to get there. They would have harassed me all that day; and, as I had only ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost a part of it1 during the attack on the following morning; and, at all events, I should have been obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it. During the attack of the 23rd, the enemy did not know where the baggage was: and, although it was so close to them, they never went near it.2 6. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed 3 a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Colonel Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night. I therefore determined to make the attack. 7. The plan concerted, you will observe,5 failed, from the deficiency of our information regarding the enemy's position, and, consequently, my coming too near them on the 23rd, with my camp, baggage, &c. 8. The enemy's first position was as shown in the plan. The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages everywhere, excepting at Peepulgaum and Waroor. I determined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, to attack the enemy's left flank and rear, and to cross the river at Peepulgaum. I intended at that time to throw my right up to9 Assye. 9. For a length of time 10 they did not see my infantry, or 11 discover my design. When they did discover it, they altered their position, and threw their left up to Assye, 7 à, followed by no article.Notice this use of d, instead of avec in the same way we say, un homme à cheveux blancs, l'Homme au masque de fer, la Poule aux œufs d'or, &c.-If, however, the Kaitna has high as well as steep banks, the French epithet for it will be rivière encaissée. 8 See page 126, note 17. 9 to throw up to,' porter jusqu'à. 10 Pendant assez longtemps. and formed across the ground between the Kaitna and Assye; but in more than one line. Luckily, they did not occupy the ford at Peepulgaum: if they had, I must have gone lower down;3 and possibly I should have been obliged to make a road across the river, which 5 would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day enough for the attack. 10. When I saw that they had got their left to Assye, I altered my plan; and determined to manœuvre by my left, and push the enemy upon the nullah, knowing that the village of Assye must fall when the right should be beat. Orders were given accordingly. 6 7 11. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which frequently happen, the officer commanding the piquets, which were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of Assye: the 74th regiment, which was on the right of the second line, and was ordered to support 9 the piquets, followed them. There was a large break in our line 10 between these corps and those 11 on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible 12 cannonade from 13 Assye, and were charged by the cavalry belonging to the campoos; consequently, in the piquets and the 74th regiment, we sustained the greatest part of our loss.15 One company of the piquets, of one officer and fifty rank and file,16 lost the officer and forty-four rank and file. This company belonged to the battalion left at Naulniah. 14 1 'on the ground which separates the K- from A-.' 2 Supply the ellipsis, which, as we have repeatedly seen above, is not allowed in French. 3 il m'aurait fallu (or, j'aurais été obligé de-j'aurais eu à) descendre plus bas. See page 44. note 3, and page 38, note 5. 4 chemin. 5 See page 8, note 6. 6 Use the imperfect tense. 7 6 who commanded.' 8 and which;' see page 56, note".-'was ordered;' turn, 'had order-or, the order' (page 21, 12. Another bad1 consequence resulting from this mistake was, the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period.2 I had ordered it to watch the motions of the enemy's cavalry hanging upon our right; and, luckily, it charged in time to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets. It was thus brought into 6 the cannonade; horses and men were lost: it charged among broken infantry, and separated; the unity of the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as I had intended when I placed it in the third line, to pursue and cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus makes the victory still more complete than it was.9 13. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assye was not defeated till worked upon 10 by the centre and left of our line, notwithstanding the movement of the piquets, the 74th, and the cavalry; and then it went off directly, and was cut up. N.B. The Juah river, or nullah, has steep banks, impassable for carriages, scarcely passable for horses. 1 fâcheuse (fem.). 2 of introducing too soon,' &c. 3 mouvements. 'We rather say cavalerie or infanterie ennemie (adjective) than de l'ennemi (substantive, as in English). -hanging upon,' qui ne cessait de rôder aux alentours de. 5 à temps pour. 7 See page 5, note 14.- when I placed ;' turn, ' in placing.' 8 See page 35, note 7. 9 See page 30, note 11, and page 5, note 14. 10 to work upon,' here, attaquer: see page 29, note 12. THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA (1854). Strategic Operations-The River Alma- Position and Force of the Russians-Earthwork Batteries to defend the Heights-The French Charge Advance of the British Line-Gallantry of Lord RaglanPassage of the River, and Brilliant Charge up the HeightsSanguinary Struggle The Russian Battery taken, and Retreat of the Enemy. HEIGHTS OF THE ALMA, September 21. THE order in which our army advanced was in columns of brigades in deploying distance,1 our left protected by a line of skirmishers, of cavalry, and of horse artillery. The advantage of the 2 formation was, that our army, in case of a strong attack from cavalry and infantry on the left or rear, could assume the form of a hollow square, with the baggage in the centre.4 Our great object was 5 to gain the right of the position, so that our attacking parties could be sheltered by the vertical fire of the fleets. 3 We had, in fact, altered our base of operations. As we marched forward to Barljanak, we allowed the enemy to deprive us of our old basis of operations, in order that we might get a new one. For this purpose the baggage was brought up and covered by the 4th Division, and the Cossacks were allowed to sweep the country in our rear far behind us.10 Our new principle, in fact, was to open communication with our fleets, and as far 11 as possible obtain their material and moral aid. In advancing towards the sea obliquely, on the morning of the 19th, we were 4 8 2 met by seventeen squadrons of cavalry, deployed to meet1 our handful of horse, and it was necessary to make a demonstration of artillery and infantry to extricate our men from the difficulty into which they had been plunged by advancing too far in front of their supports. However, the enemy were driven back 3 by our guns, which made beautiful practice, and the cavalry maintained their ground,5 having retired in splendid order before a force which refused to meet them when they might have done so, by a charge down from the elevated position they occupied, with a fair chance of an encounter 9 ere our artillery could come up. Our line of march on the 20th, as I have said, was toward the right of our former base, and brought us in contact with the French left, 10 under Prince Napoleon, it being understood 11 that Sir De Lacy Evans's division on the extreme right should act in concert with that of his Royal Highness the Prince, which was of course furthest from the sea. As soon as we had ascertained the position of our allies accurately, the whole line, extending itself across the champaign country 12 for some five or six miles, advanced.13 The scheme of operations concerted between the generals, was, that the French and Turks on our right were to force 14 the passage of the river, a rivulet of the Alma, and establish themselves on the heights over the stream at the 8' down from,' du haut de. 9 et cela avec une assez belle chance pour lui; and a comma after lui.-'to come up;' simply, arriver. 10 et nous relia à la gauche des Français. 'Prince Napoléon ;' see page 4, note 1, and various other places. car il avait été convenu; it being,' &c., is not any more a French turn than its being,' &c. (page 21, note 1). 12 la plaine.-'some, in this sense; see page 308, note 2. 13 to advance,' or 'to move, or 'begin to move,' in a military sense, s'ébranler. 14 See page 79, note 2.. |