cording to Ariftotle, because a thing is, it must actually exift. This is evident from the eighth book of his Metaphyfics, where he animadverts on the Megaric philofophers, as not admitting a poffible existence diftinct from the actual: from whence, faith he, it must follow, that there is nothing cold or hot or fweet or any fenfible thing at all, where there is no perception. He adds, that in confequence of that Megaric doctrine, we can have no fenfe but while we actually exert it: we are blind when we do not fee, and therefore both blind and deaf several times in a day. 313. The ἐντελέχεια πρῶται of the Peripatetics, that is, the fciences, arts, and habits, were by them diftinguited from the acts or ἐνελέχεια regas, and fuppofed to exift in the mind, though not exerted or put into act. This feems to illuftrate the manner in which Socrates, Plato, and their followers conceived innate (c) notions to be in the foul of man. It was the Platonic doctrine, that human fouls or minds descended from above, and were fowed in generation, that they were stunned, ftupified, and intoxicated by this defcent and immerfion into animal nature. And that the foul, in this overgwis, or flumber, forgets her original notions, which are fmothered and oppreffed by many falfe tenets and prejudices of fenfe. Infomuch that Proclus compares the foul, in her defcent invested with growing prejudices, to Glaucus diving to the bottom of the fea, and there contracting divers coats of fea-weed, coral, and fhells, which stick close to him and conceal his true shape. 314. Hence, according to this philofophy, the mind of man is fo reftlefs to fhake off that flumber, to difengage and emancipate herfelf from those prejudices and falfe opinions, that fo ftraitly befet and cling to her, to rub off thofe covers, that difguife her original form, and to regain her primæval ftate and firft notions: Hence, that perpetual ftruggle to recover the loft region of light, that ardent thirst and endeavour after truth and intellectual ideas, which he would neither feek to attain, nor rejoice in, nor know when attained, except fhe had fome prænotion or anticipation of them, and they had lain innate and dormant like habits and sciences in the mind, or things laid up, which are called out and roufed by recollection or reminifcence. So that learning feemeth in effect reminifcence. 315. The Peripatetics themselves diftinguish between reminifcence and mere memory. Themiftius obferves that the best memories commonly go with the worst parts; but that reminiscence is moft perfect in the moft ingenious minds. And notwithstanding the tabula rafa (d) of Aristotle, yet fome of his followers have undertaken to make him fpeak Plato's fenfe. Thus Plutarch the Peripatetic teacheth, as agreeable to his mafter's doctrine, that learning is reminifcence, and that the 1 x is in children. Simplicius alfo, in his commentary on the third book of Ariftotle wei Luxus, fpeaketh of a certain interiour reason in the foul, acting of itself, and originally full of its own proper notions, πλήρης ἀφ' ἑαυτῇ τῶν οἰκείων γνωςῶν. 316. And as the Platonic philofophy supposed intellectual notions to be originally inexiftent or innate in the foul (e), fo likewife it fuppofed fenfible qualities to exift (though not originally) in the foul, and there only. Socrates faith to Theætetus, You must not think the white colour that you fee is in any thing without your eyes, or in your eyes, (d) 308. (e) 309, 314. or 3 or in any place at all, And in the Timæus Plato teacheth, that the figure and motion of the particles of fire dividing the parts of our bodies, produce that painful fenfation we call heat. And Plotinus, in the fixth book of his fecond Ennead, obferves, that heat and other qualities are not qualities in the things themselves, but acts: that heat is not a quality, but act, in the fire: that fire is not really what we perceive in the qualities light, heat, and colour. From all which it is plain, that whatever real things they fuppofed to exift independent of the foul, thofe were neither fenfible things, nor cloathed with fenfible qualities. 317. Neither Plato nor Ariftotle by matter, Can, understood corporeal fubftance, whatever the moderns may underftand by that word. To them certainly it fignified no pofitive actual being. Ariftotle defcribes it as made up of negatives, having neither quantity, nor quality, nor effence. And not only the Platonifts and Pythagoreans, but also the Peripatetics themselves declare it to be known neither by fenfe, nor by any direct and juft reafoning, but only by fome fpurious or adulterine method, as hath been obferved before. Simon Portius, a famous Peripatetic of the fixteenth century, denies it to be any fubftance at all, for, faith he, nequit per fe fubfiftere, quia fequeretur, id quod non eft in actu effe in actu. If Jamblichus may be credited, the Egyptians fuppofed matter fo far from including ought of fubftance or effence, that, according to them, God produced it by a feparation from all fubftance, effence, or being, ἀπὸ ἐσιότητα Σπιχισθείσης υλότης. That matter is actually nothing, but potentially all things, is the doctrine of Ariftotle, Theophraftus, and all the antient Peripatetics. 318. According to thofe philofophers, matter is U only only a pura potentia, a mere poffibility. But Anaximander, fucceffor to Thales, is reprefented as having thought the fupreme Deity to be infinite matter. Nevertheless though Plutarch calleth it matter, yet it was fimply to regov, which means no more than infinite or indefinite. And although the moderns teach that fpace is real and infinitely extended; yet if we confider that it is no intellectual notion, nor yet perceived by any of our fenfes, we fhall perhaps be inclined to think with Plato in his Timæus, that this alfo is the refult of aoziopos votos, or fpurious reasoning, and a kind of waking dream. Plato obferves that we dream, as it were, when we think of place, and believe it neceffary, that whatever exifts fhould exift in fome place. Which place or space (ƒ) he also obferves is μετ ̓ ἀνασθησίας ἁπλὸν, that is to be felt as darkness is feen, or filence heard, being a mere privation. 319. If any one fhould think to infer the reality or actual being of matter from the modern tenet, that gravity is always proportionable to the quantity of matter, let him but narrowly fcan the modern demonftration of that tenet, and he will find it to be a vain circle, concluding in truth .no more than this, that gravity is proportionable to weight, that is to it felf. Since matter is conceived only as defect and mere poffibility; and fince God' is abfolute perfection and act; it follows there is the greateft diftance and oppofition imaginable between God and matter. Infomuch that a material God would be altogether inconfiftent. 320. The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the goodness that perfects all things, is the fupreme being. Evil, defect, negation, "is not the object of God's creative power, Fron (f) 250, 270. motion motion the Peripatetics trace out a first immove able mover. The Platonics make God author of all good, author of no evil, and unchangeable. According to Anaxagoras there was a confufed mafs of all things in one chaos, but mind fupervening, ev, diftinguished and divided them. Anaxagoras, it feems, afcribed the motive faculty to mind, which mind fome fubfequent philofophers have accurately difcriminated from foul and life, afcribing to it the fole faculty of intellection. ἐπελθὼν, 321. But ftill God was fuppofed the first agent, the fource and original of all things, which he produceth, not occafionally or inftrumentally, but with actual and real efficacy. Thus, the treatife De fecretiore parte divinæ fapientiæ fecundum Ægyptios, in the tenth book, faith of God, that he is not only the firft agent, but also that he it is who truly acts or creates, qui verè efficit. 322. Varro, Tully, and St. Augustin understand the foul to be vis, the power, or force, that acts moves, enlivens. Now although, in our conception, vis, or fpirit, might be diftinguished from mind, it would not thence follow, that it acts blindly or without mind, or that it is not closely connected with intellect. If Plutarch is to be trusted in his account of the opinions of philofophers, Thales held the mind of the world to be God: Democritus held the foul of the world to be an igniform deity (g): Pythagoras taught that God was the monad and the good, or r'ayαtiv: Socrates alfo and Plato pronounced him to be the Tv (b), the fingle, felf-originate one, effentially good. Each of which appellations and forms of fpeech directly tends to, and determines in mind, eis Tov vv aúde, faith Plutarch. 323. Whence that author concludes, that in the fenfe (g) 166, 168, 277. (6) 287. |