was bitter. In this and a subsequent paper the vocabulary of exasperating language at the service of hostile nations was well-nigh exhausted. England was described as a Power whose traditional policy was one of vexation and acts of violence. Her maxim was, her right to be the exclusive mistress of the seas; to this all her efforts were directed. She found the power of France in her way, and she resolved that it must be destroyed or confined within narrow bounds. If every treaty from the time of Cromwell were examined, there would be found in all evident and revolting traces of the haughty, envious, and encroaching policy of the Court of London. manifesto contrasted such conduct with the pacific and loyal behaviour of France, and sought to throw on England the responsibility of having begun the war. It was wholly an appeal to facts. The transactions just related form, certainly, a curious commentary on the paper.

The

An answer was written by Gibbon. Like the manifesto of M. de Vergennes, it dealt chiefly, though not so exclusively, with facts. The justification of England was reduced to the proof of two propositions :

1. That, during a period of profound peace, France had formed relations, at first secret, and afterwards open and avowed, with the revolted colonies of America.

2. That, according to the best recognised maxims of the Law of Nations, and actually subsisting treaties, these relations might be regarded as violations of peace, and that the avowal of these relations was equivalent to a declaration of war.

We need not follow the reasoning. One remark is enough. Such a mode of stating the case avoids any discussion on the abstract principles of recognition. The answer was written upon the facts contained in Lord Stormont's despatches. Like the manifesto of M. de Vergennes it was bitter in tone. France was represented as the perpetual enemy of the public repose. She did not blush to lower her dignity by forming secret relations with rebellious subjects. Perfidy and dissimulation reigned in her counsels. The most insidious policy was concealed under the most seductive professions,-professions which served to give the lie to her declarations. She could find no excuse for

her conduct, except by an unfounded and improbable assumption of intentions on the part of England. The Court of Versailles stated, with an air of frankness and simplicity, that it had found the colonies independent. The most important towns were in the occupation of the English army. The English flag ruled over the American seas. The Court of Versailles had alone contributed, by clandestine assistance, to fan the flame of revolt, and, at the rumour of a reconciliation, concluded the treaty to throw fuel on the flames. Under these circumstances it

would be an insult to reason and truth to deny that the declaration of the 13th of March of the treaty and the eventual measures was a declaration of war.

The answer called forth "Observations" in reply. In the midst of irrelevant abuse, and statements which have lost their interest, because we know them to have been untrue, we shall find the principles stated upon which the policy of France claimed to be founded. Some of these principles will command universal acceptance. Freedom of trade between the French and Americans was thus defended :

:

"In time of war, commerce may be divided into two "branches: the first comprises merchandise not prohibited; "the object of the second is merchandise known under the

name of contraband of war. Nations who wish to be "neutral, continue perfectly free to carry on the first "kind of commerce with the belligerent parties: but the "second is prohibited; the merchandise may be intercepted "and confiscated, in conformity with the rules prescribed by usage or treaty. On referring both to one and the other, it will be found, not that the commerce in objects "called contraband is a breach of neutrality, but that the "individuals who engage in it simply render themselves liable "to the penalty of confiscation."

The statement is clear and accurate, but it was not to the point. The indigo and rice brought home by the Amphitrite were not contraband of war. The guns and officers taken out in the Amphitrite were contraband of war. The putting on board a contraband cargo by Beaumarchais, simply rendered his vessel liable to confiscation. Furnishing a contraband cargo

out of the public stores, by the aid of public money advanced by the Minister under a warrant from the King, was a breach of neutrality.

The Observations further state, that the act of the King of France in recognising and forming treaty relations with the Americans, was based on two incontestable truths: first, that, at the date of the 6th of February, 1778, the Americans were in public possession of their independence; and, secondly, that the king had the right of regarding this independence as existing, without being obliged to examine its legality. Both these points are argued at length and with ability. Upon the second, it is said:

"Whether the United States had or had not the right of abjuring the sovereignty of England; whether their possession "of independence be legitimate or not, are questions which it "is not for France to discuss. The King is not the judge of "the domestic quarrels of England. Neither the law of

nations, nor treaties, nor morality, nor policy, imposed on "him the obligation of being the guardian of the loyalty which English subjects may owe to their Sovereign. It is suf"ficient for the justification of His Majesty that the colonies, " which form a considerable nation, as well by the number of “their inhabitants as by the extent of their dominions, have established their independence not only by a solemn act, but "also in fact, and have maintained it against the efforts of the "Mother Country. Such was, in effect, the position of the "United States when the King began to negotiate with them. "His Majesty was perfectly at liberty to regard them either as independent, or as subjects of Great Britain. His Majesty "has chosen the former course, because his safety, the interest "of his nation, his invariable policy, and, above all, the secret projects of the Court of London, imposed on him this obligation."

The Paper might have stopped there, but it goes on to lay down this principle :—

That the law of nations, the policy and example even of England, authorised the King to regard the Americans as independent in fact, from the epoch of the 4th of July, 1776, "and a fortiori from that of the 6th of February, 1778.”

This assertion might perhaps be made as to the latter date. The French Government might be justified in saying that the surrender at Saratoga rendered the attempt to conquer the Americans hopeless. But, at the earlier date, they were not independent in fact. The proposition, that the King of France had the right of treating the Americans as independent after the publication of their manifesto of the 4th of July, 1776, must be a proposition of law, resting on the principle that in such cases of dispute between a revolted portion and the parent State, foreign Powers are not bound to look beyond the declaration of independence. This appears to be the view of Hautefeuille : "Neutral foreigners," he says, " may make with the two parties "such treaties of commerce, of navigation, of recognition, as "they judge convenient, provided they abstain from taking any part in hostilities: provided they do not furnish assistance in men or munitions of war; provided, in a word, they discharge the duties of neutrality."* But this view is opposed to the great current of authority. He stands alone, I believe, in his opinion. Enough, however, has been said to show, that, tried even by this standard, the policy of France was one of intervention from the first. An English writer may be open to the suspicion of looking, even at past history, from an English point of view. It is safer to quote a well-known authority in diplomatic literature. This is the judgment of Martens upon the whole transaction :—

"The Court of Versailles displayed a profound policy and uncommon skill in the execution of its plan of wishing to serve as guide to the American colonists, and of conducting "them openly to independence. It may even be said that in no other affair, however important, and at no other time, has "the French Government given equal proof of sagacity and "constancy. It worked underground as long as it was perilous to discover its agency; and it marched with a bold "front from the moment that the success of the colonists "allowed it to see in them sure allies. It entered into the struggle when its armies, and above all its fleets, were ready;

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* Droits des Nations Neutres, i. 452.

с

"when all nations pronounced in its favour; when, in a word, everything promised it victory."

The French have always looked with pride on their share in the establishment of the independence of the United States. They call the war of 1778 the American war. In a paper lately written in the Revue des Deux Mondes, containing an account of a campaign with the army of the Potomac, by a French officer, the writer traces with natural pride the lines of Rochambeau, in front of York Town:-"The combined operations of Washington and Rochambeau," he says, "were consummated by the capitulation which insured the independence of the United States. On the ramparts of York Town the blood of French soldiers sealed an alliance to which the United States have owed their prosperity and greatness."+

The more true the boast, the less valuable is the precedent in international law. This second surrender-the capitulation of Lord Cornwallis-took place on the 19th of October, 1781. The provisional treaty of peace between England and the United States, by which the independence of the latter was first acknowledged by the former, was made on the 30th of November in the following year. But this capitulation really ended the struggle. The English troops still held the positions of New York, Charleston, and Savannah; and more fighting took place, but no reinforcements were sent out, no new effort was made. After this date, England could not, I think, have complained of the recognition of the United States by neutral nations. The dominion over the country had passed out of her hands, though she retained some outposts. But the recognition of the independence of the United States by France in 1778, was followed by three years of war, in which France herself took a considerable part, before the independence was really established.

II. The second of the two cases which make up our chapter of history is separated from the first by nearly half a century. It differs from the former in almost every important particular. In this case, the State Papers are excellent, the precedent * Martens' Nouv. C, C. i. p. 498. † Rev. des deux Mondes, Oct. 14, 1862.