that the question has not before been authoritatively decided in that state, and lays down this rule: That when a writing is disputed, and another is offered in proof as a standard, the court should first find, as a fact, that the latter is genuine, and then submit it to the jury in comparison with that in controversy.

The doctrine as enunciated in Com. v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481, which is the same as that so recently settled in Vermont, has since been reaffirmed in Costello v. Crowell, 133 Mass. 352, and again in Costelo v. Crowell, 139 Mass. 590.

The rule in England is now the same as in Massachusetts and Vermont. For centuries, however, it was otherwise, and the English courts denied the admissibility of such testimony altogether, until 1854, when Parliament, by 17 & 18 Vict. chap. 125, passed what is known as "The Common Law Procedure Act," which provides that "comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses; and such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise, of the writing in dispute." Under this rule, when any writing is proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the presiding judge, it shall be admitted as a standard of comparison. By the English rule, under this statute, the jury need not consider or inquire into the genuineness of the writing introduced for the purpose of comparison, as the statute obviates the necessity of any such inquiry, and makes the finding of the judge conclusive on that point. In the light of the authorities, however, there are courts of high standing and for whose decisions we have great respect, which have adopted a different rule, and which hold that the jury should ultimately pass upon the question. Such is the rule in New Hampshire, where, as it is well understood, the doctrine of proof of handwriting by comparison has always clung more tenaciously to the conservative English common law rule than ever appeared satisfactory to the courts of Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, and some of the other states.

A witness to handwriting cannot be asked on cross-examination his opinion as to a document not relevant to the issue, and not already received as a standard of comparison for the purpose of contradicting his answers. Van Wyck v. McIntosh, 14 N. Y. 439; Bank of Commonwealth v. Mudgett, 44 N. Y. 514, 523;

United States v. Chamberlain, 12 Blatchf. 390; Rose v. First Nat. Bank of Springfield, 91 Mo. 399, 60 Am. Rep. 258. Here issue being whether a check was forged, the court, over objection, permitted to be presented to the bank cashier upon cross-examination, two checks upon which were written the alleged forged name; and subsequently a witness in rebuttal testified that he had written the name at the trial. Held, reversible error, as the rule which excludes comparison with extrinsic papers and signatures, is substantially the same in direct and cross-examination. Tyler v. Todd, 36 Conn. 218, citing Bacon v. Williams, 13 Gray, 525, to the same effect. Abbott, Trial Brief, § 429.

When handwriting is to be proved by comparison, the standard used for the purpose must be the genuine and original writing, and must first be established by clear and undoubted proof. Impres

NOTE.-While the defendants were putting in their evidence upon the trial, and for the purpose of having a larger number of Mary A. Suiter's genuine signatures in evidence for comparison with the alleged forged signatures, she produced a signature which she said she had written two years before; and the defendants' counsel offered to put it in evidence. Plaintiff's counsel objected to it as incompetent, immaterial and improper, and on the further ground that it was written with a pencil. The trial judge then remarked: "I don't think the signature of a party written on a loose scrap of paper at some time or another should be put in evidence. I will sustain that objection. It would be a dangerous rule to adopt. I will sustain the objection on that particular piece of paper." The same witness then produced two of her signatures written, one fourteen and the other twelve or thirteen years before the trial, and testified that she had written them at the times mentioned; and defendants' counsel offered to put them in evidence for the purpose of comparison. Plaintiff's counsel objected to them on the same grounds as before, and the trial judge said: "I will exclude the evidence and give you an exception. I don't think this evidence is either admissible or safe." It will be observed that these three signatures were not excluded upon the ground that they were not sufficiently proved, or that the judge was not satisfied that they were not genuine. We agree with the general term that these signatures should have been received in evidence for comparison. They would have given to the expert witnesses a wider range for comparison. As it was, the only signatures they had for comparison with the alleged forged signatures were the signatures of Mary A. Suiter to her affidavit upon the answer, and the signature of Ann Suiter to her affidavit upon her answer in this action, which was written by Mary A. Suiter. So that there was in evidence for comparison only one signature of the name of Mary A. Suiter, with which the experts could compare the alleged forged signature. We think the range of comparison was altogether too nar rowly limited, and that it could not be thus arbitrarily confined. It cannot be said that the exclusion of this evidence was harmless. Mutual L. Ins. Co. of New York v. Suiter, 131 N. Y. 557.

sions of writings taken by means of a press, and duplicates made by a copying machine are not original, and cannot be used as standards of comparison. Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 189, 48 Am. Dec. 596.

The rule as to comparison of handwriting does not apply to the court or the jury, who may compare the two documents together, when they are properly in evidence, and from that comparison form a judgment upon the genuineness of the handwriting. Griffith v. Williams, 1 Cromp. & J. 47.

But the document with which the comparison is made must be one already in evidence in the case, and not produced merely for the purpose of the comparison. Thus, where upon an indictment for sending a threatening letter, in order to prove the handwriting to it, it was proposed to put in a document undoubtedly written by the prisoner, but unconnected with the charge, in order that the jury might compare the writing with that of the letter, Bolland, B., after considering Griffith v. Williams, rejected the evidence, observing, that to say that a party might select and put in evidence particular letters, bearing a certain degree of resemblance or dissimilarity to the writing in question, was a different thing from allowing a jury to form a conclusion from inspecting a document put in for another purpose, and therefore free from the suspicion of having been so selected. Morgan's Case, 1 Mood. & R. 134.

In order to prove that the prisoner was guilty of counterfeiting it is not necessary to show that he was detected in the act, but presumptive evidence, as in other cases, will be sufficient, viz: that false coin was found in his possession, and that there were coining tools discovered in his house, etc. But the evidence must be such as to lead to a plain implication of guilt. Two women were indicted for coloring a shilling and a sixpence, and the third prisoner, a man, for counseling them, etc. It appeared that he had visited them once or twice a week; that the rattling of copper money had been heard whilst he was with them; that on one occasion he was seen counting something after he came out; that he resisted being stopped, and jumped over a wall to escape; and there was found upon him a bad three shilling piece, five bad shillings and five bad sixpences. Upon a case reserved, the judge thought this evidence too slight to support a conviction. Isaac's Case, cited in 1 Russ. Crimes (Greave's ed.) 61.

§ 497. Direct Evidence Seldom Required. "It is seldom that direct evidence can be given of the fact of forgery. In the case of negotiable securities, the evidence is usually applied to the uttering rather than to the forging, although both are usually charged. Where the instrument is not of a negotiable nature, as in the case of a bond or will, after proof that the instrument has been forged by someone, a strong presumption necessarily arises against the party in whose favor the forgery is made, or who has the possession of it, and seeks to derive benefit from it. Evidence that the forged instrument is in the handwriting of the prisoner, must, if unexplained, necessarily be strong evidence of his guilt." 2 Stark. Ev. (2d ed.) 460.

$498. New York Code Provisions.-"A person is guilty of forgery in the first degree who with intent to defraud, forges,

"1. A will or codicil of real or personal property, or the attestation thereof, or a deed or other instrument, being or purporting to be the act of another, by which any right or interest in property is or purports to be transferred, conveyed, or in any way charged or affected; or,

"2. A certificate of the acknowledgment or proof of a will, codicil, deed, or other instrument, which by law may be recorded or given in evidence when duly proved or acknowledged, made or purporting to have been made by a court or officer duly authorized to make such a certificate; or,

"3. A certificate, bond, paper, writing, or other public security, issued or purporting to have been issued by or under the authority of this state, or of the United States, or of any other state or territory of the United States, or of any foreign government, country or state, or by any officer thereof in his official capacity, by which the payment of money is promised absolutely or upon any contingency, or the receipt of any money or property is acknowledged, or being or purporting to be evidence of any debt or liability, either absolute or contingent, issued or purporting to have been issued by lawful authority; or,

"4. An indorsement or other instrument, transferring or purporting to transfer the right or interest of any holder of such a certificate, obligation, public security, evidence of debt or liability, or of any person entitled to such right or interest; or,

"5. A certificate of stock, bond or other writing, bank-note, bill of exchange, draft, check, certificate of deposit, or other obliga

tion or evidence of debt, issued or purporting to be issued, by any bank, banking association or body corporate existing under the laws of this state, or of the United States, or of any other state, government or country, declaring or purporting to declare any right, title or interest of any person in any portion of the capital stock, or property of such a body corporate, or promising or pur porting to promise or agree to the payment of money, or the performance of any act, duty or obligation; or,

"6. An indorsement or other writing, transferring or purporting to transfer the right or interest of any holder of such a certificate, bond, or writing obligatory, or of any person entitled to such right or interest." N. Y. Penal Code, § 509.

"A person is guilty of forgery in the second degree who, with intent to defraud,

"1. Forges the great or private seal of this state, the seal of any court of record, or of any public office or officer authorized by law, or of any body corporate created by or existing under the laws of this state, or of the United States, or of any other state or territory of the United States, or of any other state, government or country, or any impression of such a seal; or any gold or silver coin, whether of the United States or of any foreign state, government or country; or,

"2. Forges a record of a will, conveyance, or instrument of any kind, the record of which is by the law of this state made evidence, or of any judgment, order, or decree of any court or officer, or a certificate or authenticated copy thereof; or,

"A judgment roll, judgment, order, or decree of any court or officer, or an enrollment thereof, or a certified or authenticated copy thereof, or any document or writing purporting to be such judgment, order, decree, enrollment, or copy; or,

"An entry made in any book of record or accounts, kept by or in the office of any officer of this state, or of any village, city, town, or county of the state, by which any demand, claim, obligation, or interest, in favor of or against the people of the state, or any city, village, town or county, or any officer thereof, is or purports to be created, increased, diminished, discharged, or in any manner affected; or an entry made in any book of records or accounts kept by a corporation doing business within the state, or in any account kept by such a corporation, whereby any pecuniary obligation, claim, or credit is or purports to be created, increased, diminished, discharged, or in any manner affected; or,