clause. THE clause describing the voyage by its termini is distinct Duration in our English policies from that which defines the commencement, continuance, and end of the risk. This latter clause, upon the construction of which the nature of the contract between the parties so materially depends, is in the statutory form of policy as follows:-" Beginning the adventure upon the said goods and merchandises, from the loading thereof aboard the said ship upon the said ship, &c. at she hath moored at anchor twenty-four hours in good safety, and upon the goods and merchandises until the same be there discharged and safely landed." As there are many decisions in our books on the con- Effect of this struction of this clause, and as the duration of the risk varies clause. upon the different subjects of insurance, it will conduce to clearness if we consider the subject of this chapter in relation to-1. The goods; 2. The ship; and 3. The freight. Duration of the risk on goods. In considering the duration of the risk on goods, we begin with the commencement of such risk. The policy runs,-" Beginning the adventure upon the said goods and ment of risk. merchandises, from the loading thereof aboard the said ship." Commence The common form of policy in this country, from which these words are taken, affords no protection against those dangers to which the goods are exposed in being carried in boats or lighters from the quays or wharfs of the port of loading to the ship's side. In this respect our law differs from that of almost all the Continental states, which either decree by their ordinances, or stipulate in their policies, that the risk of the underwriters on goods shall commence directly the goods leave the shore, in order to be loaded on board the ship.1 There is no bar, however, in this country against protecting goods during this transit from quay to ship by an express 1 Thus, the law of Hamburg provides that the risk on goods shall begin immediately from the time the goods leave the shore (da das Gut vom Lande schiedet), and continue till they are landed again in safety at their place of destination. (Assecuranz-ordnung, tit. v. art. 11, 13.) The insurance regulations of 1847 add:"The insurer is not responsible for loss caused by any mode of conveying goods from ship to shore, not usual at the port of discharge, unless informed that it will be resorted to." (1 Nolte's Benecke, 643.) By the Antwerp policies, "The risk on merchandise begins from the moment they are loaded in the ship, or in lighters to convey them there, and continues till landed at the port of discharge." (Vaucher, Guide, 16.) The ordinances of Amsterdam (art. 5), of Rotterdam (art. 46, 47), and of Spain (Code, art. 835, 871), go even farther, and declare that the risk on goods shall commence from the time they are brought down to the quay or wharf in order to be loaded on board. The Stockholm policies agree with these latter ordinances. (See Vaucher, Guide, 172.) The Prussian code (Tit. Versicherungen, § 2184, 2185) makes the risk commence from the loading on board of ship, or the lighters that are to convey them thither; and the French Code de Com. (art. 328, 341) contains exactly the same provision: and see 3 BoulayPaty, Droit Mar. 418-420; see also 2 Emerigon, c. xiii. s. 2, p. 48; and 2 Benecke, des Assecuranz, p. 205; 1 Nolte's ed. 641-646. By the German code the insurers undertake the risk of lighters when the use of such craft is in accordance with the custom of the port; art. 828. clause in the policy, properly framed for the purpose. Thus, in a policy on goods at and from St. Petersburg to London there was this clause: "Beginning the adventure on the said goods from and immediately following the loading thereof on board boats at St. Petersburg," and it was not disputed that under it the risk on goods commenced directly they were put on board boats at St. Petersburg to be loaded (in the usual course of trade there) on board the ship at Cronstadt.1 2 The clause in the policy runs,-"From the loading thereof From the port on board the said ship at," &c. Upon these words it has of loading. been frequently decided that a policy on goods for a voyage "at and from" a specified terminus in which the risk is expressed to begin "from the loading thereof on board the ship" in the common form, will attach only on goods loaded on board at the very place named as the terminus a quo of the voyage. It is so held although it appear from extrinsic evidence that the underwriters knew the goods had, in fact, been loaded on board prior to the ship's arrival at the place specified as the terminus a quo of the voyage, and that it was the intention of the assured by the policy to protect the goods so loaded elsewhere. Most of the cases arose during the wars of the French Revolution, when, in consequence of Napoleon's Berlin and Milan decrees, goods really 1 Hurry v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co., 2 B. & P. 430; see per Heath, J., ibid. 435. The general law of Russia is (like our own), that the underwriter on goods shall not be liable for any loss in the course of transporting the goods from shore to ship, except by virtue of a special clause in the policy. Imperial Shipping Ordinance of Russia, c. 10, s. 183; Nolte's Benecke, vol. i. p. 646. 2 Robertson v. French, 4 East, 130; Spitta v. Woodman, 2 Taunt. 416; Horneyer v. Lushington, 15 East, 46; Langhorn v. Hardy, 4 Taunt. 628; Mellish v. Andrews, 2 M. & Sel. 3 Per Bayley, J., in Gladstone v. Spitta v. Rickman v. shipped in this country were insured as if shipped at some Baltic port. Thus, to take one case as an illustration of many; a cargo insured "at and from Gottenburg to the ship's port or ports of discharge in the Baltic," with the usual clause, “beginning the adventure on the said goods from the loading thereof on board the said ship," had been loaded at London, carried to Gottenburg, and without being taken out and reloaded there, was proceeding thence when it was captured. Although the policy on which the action was brought was in continuance of another policy from London to Gottenburg, effected with the same underwriter, as he well knew, the Court felt bound by the express words of the policy to hold that as the goods had been loaded on board, not at Gottenburg, the terminus a quo of the voyage insured, but at a previous port, the policy never attached at all, and that the assured could recover nothing.' In this case the risk was on the goods "from the loading thereof on board the ship," without saying where; of course, if the risk is from their being "loaded on board the ship at " the terminus a quo or other place named, the reason for a strict construction of the policy is still more cogent.2 The rule of construction was not relaxed in the more recent case of Rickman v. Carstairs. That was an action on a policy on ship and goods for a homeward voyage “at and from the coast of Africa" to the ship's port of discharge in the United Kingdom, beginning the adventure on the goods "from the loading thereof aboard the said ship twenty-four hours after her arrival on the coast of Africa;" and it was held by Lord Denman and the Court of King's Bench, that, in the absence of anything upon the face of the instrument 1 Spitta v. Woodman, 2 Taunt. 416; S. C., 16 East, 188, note. See also Mellish v. Allnutt, 2 M. & Sel. 106, where the risk was also made to begin "from the loading on board ship," without more. 2 See accordingly Robertson v. French, 4 East, 130; Horneyer v. Lushington, 15 East, 46; Langhorn v. Hardy, 4 Taunt. 628, in all of which the risk was made to commence from the loading on board at a place named. to show the contrary, this policy did not attach on part of the outward cargo, loaded at her port of departure in this country, although still remaining on board on the coast of Africa more than twenty-four hours after her arrival there and at the time of the loss. "It appears very likely," said Lord Denman, "that the assured intended by this policy to insure both the outward and homeward cargo: unfortunately, however, they have used words which will not, we think, effectuate that intention. The question in this and other cases of the construction of written instruments is, not what was the intention of the parties, but what is the meaning of the words they have used."1 The Courts take every opportunity afforded by The application of this rule to some of these cases has lately been the subject of severe animadversion. "In the several Gottenburg cases it seems to me," says Erle, C. J.,2 "that a construction was put on the policies so as to defeat modifying 3 the parties of the strict the intention of the parties." Cockburn, C. J., in the same rule. son. Accordingly, where a policy on American produce "at and Bell v. Hobfrom Gottenburg to any ports in the Baltic, beginning the adventure on the goods from the loading thereof on board the ship," was expressed to be "in continuation of five other policies," and these were on the same cargo for a voyage 1 Rickman v. Carstairs, 5 B. & Ad. 651, 662, 663. 2 Carr & Josling v. Montefiore, 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 256. 3 Id., ibid. 57; 5 B. & S. 408, 425. 4 Bell v. Hobson, 16 East, 240, 248; S. C., 3 Camp. 273. |