by Cowper, C., that the day of redemption being lapsed, the plaintiff could not redeem the jewels without paying also the money due on the notes; but that the goods. of Knight, which were pawned with the jewels, should be first applied towards payment of the notes, as far as the value thereof would extend (g).

And where a pawnee of debentures which had been deposited with him as a security for the payment of a bill of exchange, with a right to sell or otherwise dispose of the debentures in the event of non-payment of the bill at a certain time, sub-pawned the debentures to a third person as a security for a debt of his own, before any default in payment of the bill by the original pawnor in an action of detinue by the pawnor against the sub-pawnee, it was held, that, notwithstanding the breach of contract by the pawnee, the pawnor could not sustain the action until he had paid or tendered the amount due on the bill (h).

Pawnee's rights as against pawnor's sub-pawnee.

In the case of a simple pawn of a personal chattel, if the pawnee part with the possession he loses his property in the pledge (i). But a mere delivery or lending of the pawn to the pawnor, with a licence to use it for a limited time, is not a parting with the possession.

And so, where one Wilson, the master of a vessel belonging to the defendants, on the eve of a voyage, in

(g) Demainbry v. Metcalfe and another, 2 Vern. 691 & 698, Mich. 1715, Ch. Prec. 420. But quære the facts in this case as to the promissory notes, and agreement between the parties.

(h) Donald v. Suckling, 7 B. & S. 783, L. R. 1 Q. B. 585. (i) Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 165.

consideration of an advance of 50l., by a memorandum in writing, dated the 23rd December, 1836, "made over to them as their property, until the sum advanced should be repaid, his chronometer and all his nautical instruments then on board the vessel, they allowing him the use of the same for the voyage." At the time this transaction took place, the chronometer was in the hands of the makers for safe custody, and to be regulated. The transaction was not communicated to the makers; but on signing the memorandum, Wilson obtained the chronometer from them and handed it over to a clerk of the defendants, who then delivered it back to Wilson to be used by him for the voyage, pursuant to the agreement. On Wilson's return in July, 1837, he deposited the chronometer with the makers, as before; and afterwards re-pledged it to the plaintiff as security for a debt. The plaintiff accordingly took possession of the chronometer, but handed it back to the makers for safe custody. It was held, upon an issue under the interpleader act, to try the property in the chronometer, that it vested in the defendants under the agreement of 23rd December, 1836, immediately upon the delivery thereof to the defendant's clerk, as a security for the repayment of the 50%. ; and that Wilson had then nothing left him but the reversionary property, to come into possession after such repayment had been made; and that the delivery of the chronometer to Wilson under the terms of the agreement, that "the defendants should allow him the use of it for the voyage," was not a parting with the possession, but merely gave him a licence or permission to use it as their servant; and

after the voyage, the possession of Wilson was the possession of the defendants; just as the possession of plate by a butler is the possession of his master; and that, therefore, the delivery over of the chronometer to the plaintiff was a wrongful act, and gave the plaintiff no better title than Wilson had himself (k).

Pledgor's right to sell his equity of redemption in the pledge.

The pledgor of a chattel retains his property in it (qualified by the right existing in the pledgee), and has a right to sell it, and thereby to transfer his property to the buyer if the pledgee refuse to deliver up the pledge, on the buyer tendering him the amount due thereon, the buyer may maintain an action of trover to recover it.

:

And where a chronometer had been pledged by the owner to the defendant, a pawnbroker, under a written agreement that it was deposited as a collateral security for 157. and interest, and that in case the owner should not redeem it within twelve months, the defendant might sell it and repay himself principal and interest: the plaintiff afterwards bought the chronometer of the owner whilst it was in defendant's hands, after the expiration of the year, and tendered the amount due and demanded possession of it; and on defendant refusing to give it up, it was held, in an action of trover for the chronometer, that a pawnor, like every other bailor, retains his property in the goods pawned, subject only

(k) Reeves v. Capper, 6 Scott, 877, 5 Bing. N. C. 136; and see Martin v. Reid, 31 L. J. C. P. 126.

to the qualified property transferred to the pawnee; that as an incident to such property, he has the right of sale, and that after the sale the purchaser has the same interest in the chattel which the pawnor had; and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover (1).

Pledges of Policies of Assurance.

Where money is lent on the security of a life policy, notice of the assignment and amount of the loan, under the hand of the pledgor, must be given to the insurance office. In the absence of such a notice, if the pledgor become bankrupt, the pledgee will have no valid security for his advance, and may be compelled by a court of equity to give up the policy for the benefit of the bankrupt's estate (m).

And by the Policies of Assurance Act, 1867 (n), any assignment of a policy of life assurance may be made either by indorsement on the policy, or by a separate instrument, in the words or to the effect set forth in the schedule thereto, such indorsement or separate instrument being duly stamped; but no assignment of a policy of life assurance is to confer on the assignee thereof, his executors, administrators, or assigns, any right to sue for the amount of such policy until a written notice of the date and purport of such assignment has been given to the assurance company. And the manager, secretary, treasurer, or other principal officer

(1) Franklin v. Neate, 13 M. & W. 481.

(m) Williams v. Thorp, 2 Sim. 257; Edwards v. Martin, 35 L. J. Ch. 186.

(n) 30 & 31 Vict. c. 144.

is required, on payment of a fee not exceeding 58., to deliver to the person giving such notice an acknowledgment thereof in writing under his hand. Such acknowledgment is then to be conclusive evidence, as against the assurance company, of their having duly received the notice.

The act is not to apply to any policy or contract entered into in pursuance of the provisions of the Acts 16 & 17 Vict. c. 45, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 43, nor to any engagement for payment on death by any Friendly Society.

Possession of pawnbrokers' duplicates is primâ facie evidence of title to possession of the goods, subject to

the loan.

If a person, not being the pawner of the goods, be in possession of the pawnbroker's duplicates, he has primâ facie a title to the goods subject to the pawnbroker's lien thereon; and the court will not presume any wrongful possession of the duplicates; and if he redeem the goods he is entitled to hold them as against the original owner, for the amount he paid to redeem them; for, having paid the loan and interest, he obtained whatever interest the pawnbroker had in the goods (0).

The pledgee may sue in debt for the loan without returning the pledge.

Where money is lent on a pledge of goods, the lender may sue the borrower without returning or ten

(0) Furber v. Sturmy, 5 Jur. N. S. 45.