Of these corporate bodies some are lay, some ecclesiastical; the lay bodies are divided into civil and eleemosynary. No doubt is suggested, but that a power of legislation is vested in lay civil corporations, provided the bye-laws are made conformable to their charters and in unison with the great purpose of the institution. The Trinity House may make bye-laws for the regulation of navigation within the limits of their authority; the insurance companies for their contracts upon policies. Similar power is vested in the College of Physicians, and in the Company of Surgeons, for improvements in medical science; in the Royal Society, for the advancement of natural history; in the Society of Antiquaries, for the promotion of the study of antiquities; and in the Royal Academy of Arts, for the cultivation of painting and sculpture. The question then arises, why such an authority is to be in any way denied to lay eleemosynary corporations? whether it does not follow, as Justice Blackstone states the proposition, that as corporations they must possess the power of internal legislation. There is a good reason why the university cannot repeal or alter the Caroline statutes. Having accepted that code of laws as their charter, they cannot alter it without breaking the condition, upon which the great executive authority of the state invested them with corporate privileges. But all other laws they may make and alter at pleasure. It seems, that after the Caroline statutes had been received and ratified, Archbishop Laud sent to the university of Oxford a statute which is now in force respecting the professor of Arabic. It must however be observed, that neither the authority from which that statute emanated, nor even the consent of the king, to which the Duke of Wellington attached so much weight, could have given validity to this statute. It became binding only as any bye-law is binding, as having

Lord Coke mentions the corporations all together, and never draws any distinction between them with reference to this point. Every body politic or corporate is either ecclesiastical or lay; ecclesiastical, either regular, as abbots, priors, &c., or secular, as bishop, deans, archdeacons, parsons, vicars, &c.; lay, as mayor and commonalty, bailiffs and burgesses, &c. Also every body politic or corporate is either elective, presentative, collective, or donative. And again, it is either sole, or aggregate of many; as you may read in the third part of my Commentaries. And this body politic or corporate, aggregate of many, is by the civilians called collegium or universitas."

been sanctioned by the university. It could not acquire additional force from the approbation of the Sovereign; no more than any bye-law passed by the corporation of the city of London, which would not be more binding because it was passed at the Sovereign's suggestion. There is no room for the Sovereign's interference, unless the corporation chooses to resign the old charter and to accept a new one.

The principles, upon which the visitatorial jurisdiction has been admired, supply an additional argument in favour of the legislative authority of the college. Those principles, as explained in the authorities which we quoted in our last number, are, that any dispute which may arise within the college may be adjusted within the college; that institutions founded for the cure of the sick, or for the promotion of education or of religion, may not be exposed to the tedious litigation of the ordinary Courts, nor the members of them to a public defence from imputations, perhaps calumnious and false. For these reasons the law permits those who enjoy the founder's bounty to be judged by the tribunal which the founder has thought proper to constitute. "The original of such power is the property of the donor, and the power every one has to dispose, direct, and regulate his own property." Now it is clear that the members of the corporation are, no less than the visitor, the creatures of the founder. Upon them he confers the beneficial enjoyment of his property, subject to the conditions contained in his statutes, just as much as upon the visitor he confers the power of enforcing the statutes. There are no other persons, upon whom he has shown the slightest wish to confer any of the privileges or benefits, which arise from the foundation. And if, consistently with the statutes, any bye-law can be framed by which the institution may be rendered more useful in the judgment of the members, it is clear, according to every decision connected with this subject, that they are to receive the benefit of the improvement. For the benefit then of the members of the college the power of making bye-laws ought to exist. The next question is, in whom it should be vested? In answering this question the principle of the visi

1 Green v. Rutherford, 1 Ves. 472.

tatorial jurisdiction must not be overlooked. The law recognizes the forum domesticum. In judicial matters it abhors external interference with the affairs of the corporation. In this respect it treats the body corporate as absolutely an unit. We submit, that in matters of legislation the same principle is applicable à fortiori. If interference from without in judicial matters would produce uncertainty, or confusion, or vexation, a legislative interference will produce them in a far greater degree. The construction of a statute left to the judicial mind of a foreigner could never create so much disturbance, as the work of legislation committed to his general discretion. The duties of a judge, as compared with those of a law-maker, admit of mathematical precision. There could be no limit to the vexation, which any foreigner might produce, if politically invested with the right to make bye-laws for a corporation. It follows from these considerations, that the policy of the law in respect of these corporate bodies cannot be carried into effect, if the power of making bye-laws rests in any other body than the corporation itself. It must be there or no where. We think that we have shown that the visitor has it not. There is no reason why one member should have the privilege more than another; and the analogy of other corporate bodies requires that it should rest in the entire body.

Indeed the power of making bye-laws is held to be so inseparably incident to bodies erected for the accomplishment of objects of a similar character, that it has been held to belong to societies which have not been incorporated. We allude to the benchers of our inns of Court. "They are not corporations, and have no constitution by charters from the Crown. They are," Lord Mansfield continues, "voluntary societies, which for ages have submitted to government, analogous to that of other seminaries of learning."1 Lord Tenterden, in explanation of this passage, says, that "Lord Mansfield must be understood to have meant, that they submit to such rules and regulations as they themselves ordained for the internal government of the society, but not that they submit to any

King v. Gray's Inn, Doug. 1, 354.

2 King v. Benchers of Lincoln's Inn, 4 B. & C. 858.

order of a foreign jurisdiction as to the persons whom they are to admit as members."

In observing upon the mischiefs which would arise if any person, or body of persons, foreign to the college, were allowed to enact laws for its internal regulation, we have alluded to the permanent existence of such an authority. We have purposely avoided all allusion to the question, whether under any peculiar circumstances such a power may be advantageously created for a time. The public interest in the state of these institutions, in their ability to educate and form the character of the higher classes, and in the degree of discipline and morality and religion within them, is far too deep to allow us to form an opinion upon this subject without very mature consideration. The "Layman," to whose pamphlet we before referred, discusses the policy, as well as of the legal and constitutional right, of interference with the colleges and universities. His pamphlet contains many of the popular errors which are prevalent upon the subject. He evidently entertains a notion, that it is upon the visitatorial authority that interference from without must necessarily encroach. The notion is orrect, on the supposition that such an interference would not exceed the enforcement of existing statutes. But that, if it takes place at all, it will exceed these limits, may be gathered from the expressions of every person who is in favour of such a step, and arises, we may almost say necessarily, from the difficulty which the rules of the thirteenth, fourteenth, or fifteenth centuries will present in any attempt to apply them strictly to the circumstances of modern times. Such an interference will, no doubt, be conducted either by the enactment of bye-laws, or else by the alteration of the original statutes. It will be a legislative interference to make alterations, some of which the members of the college may themselves make, others they may pray the sovereign to make by the grant of a new charter, or the legislature by an act of Parliament. Thus foreign interference will encroach upon no power of the visitor, but upon the legislative authority of the entire college. The "Layman" dismisses, with only a passing notice, the existence of a legislative authority in the college.1 We cannot help thinking that he ought to have made

1 Page 5.

it his great weapon of defence, and to have shown that the best workmen in the task of college improvement will be its own members, who unite an intimate acquaintance with the system, to associations and sympathies with the community at large.

Towards the conclusion of the pamphlet, the writer brings forward the oath which fellows take on entering a college, as a further impediment to alteration. He forgets that if, according to his construction, the oath is violated by every departure from the statutes originally sworn to, the violation must equally be an offence from whatever quarter the alteration proceeds. Let the college itself and the legislature, and the whole country, desire a change, still, if his doctrine is correct, it cannot be made without producing a violation of the oath. This inference flows necessarily from the writer's argument, and savours strongly of the reductio ad absurdum. We regret that such an argument should have been employed, for it is less likely to promote respect for the sanctity of an oath, than to convert the oath itself into a subject of ridicule.1

We think, then, that every college has power to make laws for internal regulation, provided they are consistent with the statutes on the one hand, or on the other with the general laws of the country. Laws at variance with a statute the college cannot make, unless a power to do so is specially con

1 The writer concludes his pamphlet by supposing the oaths to be altered, and the fellows, for conscience' sake, to abandon their colleges. He then gives vent to his feelings in the following pathetic description. "They will therefore surrender their possessions to the force which overpowers them, and voluntarily disband themselves-quitting their homes and emoluments, which will indeed then have become comparatively worthless, being held only by the flimsy tenure of the capricious will of an arbitrary and tyrannical legislature, and leave their place to be occupied by the mixed body which is waiting without, and in whose favour the great work of spoliation will have been done.

'Whether the country would endure a spectacle of this nature,-the wise, the good, the learned, the religious, some of the very best members of society, martyrs indeed for conscience' sake, in the great cause of civil and religious liberty, driven by a tyrant power from their rightful possessions, and outlawed from their proper homes, may indeed be doubted. It is probable that under such provocation the spirit of the nation would rise up, and demand on the one side restitution to the injured, and on the other the punishment of their oppressors."

If Alma Mater could but speak for herself, she would certainly cry rescue from her imaginative champion.