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possible, should be, and in such cases should be signed by the deceased before witnesses. There is no particnlar form of declaration, nor do they require to be sworn to, the awful situation of the dying person being considered equal to the sanctity of an oath. To render dying declarations admissible in evidence it is necessary

1. That at the time when they were made the declarant should have been in actual danger of death.

2. That he should have had a full apprehension of his danger, and have no expectation or hope of recovery.

3. That death should have ensued.

Although there is no particular form of declaration, yet, in order to comply with above requirements, it is desirable that it should commence with a statement somewhat as follows: “I, A. B., having the fear of death before me, and being without hope of recovery, state," &c.

The presence of the accused is not necessary, but if he be present he should be permitted to ask his accuser any question he wishes. Dying declarations are admissible only in the single instance of homicide. The declarations of the deceased are admissible only as to matters to which he would have been competent to testify if sworn in the court. They must, therefore, in general speak to facts only, and must be confined to what is relevant to the issue.

Statutory provisions, &c.-By 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 2, on the trial of issue joined, the parties thereto, and the persons in whose behalf any suit, action, or other proceeding may be brought or defended, shall, except as hereafter excepted, be competent and compellable to give evidence on behalf of either or any of the parties to the suit, action, or other proceeding, but (by section 3 of Act) nothing herein contained shall render any person who in any criminal proceeding (a)

(a) What is a civil or criminal proceeding was discussed in AttorneyGeneral v. Radloff, 23 L. J. Exch. 240. In that case the judges were equally divided. POLLOCK, C. B., and PARKE, B., argued that all offences punishable by fine or imprisonment on summary conviction were

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is charged with the commission of any indictable offence, or any offence punishable on summary conviction, competent or compellable to give evidence for or against himself or herself (a), or shall render any person compellable to answer any question tending to criminate himself or herself, or shall in any criminal proceeding render any husband competent or compellable to give evidence for or against his wife, or any wife competent or compellable to give evidence for or against her husband.

Exceptions. Recent legislation has, however, modified this section, and all parties and their husbands and wives are competent witnesses in cases under the Licensing Acts, 1872 and 1874, the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883 (section 53), and the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (sections 4, 5, 6); the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, and sections 48 and 52 to 55 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100 (see note, p. 417.)

Under the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878, a person charged with an offence under that Act may tender himself as a witness on his own behalf (section 66).

Under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (see under that title, post) a husband or wife shall be competent to give evidence against each other in any indictment or other proceeding under section 12 of that statute.

Competency of husband and wife.-By the general rule of law, as well as by 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 8 (see preceding page), and 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83, s. 2, which enacts that nothing shall render any husband or wife competent or compellable to give evidence for or against the other in any criminal proceeding, it appears that husband and wife cannot

"criminal proceedings." In R. v. Hawkhurst (7 L. T. 268, and 26 J. P. 772), CROMPTON, J., said the test of a criminal proceeding is whether the offence is punishable by a fine or imprisonment, and is not a mere debt. (a) See, however, 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, s. 20, p. 517.

be witnesses for or against each other in any criminal proceedings (a).

"These statutes do not, however, render a husband or wife incompetent to give evidence against the other in any criminal case in which they were competent to do so before the passing of these Acts. The husband or wife of the nominal informer is competent and compellable to give evidence against as well as for the defendant. The Crown being the real prosecutor, and the person preferring the charge being the nominal prosecutor only, such evidence is not given for or against each other.' The evidence of a wife cannot, therefore, be rejected on the ground that it is brought to contradict the testimony of her husband, the prosecutor. In charges of assault upon the husband it is the invariable practice to receive the wife's evidence against the defendant, and the same course is adopted in regard to the testimony of the husband in charges of assault upon the wife, although the wife or the husband of the defendant in such cases cannot be witnesses for or against each other. It is clear law that a wife is a competent witness against her husband in respect of any charge which affects her liberty or person, and so is a husband a competent witness against his wife under like circumstances. The evidence of the wife is not, however, admissible in charges against the husband under the Vagrant Act (Reeve v. Wood, 34 L. J. 15, and Treat.; 32 J. P. 145, 316), nor does the third section of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, render her competent, or apply to such proceedings." (Stone's Justices' Manual, 21st ed., p. 228.)

The wife of one prisoner cannot be called as a witness for another prisoner with whom her husband is jointly indicted (R. v. Thompson, 36 J. P. 532, 667).

(a) See note (a) preceding page. See also heading "Exceptions," under title STATUTORY PROVISIONS, &c., preceding page, and heading "Married Women," post.

Credit of witnesses, &c.-The credibility of a witness depends upon the knowledge of the fact he testifies, his disinterestedness, his integrity, his veracity, and his being bound to speak the truth by such oath as he deems binding. In all cases of treason two lawful witnesses are required to convict a prisoner. In almost all other cases one witness is sufficient.

The law with respect to the impeachment of the credit of witnesses has been the subject of legislative enactment, and the rules laid down by 28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, are applicable (by section 1) to all courts of judicature.

Incapacity.-No person is now excluded by reason of incapacity from crime from giving evidence in person or by deposition (6 & 7 Vict. c. 85, s. 1).

Infants.-The evidence of children of any age is admissible, if they appear to understand the moral obligation of an oath (a).

Dissuading witnesses.-Every one commits a misdemeanor who, in order to obstruct the due course of justice, dissuades, hinders, or prevents any person lawfully bound to appear and give evidence as a witness from so appearing and giving evidence, or endeavours to do so.

Oath. By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 66, s. 1, persons called as witnesses, and objecting from conscientious motives to be sworn, are permitted to make a solemn affirmation or declaration in lieu of an oath. See also 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, s. 4. And in the case of Jews, Mahommedans, heathens, &c., the oath is to be administered in such form and mode as according to the religion of such persons will be a moral obligation (20 J. P. 203).

Examination of police as witnesses.-Police when under examination should answer all questions put to them briefly and truly in a distinct tone of voice without hesitation,

(a) See, however, 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, s. 4, p. 517.

taking care to depose to those facts only of which the witness has a personal knowledge. When prisoners have made confessions or statements, the exact words used by them should be given in evidence. Disgusting and filthy language should not be repeated unless the witness is specially called upon to state the exact words made use of.

Conversations and remarks which were not made in the presence of the prisoner cannot be given in evidence.

Police officers have no right to act as advocates for the prosecution. A police officer has no status as an advocate in any court, and he certainly has no duty requiring him to act as such, even though the information in the case be laid in his name.

It is altogether unlawful for a prosecutor in any criminal case, whether summary or otherwise, to address the court or act in any way as advocate for the prosecution; all that he can lawfully do is to give evidence on oath like any other witness.

Regarding the rights of a prosecutor and the meaning of the provision relative to conduct of cases contained in section 12 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 (Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848), see 48 J. P. 675.

Direct examination.-The examination of a witness by the party who produces him is called his direct examination or his examination in chief. In the direct examination leading questions on material points are not allowed to be put. "Leading questions" are those which suggest to the witness the answer desired or embody the answer, or in general that can be answered by "yes" or "no." A party may lead his own witness in the following cases-on all matters which are merely introductory, and form no part of the substance of the inquiry; for the purpose of identifying persons or things; when a witness is called to contradict another as to expressions which he denies having used; where the witness appears hostile, by permission of the court; where witness's memory is defective, or the matter of the question com

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