N.B.-Special arrangements will be made for the inspection of Hackney and Stage Carriages standing at a greater distance than three miles from the nearest police station of the district, on application being made to the Superintendent of the Public Carriage Office for that purpose. The inspection to take place at the police station nearest to the yard at which the carriages stand.

E. R. C. BRADFORD, Commissioner of Police of Metropolis.

METROPOLITAN POLICE OFFICE,

March, 1896.

In addition to the above statutes the following enactments will also apply in the case of the use of motor cars upon highways, and of all other carriages or vehicles.

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An Act to consolidate and amend the Law relating to Offences Against the Person (s), which by sect. 35 provides― Whosoever, having the charge of any carriage or vehicle, shall by wanton or furious driving or racing, or other wilful misconduct, or by wilful neglect, do or cause to be done any bodily harm to any person whatsoever, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the Court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour.

An Act of somewhat similar nature, in so far as it regulates the conduct of drivers of vehicles upon highways, is the

Intoxicating Liquors Act, 1872 (t),

which provides that "Every person who is drunk while in charge on any highway or other public place of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam-engine, may be apprehended, and shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding forty shillings, or in the discretion of the Court to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any term not exceeding one month. Where the Court commits any person to prison for non-payment of any penalty under this section the Court may order him to be imprisoned with hard labour."

It will have been observed that the statutes relating to highways and hackney carriages, which have been already referred to, only deal in a general manner with the regulation of traffic upon highways. But it should be remembered that boroughs have power under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (u), to make bye-laws for the purpose of regulating traffic within the limits of their authority, and for the prevention and suppression of nuisances. These or similar powers are conferred upon County Councils by the Local Government Act, 1888 (x), which further provides that such bye-laws must be submitted for approval to the Local Government Board under the provisions of the Public

(s) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 35. (t) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 12.

(u) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, s. 23. See also Traffic Regulation, Metropolis, Act, 1867. See Appendix.

(x) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, s. 16.

Health Act, 1875 (y). The County Councils apparently also have transferred to them the administrative business of county authorities (i.e., justices) as to bye-laws and regulations affecting the use of waggons, carts, and carriages, in relation to the width, or construction, or number of wheels, and the locking of, or affixing of a skid or shoe to the wheels of any such waggon, cart, or carriage under sect. 26 of the Highways and Locomotives Act, 1878 (z).

Any bye-laws or regulations made under the above statutes must be strictly within the authority under which they are made, and in addition must also be reasonable (a).

All summary proceedings by way of information or complaint under the various Hackney Carriage Acts are regulated by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, 1848 to 1884 (b). Sect. 5 of the Act of 1879 fixes the scales of imprisonment to be imposed in default of payment of the money or fine adjudged to be paid on conviction; such imprisonment is to be without hard labour.

The Excise duties payable in respect of all carriages will be found dealt with, so far as motor cars can be concerned, in the note to sect. 8 in Chapter I. (c). The Inland Revenue Acts are set out in the Appendix.

(y) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 187.

(z) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, s. 26. For transfer to County Council, see 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, ss. 3, 11.

(a) Strickland v. Hayes, (1896) 1 Q. B. 290; Johnson v. Mayor of Croydon, 16 Q. B. D. 708.

(b) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43; 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49; 47 & 48 Vict. c. 43. See also the Summary Jurisdiction Rules, 1896.

(c) See p. 31 et seq.

CHAPTER III.

NEGLIGENCE.

EXCEPT So far as the Motor Car Acts of 1896 or 1903, and the Regulations thereunder provide special rules as to the use of motor cars upon the highway, these vehicles will be subject to the ordinary rules of law applicable to all vehicles. And, except where specially mentioned, the following rules as laid down will apply generally to all vehicles. It must, however, be understood that, in the case of motor cars, locomotives, and hackney carriages, or bicycles, special regard must be paid to the special Acts or Regulations affecting those particular classes of vehicles. Except where specially mentioned, the law, as laid down in the following chapter, applies to the use of all vehicles upon highways.

Where the use of a vehicle of any class on a highway or public place is such as to be not merely a public nuisance, for which the owner or driver may be liable to penalties on conviction, but also such as to cause an injury to a private individual, such private individual has his remedy by bringing an action at law for damages (a). Remote consequential damage will not give rise to a cause of action (b). This is illustrated by a case in which the defendant's servants washed a van in a public highway, in contravention of the Metropolitan Police Act (c); the water ran by the gutter to the mouth of a sewer, where it was choked, so that the water accumulated on the road, where it froze. The plaintiff's horse slipped on the ice, and was injured. In an action to recover damages for the injury to the horse, it was held that, though the defendant was generally answerable for the natural consequences of his negligence, yet that he was not liable for the injury in question, because the proximate cause of such

(a) See Pollock's Law of Torts; Smith's Law of Negligence; Beven's Negligence in Law.

(b) Cf. Ricket v. Metropolitan Rail Co., L. R. 2 H. L. 175; 36 L. J. Q. B. 205; 16 L. T. (N. S.) 542.

(c) 2 & 3 Vict, c. 47, s. 54.

injury was not such as might have been reasonably expected to result from such negligence, and that the damage was too remote (d).

It is not feasible, in this book, to do more than give a general view of the law of negligence, of nuisance, or of bailment or carriers respectively. All these are more properly and more conveniently dealt with in the leading text books upon those subjects. There are, however, certain general rules and certain well-known cases which may be usefully referred to, though only, it may be, for the purpose of enabling the reader to ascertain the proper place in which to find the law affecting any particular question which may arise. First of all, it is well to consider shortly what constitutes negligence for which an owner of a vehicle is responsible.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do; if by such omission, or by such act, mischief is caused, though not intentionally, an action will lie at the suit of the person suffering such mischief (e).

:

Certain duties are imposed upon all persons with regard to their conduct so far as regards all other persons. Mr. Horace Smith, in his book on Negligence, says (ƒ) these duties are divided into three heads: (1) duties which arise out of rights, (2) duties which arise out of employment, (3) duties imposed by statutes. With regard to these three heads, Mr. Smith continues (1) Men are put by the law in possession of rights, and the law imposes upon all men in the exercise of any rights a duty not to interfere with the equal rights of another, apart from any agreements which they may have made between themselves. If, in the exercise of a right which a man has by law, he unintentionally breaks, or omits the duty of not interfering with the equal rights of another, which is imposed by law, and thereby injures another, he is guilty of a tort called negligence. (2) So, also, where two persons assume relations towards each other of employer and employed, involving the performance of services, there the law implies or imposes the conditions that the performance must be carefully carried out. These are, strictly speaking, contracts, and

(d) Sharp v. Powell, 7 C. P. 253; 41 L. J. C. P. 95; 26 L. T. (N. S.) 436. (e) Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Exch. 781; 25 L. J. Exch. 212, per Alderson, B.

(1) Smith on Negligence, Chap. I., p. 9.