, did we concede our title to that life with which our Creator has endowed us? In no instance can this preposterous sacrifice be implied. The right of life remains among those reserved rights which we have not yielded up to society." This argument rests on the figment of a social compact, as the basis of society-a notion which it surprises us to see gravely advanced in a report to the legislature of the most cultivated State in the Union. But it is more surprising that it should not be seen at a glance, that a social compact necessarily implies a surrender to society of all the rights and powers which are indispensable to its own preservation, among which the right of

What

taking life is undeniable. power can there be in a State to restrain and coerce turbulent citizens, or to punish in any manner those who are guilty of an infraction of the laws, if the lives of such are sacred and inviolable? A State without an army, without an armed police, what can it do? It is powerless. Every band of ruffians, every individual ruffian, is too strong for such a government. We presume Mr. Rantoul did not enter either expressly or tacitly into a compact with such a society, 'to enable him the better to retain his rights. If it is necessary to the very existence of society with power to protect individuals, that society should have the right to destroy life in certain contingencies, then in forming society, the individual must be supposed to yield up to society so far forth a right to his life. He cannot otherwise the better retain the aggregate of rights for which he surrendered to society the smallest possible portion of his liberty.' No society can exist, much less protect its members, on the basis of a compact which reserves to every individual the right of life in all contingencies. The right of life, therefore, is not reserved.

Others deny the lawfulness of capital punishment, because an unjust infliction admits of no remedy. This argument is founded on an essential imperfection of civil government. Human tribunals are not infallible. The corruption of witnesses and jurors, and even their mistakes, may lead to the conviction of the innocent. But this is equally true, whatever penalty may be affixed to the crime. It would be impossible adequately to repair the injury, if a person falsely convicted of a crime, should be immured in a prison for the greater part of his life, before the error should be discovered, especially if it should never be discovered. And as there is liability to error in every

case of conviction, and nearly an equal probability that an error once committed will never be detected, this argument goes to the abolition of all penalties, or to the annihilation of civil government-an absurdity which broadly exposes the falsity of the premise on which it rests. It is also worthy of notice, that the very severity of the punishment of death affords the best safeguard against the conviction of the innocent, since it leads to a most rigid scrutiny of the evidence, secures to the accused the full advantage of every doubt, and lays the strongest hold on the conscience and sympathy of the court and wit

nesses.

Others rest their denial of the moral right of capital punishment on the fact, that it cuts the criminal off from any farther opportunity of repentance. They deny the right of man to abridge the life of a fellow creature, and force him, perhaps unprepared, into the presence of his Judge. They seem to overlook the reflection which their argument casts on the providence of God, who daily summons multitudes into eternity, with as little warning and preparation as fall to the lot of the subjects of capital punishment. Whoever supposes the cases are different, because sudden death, in the ordinary course of nature, is to be regarded as an act of God, who has a right to take the life which He gives, forgets that capital punishment is, in our view, a divine institution. He begs the question, by assuming that it is destitute of divine authority. Whatever society is obliged to do in order to accomplish the ends of society, it may rightfully do; and in all such acts of society, God himself, in an important sense, acts; that which is done, is done by His authority and appointment. It should also be recollected, that capital punishment is supposed to preserve more lives than it destroys. The execution of

a few murderers preserves the lives of thousands, who would otherwise be murdered. The question for the legislator to decide is, whether, in view of the retributions of the future world, he ought to leave the community in such a defenseless state, that multitudes of people will be suddenly hurried into eternity, by the hand of violence; or, on the other hand, prevent most of these sudden deaths, by the capital punishment of the murderer. And he should reflect, too, that death by the hand of the executioner, is, in this country, less sudden than most other deaths. It has no claim to be called a sudden death. When the murderer is arrested and bound over for trial, he has his first warning to prepare for eternity; when he is convicted and sentenced to be executed, he receives another, which points him forward to a definite period when he must die, affording him ample opportunity, in the interval, for every religious duty. It is hence far from evident that imprisonment, which is proposed as a substitute for death, is more favorable than capital punishment, to the spiritual interests of the criminal. The contrary seems to be the fact, judging both from observation and from the nature of

man.

Who that knows his own heart, can doubt that, if he were condemned to death for the crime of murder, he would address himself to a preparation for another world, with more serious earnestness, than under a sentence of mere imprisonment?

Another objection of a moral and religious nature, against capital punishment, is founded on the duty of forgiving injuries. The precepts which inculcate this duty, are said to be binding on society as well as on individuals. Society must not, it is contended, return evil for evil. But it is obvious that if this class of precepts forbid capital punishment, they forbid also every other kind of

punishment. The nature of revenge does not lie in the amount of evil inflicted. We may revenge ourselves, contrary to the precepts of Christianity, by a light biow with the hand, by a significant shake of the finger, by a sneer. To suppose, therefore, that these precepts are addressed to the State as well as to the individual citizen, is laying the axe at the root of civil government. It is even a plain denial of the right of God to govern His creatures, by the infliction of evil for evil; for if society cannot punish a wrong doer without malice, neither can God. But there is manifestly no incompatibility between the infliction of civil penalties and a spirit of kindness, of good will, of lively compassion toward the criminal, on the part of the makers and administrators of the law. Benevolence is not a blind impulse, but an intelligent regard for happiness. It impels us to inflict evil for a greater good, not otherwise attainable; it steadies the hand of the surgeon; it gives firmness, in a just war, to the voice of command which may extinguish the lives of thousands; it presides in the discipline of the family; it is "a terror to evil doers" in the State; it shines most luminously in the retributions of eternity. Benevolence looks to the good of all, to the greatest good, and perceiving that the peace and security of the community at large will be sacrificed to the violence of a murderer, unless he is cut off, it calls for his blood. And if it should be inquired, what then is the meaning and appli cation of the precepts against rendering evil for evil, the answer is, they are not meant to apply to the cognizance which society takes of crimes, nor to seeking redress for injuries before tribunals of justice; but are directed solely against the intolerable evil of that state of society in which each individual presumes to be judge, jury and executioner, in all cases to which he is a party; and they also