things so different. He says expressly, "there is another right, a right above all human law, a right of resistance to law, a right of rev founded with the right at first considered. That was a legal right—a right of the majority to change their government in their own way and at their own time." We thus have before us, the doctrine of the legal right of revolution and in the language of an able advocate. The corresponding legal obligation of obedience, follows of course, and we find the same writer drawing the conclusion with perfect consistency, from the principles which he had laid down, that "if a majority of the people of Rhode Island ratified the people's constitution,' it is the true and real organic law of the state." We might here refer to the letter of Governor Hubbard, where the same doctrine is maintained, but it is unnecessary, the more especially as the doctrine seems to have been borrowed from the writer already quoted, while the distinctions upon which the whole argument depends, have been entirely disregarded. legal right thus broad in its operations, and to be exercised in defiance of law, will appear strange to our readers, and they may doubt the obvious meaning of this pas-olution." "It must never be consage. But the writer fairly embraces the entire consequences of this principle; for he answers the objection, "where will all this lead? may you at any time take a census of all this body of persons," that is, of the people," and if you can procure the consent of a majority of them to any scheme, does such scheme, ipso facto, become the law of the land?" he answers this objection, of its leading to extremes, by admitting it. "For," he says, "if the people should choose to act in an irregular manner, it cannot be helped." And that is the logical answer; but why call it "an irregular manner?" Can the fact of a majority's favoring any measure, be ascertained in a more certain, and therefore in a more regular manner than by a census? Is the writer startled at his own conclusions? It is just to subjoin his second reply, which is, "that the people of this country never will act in that manner as long as they are fit for freedom." But we would like to ask, in case any people should degenerate and become unfit for freedom, and as a consequence should act in this "irregular manner," whether there would be a legal obligation of obedience? We suppose in his opinion there would be, since "there is," as he says, "no help for it." We are not now upon the argument, but we think there must be a strong presumption against a legal right which binds us to acquiesce peaceably in "any scheme," which may be formed by a people "unfit for freedom." It may occur to some that this writer must after all mean the right of revolution by force. It is true some other advocates on the same side have made no discrimination, but the present writer is by far too good a reasoner to confound We will now give a statement of the proceedings which these principles are brought forward to justify. We shall not go into a minute detail; it will be sufficient to mention only those circumstances, which bring clearly before us the points in issue. A large number of the inhabitants of Rhode Island meet in a mass assembly at Providence and determine upon calling a convention to form a constitution for the state. This was on the fifth of July, 1841. Delegates are elected; the convention convenes and frames a constitution, and in December the constitution is ratified by the unanimous voice of those who voted upon its adoption. An election of officers and of a legislature, took place on the eighteenth of April, 1842, and on the third of May, at Providence, a government was organized in the state of Rhode Island. This organization was supported by a body of about five hundred troops-the friends of these movements having previously commenced a military enrollment and made preparations to maintain, if necessary, the new constitution by force. On the other hand, the existing government opposed these measures at every step. It denied the validity of the constitution, by resolving at the January session in 1842, "that all the acts done for the purpose of imposing upon this state a constitution are an assumption of the powers of government, in violation of the rights of the existing government and of the rights of the people at large;" and, at an extra session in March, enacted a law declaring all meetings for the election of town, county or state officers, illegal and void, and making it penal to preside at such meeting, or to have any official connection with them, or to signify a willingness to accept of any office by virtue of such election, while the actual acceptance and exercise of any such office is pronounced to be treason against the state. After the elections were held, it made several arrests under this law, and at length resisted with the whole military power of the state, the attempt to maintain by force the new organization of government. Such are the facts. The only point now in dispute is, was this constitution legally made and rati fied. If it was, then it is to be admitted that all the subsequent proceedings were legal; that the elections were neither illegal nor void; that those who accepted of the offices to which they were elected, instead of being guilty of treason, were only exercising their constitutional rights, and the military movements were not rebellious, but in support of a just government. Then, too, it follows, that the government which continued to exercise power was a usurpation, and that the whole military force of the state was in open rebellion against a legitimate government. On the other hand, if the constitution was not legally made and ratified, then it follows-but we will not say at present what does follow. We turn now to the argument. Had that portion of the people who made and ratified this constitution a "legal right" to do it? It seems to us that the very statement of the proposition, that there is a legal right of forming a constitution indepen dent of the existing government and law, is enough to refute it. The idea of law is one that can be mistaken for no other. It is clear and distinct by itself. The same may be said of the idea of government. Every body knows what law is, and what government is. These ideas therefore may be taken, since they are universally known and acknowledged, as the groundwork of our reasoning. Now we say no man can reflect distinctly upon what law and government are, without seeing that law must proceed from government. A legal right, then, is a right with which law is at least in some way connected. It may not be that law has conferred it, it may only control its exercise; at any rate, and this is enough for the argument, it holds some relation to law, and law proceeds from government. A legal right to form a constitution for a state, therefore, must be a right connected in some way with the law of the government of that state. But the making and ratification of this constitution was without law, and they who were engaged in those proceedings did in those acts renounce the legal authority of the state. We do not say they had no right-they may have had the right of revolution-but let the measure be properly named, let not an act which discards law, support itself by the authority of law. It may be a right, but not a legal right. For that exists under law and govern. ment. But the very parties in these proceedings would insist, that the chartered government and laws had nothing to do with their constitution. To talk of a legal right under these circumstances, is to talk inconsistently; a legal right founded on no law, a right with law and at the same time without law, seems to us a downright absurdity. The truth is, there are but two ways in which the people can exercise the natural and inalienable right of abolishing and changing government; one, with the government peacefully, and the other, against government by force. And those inhabitants of Rhode Isl. and, who have chosen the latter course, cannot now alter the nature of the transaction by applying to it the language of law and peace. Again, a legal right can be enforced in a court of justice; and it has been suggested that the validity of this legal right of revolution, be tried in the Supreme Court of the United States. Here there would be a law-suit between two governments claiming to exercise authority over the same state. For, it is not a suit between two sets of officers, claiming under the same government, but between the whole people of Rhode Island, living under the one government, and the whole people of Rhode Island, living under the other government. We are not versed in the forms of law, but we doubt a little, whether the same man can sue himself, or be both plaintiff and defendant in the same suit. But passing by this, let the case come on; the new government claims to have been established by the authority of a legal right, by law. But by what law? By the law of the existing government? No. By the law of the new? No; that did not exist so as to make a law for its own creation. What law then? None. View this position as we will, it involves an absurdity. Nor is it mere cavil at words. The proposition that there is a legal right Vol. I. 12 to change a government, which is not the right of revolution by force, nor the right retained under govern. ment, and exercised with its coöperation, cannot be stated in any language, which will not express an absurdity, for the ideas themselves are incompatible with one another. It may be thought we have given too strict an interpretation to the term "legal right." We confess we have seen no definition of that sort of legal right, which is independent of law and government. But we have given to the words, the only meaning they can have and express the ideas always designated by them. And moreover we have ta ken them in the only sense, which is relevant to the point to be proved. For, leaving out of view the peaceful change of government through its own coöperation, and also the violent change against the resistance of the government, what is left but this inconsistency, the legal right of forcible revolution? If it be said the meaning is this, it is a universally admitted truth or principle among us, a kind of common law, that it is the right of the people to form a constitution against an existing government, then we ask, what is the nature of this right? Is it the right of revolution against government by force, or with government by law? If it is either of these, it is not the right brought forward by those whose opinions we are refuting. If it is not either of these, what is it but this third kind of a right which is called a "legal right.' So that the above statement comes exactly to the same thing and has no advantage over the other form of expression, except it is less open and fair. The fault is not in the words, but in the ideas. The writers on that side, undertook too hard a task when they tried to make out civil war to be a legal remedy. We think the inconsistency, inherent in any statement of these principles, enough to overthrow them. But yet we will examine the arguments in their support. We will repeat the position to be proved, that there is a legal right of revolution, against the existing government, which is distinct from the right of revolution by force. Every American citizen glories in the latter, though he knows the exercise of it is attended with solemn consequences, since it lays the opposing party under no obligation peaceably to yield to it. But that there is a right of revolution against gov. ernment, which brings an obligation upon the opposing party to submit to it-an obligation too, of a legal nature, the violation of which may be treason itself this is the issue. Is there a legal obligation binding upon our citizens to acquiesce in any scheme to which a single individual, or a body of individ. uals united in a party, without authority of law and government, might, by canvassing the state, procure the consent of a majority of the people? and does such a scheme become law, so as to make resist ance to it rebellion? or would the charge of rebellion be upon those who get up the scheme against government? In the case a majority of the people of Connecticut should in this way abolish the town boundaries, and change the present ratio of representatives, would that act of the majority impose a legal obligation upon the rest of the state to yield to it? and would resistance on their part be rebellion? Such is the doctrine, for the support of which is alledged the authority of the declaration of independence, and of the declaration of rights in the constitutions of the several states. The declaration of independence lays down the follow ing doctrines: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of [Jan. happiness. That to secure these made the resistance of England, a position? That man-not a body What is the first of men, but man individually-has from God the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that this right, this right derived taken from him. Then, the relafrom nature's God, cannot be justly stated and asserted to be that of tion of government to this right is security. This brings on the conclusion, that when government bethe right of the people to alter or comes destructive of this end, it is abolish it; that is, the people may, in the exercise of right-and of ject of discourse?-alter or abolish what right but that which is the subit. Is it not certain that the right here spoken of, is the above men b tioned right, not derived from government, not derived from society, existing independent of law and government, independent of society-a right which man has received from God, and for the exercise of which he is responsible to God alone? How then can the declaration of independence be any authority for another and distinct right, the legal right of a majority to change constitutions at will? It is assumed here, we are aware, first, that this right of THE PEOPLE belongs to the people as an organized body; and, secondly, that this organized body is a permanent one, acting by a majority; whence it is inferred, since the right itself is indefeasible, the people as an organized body, always have it in reserve to exercise at pleasure. We say both of these positions are mere assumptions, without any proof. In regard to the first, we know with absolute assurance that each individual possesses these inalienable rights, but what is the process of reasoning the intermediate truths, by which we arrive at the conclusion that the organic whole has the same? An organic whole has a will distinct from that of each individual composing it, and the exercise of an indefeasible right by a majority, is incompatible with the exercise of the same by the individuals of a minority. Indeed how could an individual alienate to the body as an organic whole, an inalienable right? Besides, we can give a more consistent meaning to the phrase. The right is inherent in the individual. But the efforts of individuals against an oppressive government, would be in vain, without coöperation. They must exercise their rights in concert, to be successful. They agree to do it. This compact, which is itself a sort of government, may lay each individual who is a party to it, under certain obligations to the organized whole; but the right thus accruing to that body is not inalienable; they are rights of agreement, governmental rights. We think it evident the expression, the right of the PEOPLE, has reference to this circumstance, and merely indicates that the individuals of any community are united in exercising their natural rights. There is an equal want of evidence to establish the second position, that this organized body is a permanent one. We may suppose three cases. The first is, that all the individuals of any community are united in overthrowing a government. They are then constituted as an organized body, but by their own consent, and for a specific purpose. But the organization ceases by its own limitation, when the object is gained for which it existed. The next thing after overthrowing a government, is to form a new one, and this of course requires consent and union in the exercise of natural rights. The second suppo sition, therefore, may be, that the larger portion of the individuals of the people agree to act together for this purpose. But this united body is a new organization, made by a new agreement, and for another purpose. It may have authority over those who are united together in it; but how can it justly exercise any over those individuals who do not join in it? since each has the same natural right to resist the new as the old government, and they may combine together to do it—and that on the authority of the declaration of independence. But we may suppose, thirdly, that all the individuals who were engaged in the revolution, unite as one whole, and consent to invest the body with authority to form a government. Here then is another union of all the individuals of the community, but this too is for a specific purpose, and it must cease when the purpose is secured, and of course with it the exercise of any rightful authority by a majority as a whole, over the individ |
