upon any one of them shall be deemed an act of war against all of them. This, while justifying any of them in going to war with the aggressor, does not oblige them to do so; but they do agree to subject it to treatment of a hostile nature; and also to give to any of their number that is actually engaged in the war aid that by international law is given only to a co-belligerent. They agree to boycott the offender completely, to blockade it by sea and land, to support one another financially and economically, to aid in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number, and to afford a passage through their territory to the troops of any of the members that are fighting the offender.

To some people it would seem better to have agreed boldly that all the members of the League should immediately declare war on the aggressor. The situation would thus have been made plain; but it would not in fact have been very different. If the aggressor were a small country a pacific blockade would be enough, and other military operations by the members of the League or at least by those at a distance, would not be needed,

either under the Covenant as it stands, or under an express agreement to declare war. If, on the other hand, the aggressor were a large and powerful nation the measures required by the Covenant would practically be certain to bring about collisions and shortly actual war with all the principal members of the League. There would, indeed, be an advantage in providing that an unjustifiable attack on one member of the League should involve immediate war with all the rest. The object of the sanction is not to punish, but to deter; and the greater the certainty of meeting with an irresistible armed force the less the danger that any ill-disposed nation will venture to precipitate a conflict. The proposed defensive alliance of England, France and the United States against Germany would have that effect.

Other people criticize the Covenant from the opposite standpoint. They complain that it may bring us into a war in the causes of which we are not directly concerned, and that our young men may be sacrificed in foreign quarrels. Often without being conscious of it, these critics are ultra-pacifists, for

they shrink from using the force necessary to prevent war in the world. They are like people who should object to a police force, created to maintain order in the streets, for fear that the policemen might get hurt. If we believe in preventing war we must use the means necessary to do so. We must be willing to risk a small sacrifice to insure against a larger one.

(Letter No. 18)

ARTICLES XVII-XX

The object of the League is to prevent war, not only among its members, but also by, against or between nations outside of the Covenant; and Article XVII is aimed at such cases. The outside nation engaged in a dispute, even if of a character that threatens war, is not treated as an outlaw, but is offered for the purpose of the dispute the benefits, as well as the obligations, of membership in the League. If it accepts the invitation it obtains the same protection as a member from attack by its adversary whether within or without the League; and if there is a voluntary submission to arbitration it has the same right as a member to demand that the award be carried out. This is certainly treating the outsider fairly.

On the other hand the outsider, whether it accept the invitation or not, is restrained

from attacking a member by the same penalties that would be applied to a signer of the Covenant. In other words, the members agree to help one another against attacks from outside as well as against those from one of their own number. They could hardly do less.

When the controversy is between two outsiders both are invited to join the League for the purpose of the dispute. If either of them accepts, the position is exactly that already described, because the one accepting has for this purpose the standing of a member of the League. If both refuse the obligations of membership cannot be directly applied, but hostilities must be prevented, and the Council is authorized to take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent them. Since the Council has no forces under its orders and cannot command those of its members without their consent, the measures it can take must be of a diplomatic nature, to be followed by recommendations for the use of force if necessary. But practically this will not happen, because it is highly unlikely that both of the outside nations.