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SOLICITOR (33), about to demobilised, REQUIRES SITUATION, with view to Partnership; good general experience in Common Law, Conveyancing, and County Court work; north of England preferred.-N. L. K." (No. 3960), Law Times Office, Bream's-buildings, E.C. 4. ence, "G. H." (No. 3960), "Law Times" Office, Bream'sbuildings, E.C. 4. LAW.-MANAGING CLERK, with thirty LANCING and GENERAL CLERK; Shorthand years' general Litigation, ENGAGEMENT, London or Brighton; salary £4.-H. TRESS, 124, Fairfax-road, Harringay. AW.-WANTED. JUNIOR CONVEYessential.-"S. B." (No. 3960). "Law Times" Office, Bream's-buildings, E.C. 4. LAW SOLICITOR (ex-officer, three years Victor-address service), age 32, DESIRES POST as ASSISTANT, with or without view to Working Partnership; fifteen years' sound experience, all branches; good Advocate, accustomed advise and act generally without super " vision; keen and energetic: highest references; salary PROBATE VALUATIONS by arrangement and subordinate (No. 3960), "Law Times" Office, Bream's-buildings, E.C. 4. LAW-ACCOUNTANT and CASHIER, experienced all duties, including Trust Accounts, Income Tax, and Costs supervision in good provincial and London offices, DESIRES POST; initiative; exnaval service." B. M." (No. 3960), "Law Times" Office, Bream's-buildings, E.C. 4. GUARAN TEED. Messrs. TOOTH and TOOTH (late Uxenhams), 187 and 189, Oxford-street, W., undertake VALUATIONS of FURNITURE and other effects on mcderate terms, and, if desired, will purchase for cash at the sum awarded by them AGENCY, London R. EDGAR HAMMOND, B.A. (Honours, Oxon.), Solicitor, assisted by an able staff, PREPARES STUDENTS for SOLICITORS', BAR, and LONDON UNIVERSITY INTERMEDIATE and LL.B. EXAMINATIONS by means of small oral classes and by post. Write or call for prospectus: 3, PLOWDEN BUILDINGS, TEMPLE, E.C. 4. Mo.). LL.B. (Lond.), Barrister-at-Law (First By arrangement Auctions in town or country can also be held on other days. Messrs. Debenham, Towson, and Chinnocks undertake Sales and Valuations for Probate and other purposes of Furniture, Pictures, Farming Stock, Timber, &c. A list is published monthly of Business Premises. Offices, and Building Sites. A Register is also kept of Estates, Town and Country Residences, Hunting and Shooting Quarters, and Investments.-Full particulars on application to Messrs. Debenham, Tewson, and Chinnocks, No. 80, Cheapside, E.C. 2, and 29, St. James's-square, S.W. 1. Telephones, City 7811 (3 lines and Gerrard 8765. Valuable LIFE INTEREST of a gentleman, aged 55, in 101 Lloyds Bank Shares and War Stock, and the Reversionary Life Interest of the same gentleman in other Stocks and Shares. Also a Policy of Assurance for £1500, with £285 10s. to the end of 1913 bonus additions, in the Alliance Insurance Company. MESSRS, VENTOM, COOPER, and Co. will SELL the above by AUCTIÓN, at Winchester House. Old Broad-street, London, EC., on Tuesday, March 4th next, at two o'clock precisely. Particulars may be had of Messrs JONAS and PARKER, Solicitors, Salisbury, and of the Auctioneers, 35, Old Jewry, London, E.C. to A Solicitors wish AW. SOLICITOR, with leading West HIGHEST REVISED REPORTS, bound in half LA End firm, skilled Conveyancer, twenty-three years' all-round experience (including Estate work, Trusts, Litigation, Divorce. Company, Parliamentary, and Local Government work), supported by highest credentials, DESIRES responsible POSITION with firm of good standing." Thorough (No. 3960), "Law Times" Office, Bream's-buildings, F.C. 4. T " Law of LEASEHOLD GROUND RENT £295 per annum secured upon a magnificent City Building, occupied by the Institute of Marine Engineers; long lease at nominal head rent. For SALE by AUCTION, by Messrs. EDWIN FOX, BURNETT, and BADDELEY, 12, Abchurch-lane, EC. COUNTRY and SUBURBAN SOLI-JE CITORS.-London Solicitors OFFER ADDRESS, &c.; nominal terms." H.,' care of Housekeeper, 78, Coleman-street, E.C. SOLICITOR, in business near Law England, Young, hard worker; general Land of South A Courts, would like to save expenses by arranging ence; salary by arrangement. Full particulars from "K. L. J." (No. 3960), "Law Times " Office, Bream'sbuildings, E.O. 4. with another Solicitor to SHARE CLERKS, &c.Apply, by letter. "S. M." (No. 3960), "Law Times " Office, Bream's-buildings, E.C. 4. Third Edition. Price 10s. 6d. cloth, half calf 15s. ELF'S WHERE TO FIND YOUR LAW. 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Advertisements, orders for papers, &c., should be kept distinct, and addressed to the Publisher, "Law Times" Office, Windsor House, Bream's-building. E.C. 3. Vol. 146-No. 3960. KING'S BENCH DIVISION. LYONS AND CO. LIMITED (apps.) v. Fox (resp.).-Revenue-Entertainments duty Restaurant-Meals and music JACKSON (app.) v. ROTH AND OTHERS (resps.). Gaming- Place used for betting-Social club-Betting between members of club ............ 769 METROPOLITAN WATER BOARD V. HORMINGHAM CORPORATION V. SAMUEL ALLSOPP AND SONS LIMITED.Local government-Street lighting-Electric standard LEADING ARTICLES, &c. 775 TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS 287 EDITORIAL TOPICS AND LEADING ARTICLES.-Covenants in Restraint of Personal Freedom-Overhanging Trees 292 .......................................................... 287 COMMENTS ON CASES ..................... 290 THE CONVEYANOBR NOTES OF BECENT DECISIONS NOT YET BEPORTED.............................. 292 LAW LIBRARY ......................................................... 294 COUNTY COURTS.- Sittings of the Courts.......................................... 294 LEGISLATION.-Topics ..................................................... 294 OCCASIONAL NOTES ........................ 295 IRISH NOTES ................................. 297 GENERAL INTELLIGENCE. King's Counsel Enfranchisement of Copyholds - Language in International Relations ......... 297 LAW SOCIETIES.-The Law Society: Metropolis to THE GAZETTES 773 BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS 301 of 304 806 ... 306 The Law and the Lawyers. The Public Trustee. Con GREAT regret will be felt at the retirement of Sir CHARLES STEWART from the responsible post of Public Trustee. His wide experience and ability have been invaluable in building up the office, and his business aptitude was largely responsible for its success. siderable astonishment will be felt at the selection of his successor, a Chancery barrister, Mr. O. R. A. SIMPKIN, called in 1905, still in his thirties, who during the war has been employed in the War Trade Intelligence Department. Whatever his abilities may be, and of these we have no means of judging, it is curious that all those who have assisted Sir CHARLES STEWART in his work have been passed over, and no serious effort made to obtain a man of eminence in the business world, while a junior member of the Chancery Bar has been selected fo a post the salary of which is £3000 a year. Some satisfactory reason for the present appointment should be forthcoming, for responsible positions of this description should be filled by persons of proved experience. New King's Counsel. Ir is satisfactory that rumour has proved correct and the list of new King's Counsel will not be issued until the beginning of April. As we have pointed out, everything should be done not to prejudice those who have been serving their country in His Majesty's Forces, both in the way of giving time for consideration to those who intend to apply for call within the Bar and allowing such of those who intend to remain as juniors to participate in the work which will be released. It is now assumed that in two months demobilisation will be sufficiently advanced to ensure that the members of the Bar who are returning to the Profession will not have their interests endangered by the creation of the new "silks." COVENANTS IN RESTRAINT OF PERSONAL FREEDOM. MR. JUSTICE SANKEY recently decided a case which raised an interesting question as to how far a person could for valuable consideration bind his freedom. Here we ought at once to say that it is obvious that every engagement undertaken by an individual binds his freedom in some way or another. Even in the simple case of a contract to sell goods the parties are bound to carry out their contract or to pay damages. A party to such a contract is obviously not in precisely the same position after he has entered into the contract as he was before. He has undertaken a liability. In a sense, then, his freedom is curtailed. But that is not the kind of curtailment of freedom with which we are about to deal. We are dealing in this article with a restriction which a man has placed upon himself and his future conduct by a covenant to abstain from some particular act. Obviously here again a man may readily bind himself by covenant which could be enforced by injunction, and no interesting question of law could arise. Thus, take the case of an ordinary covenant by a man not to build on a plot of land. Such restrictions on a man's ownership are very common. No, the kind of case which we propose to deal with is where a man binds himself to abstain personally from some act which all the King's subjects in common are free to do. A good example is a covenant by A. not to carry on a trade within ten miles, of some particular place. As is well known, such cases often give rise to discussions in the courts whether or not too great a limitation has been placed on the covenantor's freedom. As is also well known, side by side with such authorities runs that particularly unsatisfactory doctrine of public policy. It is against public policy that a man should debar himself for the remainder of his life from being a useful member of society. That proposition may be readily accepted. But a chemist or some such person skilled in one particular trade or calling can be a useful member of society just as much in one part of the kingdom as another, and, if he binds himself not to carry on that trade or calling in one place, non constat that the principles of the doctrine of public policy will in any way be infringed. He can go elsewhere. In the recent case before Mr. Justice Sankey to which we have alluded-i rustee of Denny v. Denny and Warr (ante, p. 273) -it was sought to invalidate a deed entered into by a young man, his father, and a trustee whereby the son transferred to his father such property as he had and the father undertook to pay the son's debts and, amongst other things, to pay to the son an annuity on certain conditions which included amongst others (a) that the son should not become bankrupt or forfeit the annuity; (b) that he would amend his mode of life; (c) that he would not associate with certain persons; (d) that he would not reside within eighty miles of Piccadilly Circus, and would not come within that radius except with his father's consent; (e) that he would not drink to excess; and (ƒ) that he would not borrow or bet. It was shown that the object of the deed was to protect the son. It was claimed that the deed was void as against public policy and also as contravening the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5. The learned judge upheld the validity of the deed. He held that it was not against public policy, and that as regards the bankruptcy laws the case was one of sale and purchase for a good and proper consideration. It is the first point which concerns us here. As to the covenant or condition (c), the learned judge remarked that covenants not to associate with specified persons had long been known to the law. Covenant (e) he said was not against public policy, and the State had itself imposed restrictions against persons being supplied with drink. As to covenant (f), that stood on the same footing as (c), and with regard to (d), which for our purposes is the most instructive, the learned judge took into consideration the nature of the mischief intended to be avoided, and did not consider the limitation on the son's freedom under that covenant excessive. None were void against public policy. Now, we have observed that the doctrine of public policy is peculiarly unsatisfactory. The reason for this is that it practically converts the judiciary into the Legislature. Moreover, the views of public policy must alter with the ever-altering circumstances of time. "Per Dieu! If he were here, to prison he should go until he had made fine to the King because he had dared to restrain the liberty of the subject." That is what Mr. Justice Hull said in a case in the Year Books (2 Hen. 5, pl. 26), which passage was referred to in the judgment of Lord St. Leonards in the well-known case of Egerton v. Brownlow (1853, 4 H. L. C. 1, at p. 238). The anger of Mr. Justice Hull was raised merely because a dyer had undertaken in a bond not to exercise his trade in a certain town for six months. Mr. Justice Hull is said to have been uncommonly angry at such a violation of all law. The man whom he would have sent to prison had no doubt amply compensated the good dyer. Such a slight curtailment of freedom was in those days considered as a violent infringement of the doctrine of public policy. Again, we may point to the case of Kingston v. Pierrepont (1 Vern. 5). There a testator gave a sum of £10,000 to be employed by certain noble kinsmen in the acquisition of a dukedom for a descendant of the testator. This could not be allowed. It was, as Lord St. Leonards in Egerton v. Brownlow (sup.) observed, an unblushing and audacious disposition. It was then regarded as against public policy that a dukedom should be purchased. No doubt the same view would be held at the present day. "I deny," said Lord Halsbury, when Lord Chancellor, in the case of Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Limited (87 L. T. Rep. 372; (1902) A. C. 484)'] "that any court can invent a new head of public policy." The learned Lord Chancellor went on to say that a contract for marriage brokerage, the creation of a perpetuity, a contract in restraint of trade, were all undoubtedly unlawful things, and that, though it might be said that they were unlawful because they were against public policy, they were really unlawful because of enactments or because they were assumed to be against the common law, and not because a judge had the right to declare that such things were in his view contrary to public policy. But this statement must be accepted with considerable reservation. The view of what is or what is not against public policy does in fact alter, possibly imperceptibly, from time to time. There seems to be great wisdom in Lord Haldane's criticisms of the foregoing observation of Lord Halsbury. "What the law recognises as contrary to public policy," said Lord Haldane in the recent case of Rodriguez v. Speyer Brothers (119 L. T. Rep. 409; (1919) A. C. 59, at p. 79), turns out to vary greatly from time to time." There is nothing more instructive than to consider in this respect the history of the gradual modification which the cases on contracts in restraint or trade have undergone. Those cases are exceedingly numerous. In the time of Elizabeth all contracts in restraint of trade were regarded as void as against public policy. But gradually it came to be recognised that under certain circumstances it might be said to be just as much against public policy that they should not be enforced. Lord Macnaghten in the well-known case of Nordenfelt v. Marim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company (71 L.T. Rep. 489: (1894) A. C. 535, at p. 564, showed in his judgment the gradual outweighing by the second consideration of the older view. The learned Lord of Appeal points out that to hold every contract in restraint of trade void as against public policy would in course of time have greatly harmed the trade which the old doctrine thought so much of. Traders could hardly venture to let their shops out of their own hands. Every apprentice was a possible rival who might in due course destroy his master's business by rivalry. Hence gradually the old rule was relaxed and covenants though apparently in restraint of trade, but actually and really tending to the advancement of trade, came to be recognised as valid, and no longer infringing against the doctrine of public policy. Bit by bit the radii proscribed, in which the covenantor was not to carry on a trade of some specified nature, came to be enlarged. The scope of activity was in one sense narrowed, but, on the other hand, a man would more readily take an apprentice and qualify him as a useful craftsman or merchant. All that was obviously in the best interests of society in general. But who can deny that the standard of what was or what was not against public policy had altered, and had, moreover, been altered by the courts ? In the case of Horwood v. Millar's Timber and Trading Company Limited (115 L. T. Rep. 805; (1917) 1 K. B. 305, at p. 317) Lord Justice Scrutton admirably summarised the previous cases, and in particular the judgments of Lord Parker in the two cases of Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Company (109 L. T. Rep. 258; (1913) A. C. 781) and Herbert Morris Limited v. Saxelby (114 L. T. Rep. 618; (1916) 1 A. C. 683). “In seeing,” said Lord Justice Scrutton, "whether any restraint of trade is justified, we have to look to see whether the restraint is reasonable reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the public." Then his Lordship, referring to Lord Parker's criticism of Lord Macnaghten's language, observed that in the light of that valuable criticism it was possible to add to the proposition we have just given above this further proposition, that for the restraint to be reasonable in the interests of the parties it must afford no more than adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, and in merely considering the interests of the parties you do not take into account the effect on the public, which is a separate matter. Applying those propositions to cases like the recent one which we have mentioned, it would seem that there would have been little or no ground, from the public point of view, for holding the covenants bad. If any ordinary man covenanted not to go within, say, 100 miles of London, no great detriment to the public would be necessarily involved. Again, it would seem that if we apply the foregoing propositions as the test of the validity of covenants restraining personal freedom we have the materials to try any particular case. But it is more easy to lay down principles than to apply them; and the difficulty must lie in the question of degree. Thus, has the covenantee more than adequate protection in the case where the covenantor covenants not to carry on a particular trade within, say, 100 miles of London? Why would eighty or even fifty miles not suffice? Again, is the restraint more than is reasonable in the circumstances? That question of reasonableness is always a somewhat difficult one to answer. Finally, we revert to the matter of the shifting view of what is or what is not against public policy. Had a young mechanic twenty years ago covenanted never to fly in England, it would never have been suggested that it was against public policy for. any person to enter into such a covenant. Yet nowadays things are very different. If a young mechanic, who formerly had been an apprentice with a chemist, had entered into a covenant, on joining the chemist, not to fly in England, the covenant might very well fail to be enforceable. The chemist would not receive any protection for his shop. On that branch of the test, the covenant would be unreasonable. The public, on the other hand, might possibly be prejudiced by such a covenant, in that the country had lost a possible valuable air pilot. So on that branch also of the test, the covenant would very possibly be held bad, as injurious to the public, and therefore against public policy. And this, at any rate, shows that, though the principles may be said now to be tolerably clear, the difficulty of applying those principles remains. OVERHANGING TREES. ONE might have reasonably supposed that the very common case of the branches of a fruit tree overhanging a neighbour's garden would have come before the courts long ago so as to settle the question as to who was entitled to the fruit that fell or might be gathered from the overhanging branches. Apparently there has been no authoritative decision given on this point up to now, and a Divisional Court had to decide this question in an appeal from a County Court in Mills v. Brooker (post, p. 293). That the overhanging boughs of trees other than fruit trees can be cut down by the occupier of the land overhung, and without any notice to the owner of the trees, was completely settled by the House of Lords case of Lemmon v. Webb (71 L. T. Rep. 647; (1895) A. C. 1). The tree in that case were ornamental oaks and elms, and the right of the neighbour to cut down the encroaching branches in such a case rests on the principle that he is entitled to abate a nuisance. There was no question of any valuable right of property in the branches when severed from the tree. The distinction between such a case and that of Third Sheet. fruit trees is, of course, that the severed branches may have fruit on them, or, at all events, are capable of producing fruit, and there would seem to be no difference between severing a branch and severing fruit by picking it off the branch. The fruit being in itself property of some-possibly considerable— value, the considerations which apply to oaks and elms may not necessarily apply to apple trees, and this is well illustrated in the recent case of Mills v. Brooker. The trees in this case were apple trees growing on the plaintiff's land and overhanging the defendant's land. The apples were of considerable value, and the defendant picked several bushels of them and sold them. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action in the County Court for damages for conversion of the apples, and recovered the sum of £10. On appeal the Divisional Court (Justices Avory and Lush) upheld this judgment. The argument for the defendant (appellant) was that he was entitled to lop off branches from the trees and could therefore pick the apples, and that the apples so picked never became the property of the plaintiff, and so no question of conversion arose. The argument for the plaintiff (respondent) was that, admitting the defendant had a right to remove the apples, when removed they became the property of the plaintiff. To this contention of the plaintiff the Divisional Court gave effect. Mr. Justice Avory in his judgment pointed out that the case was not governed by Lemmon v. Webb, and that the right to cut down branches of oaks and elms, as was done in that case, was based on the law of nuisance and not of trespass. The apples were the property of the plaintiff before they were severed from the trees, and remained his property after severance. Both property and right of possession were in the plaintiff, and the defendant, by appropriating and selling the apples, was guilty of conversion, and therefore liable to the plaintiff in damages. Only one case-of the sixteenth century-was cited for the plaintiff, and is worth noticing, though not referred to in Mr. Justice Avory's judgment. This case is Mulgrave v. Ogden (1591, 1 Cro. Eliz. 219). Trover was brought for some barrels of butter, and part of the cause of action alleged was that the defendant had been negligent in taking care of them, so they had become of little value. The court held that the negligence gave no cause of action: "No law compelleth him that findeth a thing to keep it safely . . . but if a man findeth a thing and useth it he is answerable, for it is conversion; so if he of purpose misuseth it." This certainly supports the decision in Mills v. Brooker. A case cited for the defendant is also worth noticing, because it seems to have been the authority for a passage in Pollock and Wright's Possession in the Common Law, which was referred to by Mr. Justice Avory. To support the argument that the apples had never been in the possession of the plaintiff and so could not be held to have been converted by the defendant, Reg. v. Townley (L. Rep. 1 C. C. R. 315) was relied on, together with the passage founded on it in Pollock and Wright (p. 230). A poacher had been convicted of stealing rabbits, having killed the rabbits and left them in a ditch and subsequently taken them away. The conviction was quashed on the ground that the whole transaction was continuous, and that rabbits killed on the land and taken away were not the subject of larceny. This was a criminal case, and there was no question of any right of property in the rabbits as between the poacher and the owner after they had been taken from the land. But the passage in Pollock and Wright runs: "Trespass to goods cannot be committed by severing and carrying away . . . fixtures or growing crop; for such things are not movable or in possession until they are severed. Accordingly the possession of the taker is not trespassory, and he cannot commit trespass or theft, either by the first taking or by a subsequent conversion or misappropriation" Mr. Justice Avory thought this passage did not help the argument in support of which it was cited, because it had no application to the question of what might be the respective rights of the parties after the thing taken had been severed from the realty. This observation certainly applies to the case of Reg. v. Townley, but hardly to the passage above quoted. The decision in Miles v. Brooker appears to be in contradiction to the quoted passage, and the latter seems to be expressed too widely. It was not necessary in the recent case for the Divisional Court to come to any decision as to how the plaintiff could have enforced his right to the apples growing over the defendant's land, supposing the defendant had not picked them In that event, it may be pointed out, the plaintiff would have been entitled to enter upon the defendant's land for the purpose of getting actual possession of his property. Authority for this statement my be found in Viner's Abridgment, where it is said: "If trees grow in my hedge, hanging over another man's land, and the fruit of them falls into the other's land, I may justify my entry to gather up the fruit, if I make no longer stay there than is convenient, nor break his hedge ": (Vin. Abr. Trespass, L. a. 6). This seems common sense, and agrees with what is laid down in the Digest de glande legenda: "Ait prætor: Glandem quæ ex illius agro in tuum cadat, quo minus illi tertio quoque die legere auferre liceat vim fieri veto.' Glandis nomine omnes fructus continentur." And, of course, just as glans in the Digest "includes every kind of fruit," so in the Abridgment it may be said that "in my hedge" includes every kind of proximity to the boundary of the land. COMMENTS ON CASES. Schemes of Compensation for Injured Infant Work men. EMPLOYERS of labour on an extensive scale find that it suits the purpose as well of their workmen as of themselves that both parties should contract themselves out of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58). This is expressly authorised to be done by sect. 3 thereof, as all are aware who ever have occasion to consult that enactment. It may be convenient, however, to remind the reader that the provisions of the scheme are substituted for the provisions of the Ac, and thereupon the employer is liable only in accordance with the scheme. But where the scheme provides for contributions by the workman, it must confer benefits at least equivalent to those contributions, in addition to the benefits which the workman would have been entitled to under the Act. Every scheme is required to be certified by the Registrar of Friendly Societies. Before he grants his certificate, however, he has to be satisfied as to the condition last mentioned. The workman is, therefore, adequately protected in every way. And that the system so warranted by statute works smoothly and efficiently in practice is evidenced by the fact that the cases in which schemes have been brought before the Court of Appeal to be adjudicated upon by it have been astonishingly few in number. The first that has for several years claimed the attention of that tribunal is that of Dowling v. Great Eastern Railway Company (noted ante, p. 235), the Master of the Rolls (Swinfen Eady), Lord Justice Scrutton, and Mr. Justice Eve being the learned judges by whom it was heard. Even so, it was not the provisions of the scheme itself that occasioned the litigation, but a dispute between the applicant, an infant workman, who was injured while in the employment of the respondents, and the respondents as to whether the applicant was bound by the scheme and was consequently precluded from applying for compensation under the Act. Incidentally was touched upon the question whether an infant workman is at liberty to contract himself out of the Act. But as Lord Justice Scrutton pointed out, the reported decisions show that an infant workman is perfectly capable of making a contract respecting his labour, provided that the same is for his own benefit. In the present case, the scheme was admittedly for the benefit of the applicant. It was, indeed, described as an excellent scheme by the learned County Court judge. And, moreover, it had received the sanction of the Registrar of Friendly Societies. That being so, it was impracticable for the applicant to raise any objection to the scheme on the score of its merits as such. But the reason why the applicant made a request for arbitration under the Act, notwiths anding the existence of the scheme, was that an anterior claim by him for compensation under the scheme had been refused by the committee appointed to administer it. The ground of their refusal was that the medical evidence showed that the applicant's incapacity for work was not due to any accident. In that state of circumstances, how could it be in any way possible for the applicant to go behind the scheme? That is the question which would occur to the mind of anyone acquainted with the subject. We must refer the reader to our note in order that he may inform himself of the answer which the learned County Court judge gave to that question We have only space at our disposal to explain here, in brief terms, the important decision of the Court of Appeal, as stated in our note, negativing the jurisdiction of the learned judge to ignore the contract into which the applicant had entered. So long as the case of the injured infant workman, who was a party to the scheme of compensation with his employers, was fairly heard by the committee appointed thereunder-they having by the rules of the scheme power to regulate their own procedure in respect of all matters to be decided by them-and full opportunity was given to place before them all the material facts-which it was not denied had been done by the applicant's father-it was not essential that the committee should hear the applicant orally, or someone on his behalf. Of course, if the committee had in any degree failed to perform their duty, it would have been a different matter altogether. But the remedy would not have been recourse to the Act of 1906. The proper remedy open to the applicant was procedure by way of mandamus to the committee ordering them to hear and determine the case in accordance with substantial principles of justice. Employment of a Casual Nature. a THE definition of “workman” in sect. 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58) is a tolerably intelligible one, and in all likelihood would have created but little difficulty in its comprehension, had it not been for the exclusion therefrom of persons whose employment is of a "casual nature." But that extremely ambiguous phraseology is answerable for having caused an infinitude of trouble and perplexity and the necessity for the decision of numerous cases. The latest is Stoker v. Wortham (noted post,. p. 293) before the Court of Appeal, consisting of the Master of the Rolls (Swinfen Eady) and Lords Justices Warrington and Duke, on appeal from His Honour Judge Selfe at the Marylebone County Court. The applicant in that case, not being a person who was employed for the respon. dent's trade or business, was refused compensation in respect of the "personal injury by accident" which she had sustained admittedly" arising out of and in the course of " her employment within the meaning of sect. 1 of the Act. The ground of the objection to pay her compensation was that such employment was of a "casual nature," and that consequently she was not "workman" according to the definition in sect. 13. As appears from our note, the applicant was taken into the respondent's domestic service and was employed as a temporary cook during the absence of the respondent's regular servant, who was absent on a fortnight's holiday. And the decision of the case afforded the learned judges of the Court of Appeal the opportunity to add much useful imformation as to the proper method of ascertaining whether or not a person's employment is included in the statutory description, to which itself "casual" may not unbefittingly be ascribed. The Master of the Rolls laid much stress upon what Lord Justice Hamilton (as he then was) had laid down in the course of his judgment in the well-known case of Knight v. Bucknil! (6 B. W. C. C. 160) relating to the expression "casual nature." His Lordship there gave it as his opinion that "casual" was used in the section not as a term of precision, but colloquially. He could think of "no adjective to describe it better"-a tribute to the ingenuity of the Parliamentary draftsman that conceivably not everyone will feel prepared to lavish upon him. Nor would he add an adjective to the already considerable list of those contrasted with it by various learned judges. Space will not permit of our quoting further from the learned Lord Justice's observations on the equivocal-if not, indeed, cryptic-term now under discussion. But his conclusion that the burden must be cast upon County Court judges of determining when employment is of a "casual nature and when it is not so is an attractively simple way of getting rid of the difficulty in so far as the Court of Appeal is concerned. If in the present case the learned judges of the Court of Appeal have not succeeded in doing much better in the way of elucidating the mystery, their Lordships have, at any rate, gone so far as to vouchsafe many hints which County Court judges generally will doubtless find of much guidance and assistance to them while applying themselves to the task before them. Chief among the same are those details that are specified in our note. And the free hand which is left to the tribunals that have, in the first instance, to deal with the question whether or not an applicant for compensation is or is not a "workman because of the nature of his employment will perhaps be appreciated to the full by some. That will be so even if othera would have preferred that the obligation should have been rendered somewhat less onerous. But there is no possibility of satisfying everyone. Shifting of the Onus of Proof. THE burden of proof may shift continually in the course of a trial, according as the evidence preponderates in favour of one |