In Connecticut, where the parents of children born out of wedlock subse quently marry, and recognize such children as theirs, they shall be deemed legitimate. Stat. 1876.

In Virginia and West Virginia children born out of wedlock, whose parents subsequently marry, if recognized by the father before or after marriage, shall be deemed legitimate.

In New Hampshire, where the parents afterwards marry and recognize them, they shall inherit as if they were legitimate.

In Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming a child born out of wedlock, whose parents shall subsequently marry, and whose father acknowledges such child, shall be deemed legitimate.

In New Mexico, children legitimated by a subsequent marriage of their parents are as direct heirs as legitimate children, with the exception of the right of primogeniture.

In North Carolina, children born out of wedlock can become legitimate only upon petition of the father, which must be presented to the superior court of the county, where he resides, and if it appear that he is the father of the child, the court may make a decree to that effect which shall be recorded by the clerk, and such child may then inherit from his father only.

In Michigan, children born out of wedlock become legitimate by the subsequent marriage of their parents, or, if they do not marry, the father can make the child "legitimate in law" by so acknowledging in writing, executed like a deed of land.

In Nebraska, children born out of wedlock become legitimate if the parents afterwards marry and have been adopted in the family with other children born in wedlock, or shall have been acknowledged by the father in writing, signed in the presence of one witness.

In Louisiana, children born out of wedlock, except those born from an incestuous or adulterous connection, may be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their father and mother, when legally acknowledged before marriage, by an act passed before a notary and two witnesses, or by their contract of marriage itself. They are then known as natural children.

CHAPTER LXII.

SEDUCTION UNDER PROMISE OF MARRIAGE.

§ 550. Term Defined.

551. Nature of the Proof.

552. Previous Chastity of the Woman the Main Issue.

553. Distinction between Seduction and Rape.

554. Presumption as to Chastity, how Rebutted.

555. Corroboration Required as to Promise and to Intercourse. 556. Time not Material.

550. The Term Defined.-Webster defines seduction as "the act or crime of persuading a female, by flattery or deception, to surrender her chastity." Seduction has been defined as "the use of some influence, promise, art or other means on the part of a man by which he induces a woman to surrender her chastity and virtue to his embraces." Anderson, Law Dict. 932; Croghan v. State, 22 Wis. 444; Patterson v. Hayden, 3 L. R. A. 529, 17 Or. 238, 11 Am. St. Rep. 822; in this last case the court say: "Courts have been more inclined to follow Webster's definition than those given by the legal lexicographers."

A woman cannot be said to be "seduced" who at the time of the alleged seduction was leading a lewd and lascivious life. Patterson v. Hayden, 3 L. R. A. 529, 17 Or. 238.

§ 551. Nature of the Proof.-The jury may find the fact of seduction upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness, and corroboration as to the promise is satisfied by proof of the circumstances usually attending an engagement of marriage. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1912; State v. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 152, 51 Am. Rep. 234, and cases cited; Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84t Am. Dec. 177; Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644.

Evidence of general reputation of the girl's want of chastity is inadmissible. Previous chaste character, in this statute, means actual personal virtue, not reputation; and can be impeached only by specific proof of lewdness. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203207, 5 Park. Crim. Rep. 254-285, 84 Am. Dec. 177; Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603–607; Kauffman v. People, 11 Hun, 82. Although the female has previously fallen from virtue, yet if

she has subsequently reformed and become chaste, she may be the subject of the offense declared in the statute. Carpenter v. Peo ple, 8 Barb. 603.

The crime is a most atrocious one, and one which most naturally tends to enlist the sympathies of all men, and of course of jurors, in favor of the victim. In such cases, while administering the law with perfect fairness, courts must be extremely careful that no evidence of a tendency to excite or influence the resentment of jurors, and which does not tend to support the evidence of the prosecutrix, or to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, should be permitted to go to the jury. People v. Kearney, 110 N. Y. 188.

It was necessary to support the prosecutrix by other evidence than her own as to the promise of marriage and the intercourse. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 207, 5 Park. Crim. Rep. 254, 84 Am. Dec. 177; People v. Heine, 8 N. Y. Legal Obs. 139; Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 645; People v. Haynes, 55 Barb. 450; State v. Crawford, 34 Iowa, 40; Com. v. Walton, 2 Brewst. 487; People v. Zeiger, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 356; Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 38.

In trials for seduction under promise of marriage, the evidence of the woman as to such promise must be corroborated to the same extent required of a principal witness in perjury. From these statutes it is plain to be seen that corroborating evidence is only required as to the promise of marriage, and in that respect to the extent of the principal witness in perjury. In cases of perjury, it is not required that the corroborating circumstances should be equal to a second witness. The additional evidence, it was said in State v. Heed, 57 Mo. 254, need not be such as, standing by itself, would justify a conviction in a case where the testimony of a single witness would suffice for that purpose; but it must at least be strongly corroborative of the testimony of the accusing witness. There must be some evidence, independent of the principal witness; any material circumstance proved by other witnesses, in confirmation of the witness who gave the direct testimony will be sufficient. Roscoe, Crim. Ev. (6 Am. ed.) 765. We can, then, apply these guides to cases like the one in hand. Evidence of circumstances which usually accompany the marriage engagement will satisfy the statute as to supporting evidence. State v. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 156, 51 Am. Rep. 234. That case, it is true, was overruled in State v. Patterson, 88 Mo. 88, 57 Am.

Rep. 374, in one respect, but not as to the question now under consideration.

Under the provision of an act declaring that a conviction shall not be had upon the testimony of the female seduced, unsupported by other evidence, supporting evidence is only required as to the promise of marriage, and the carnal connection.

As to the promise of marriage the provision is satisfied by proof of circumstances which usually attend an engagement of marriage; as to the illicit intercourse and the immediate persuasions and the inducements which led the female to consent, evidence of opportunities more or less frequent and continued, and that the relations of the parties were such as indicated that confidence in and affection for the accused, on the part of the female which rendered it possible that the act may have been done, are sufficient.

The fact that the prosecutrix in her testimony limits the carnal connection to a single act, and specifies the time, does not require that the supporting evidence shall be confined to that particular time; if it covers a period including the specified time it is sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute, although there is no corroborative evidence as to the particular act testified to. Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 38.

On an indictment for seduction under promise of marriage, under the laws of 1848, chapter 111,-which constitutes such an act a misdemeanor,-although an express promise on the part of the defendant ought to be proved, it is not necessary that there should be proof of an express promise on the part of the person seduced, in order to support defendant's promise. A promise on her part, if necessary at all, may be inferred from circumstances. It seems, that a promise on the part of the defendant alone, is enough to sustain a conviction.

On an indictment for seduction under promise of marriage, the previous chaste character of the complainant is presumed until evidence impeaching it is produced. People v. Kane, 14 Abb. Pr. 15.

There must be a promise of marriage, seduction of and illicit connection with an unmarried female, who must have been of "previous chaste character," and the indictment must be found. within two years after the commission of the offense; and the prosecution cannot be sustained by the testimony of the female seduced, unsupported by other evidence. Safford v. People, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 474.

So, too, the act of illicit connection, and the immediate persuasions and inducements, which led to the compliance, need not be proved by the evidence of third persons directly to the fact. They are to be inferred from the facts; that the man had the opportunities, more or less frequented and continued, of making the advances and the proposition; and that the relations of the parties were such, as that there was likely to be that confidence on the part of the woman in the asseverations of devotion on the part of the man, and that affection towards him personally, which would overcome the reluctance on her part, so long instilled as to have become natural, to surrender her chastity. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177; Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y.

644.

Circumstances of this kind vary in weight in different cases, and it is for the jury to determine their strength. But, when proof is made of the existence of them, in some degree, it cannot be said that there is no supporting evidence. A court cannot then properly direct a verdict, or discharge the defendant in the indictment, on the ground that no case is made for the consideration of the jury. Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 44.

I think the true rule is, in cases like this, when there is some evidence given by other witnesses, which supports the testimony of the prosecutrix, on the material questions in the case, the jury must determine whether she is sufficiently corroborated to warrant a verdict of guilty. And this conclusion is in harmony with the decision in Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177; Crandall v. People, 2 Lans. 309.

§ 552. Previous Chastity of the Woman the Main Issue.An important requisite to the offense charged is, that the female against whom it is alleged to have been committed, shall have been of a previously chaste character. The requisition of the statute, it is held, relates not to the reputation of the prosecutrix but to her actual condition, and requires absolute personal chastity. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177. It is, therefore, impossible that the offense be twice committed against the same female. If she has once consented to and willingly permitted sexual intercourse with herself, she no longer possesses that chaste character required by the statute as an essential ingredient of the offense. Accordingly where a seduction under a promise of marriage had taken place four or five years before the indictment,