representatives of the powerful nations whose opinions cannot fail to carry weight with states that are fomenting trouble. Moreover, the function of the Council being merely to make recommendations, these are far more likely to be accepted by a nation if prepared by the official representatives of its own government, than if by spokesmen of a minority, or by any other men who do not act under the directions of the political authority of the nation; and that must continue to be the case so long as the League is an alliance of independent states seeking to promote harmony of action, not a common government for the peoples of those states. Mr. Root is clearly right that it would be wise to have the American members of the Council appointed and confirmed like ambassadors, since that is in effect the position they are to hold. This applies much less to the Assembly, which, with its very restricted functions, is intended to be a body for general discussion, and will serve its most useful purpose in ventilating the opinions of all mankind. Here again, however, it would be better not to have any rigid system of minority representation such as has been suggested, but to leave the matter to be determined in each case according to the class of questions likely to arise. If, as we hope, the Assembly should undertake a revision of international law, it would be highly expedient to select jurists learned in that subject without much regard to party; and the same thing is true of other matters requiring technical knowledge of economic or social questions. In these opening letters "The Covenanter" has tried to set forth the general principles on which any League of Nations must be based. After considering certain questions particularly affecting the relation of the United States to a league, it will be of interest to examine in what way, and to what extent, these general principles are applied in the Covenant of Paris. (Letter No. 4) SOVEREIGNTY Every civilized nation must, in the interest of its citizens, make treaties, and, like ordinary trades between individuals, these must be negotiated on the principle of "give and take." Whatever it agrees to do or to refrain from doing imposes a restriction which detracts from its complete sovereignty. But it does not thereby unduly surrender its independence, unless the restriction makes its ordinary governmental functions subject to control by another country, as was the case, for instance, with Cuba, when she accepted the terms of the Platt Amendment, and thereby subjected her national financial policy and her foreign relations to the supervisory control of the United States. A nation's independence is not unduly impaired by a treaty by which it receives advantages which compensate it for what it concedes. It is too late to argue in this country that international agreements to make or to refrain from making war, to guarantee protection to the territory of other nations and to limit armament, unduly impair a nation's sovereignty; for numerous instances of such agreements in existing treaties will be found in our diplomatic history. Nor can it be said that such agreements were not contemplated when our Constitution was adopted, for the Supreme Court has held that under the treaty-making power, the President and the Senate may make any agreement they regard as appropriate, provided it does not result in "a change in the character of the Government or in that of any of the states or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent." Article X of the Covenant is criticized as involving an impairment of sovereignty. By that Article there is created a defensive alliance of the nations of the League to prevent external aggressions threatening the territorial integrity or the political independence of any member nation. The alliance is designed primarily to give protection to the seven new republics in Europe and the four autonomous nations in the Near East, created as a result of the war; and the obligation to join in such an alliance was thrown upon us because, by the Fourteen Points on which the armistice was expressly based, we made ourselves responsible, not only for the erection of the new states but also for their protection against attacks from without, threatening their status as it was to be established by the Treaty of Peace. For this we are to receive the further advantage of the continuous co-operation of the League in preserving the peace of the world. Furthermore, the obligation imposed by Article X will probably be less burdensome than opponents of the League have assumed, for if it were sought to have the Council advise that the United States should intervene in what we regarded as an unsuitable case, we could veto the suggestion by our single vote. But it is altogether improbable that that would be necessary; for in any concrete case it would naturally happen that the burden of performing the guaranty would, in the first instance, fall on the nation nearest |