the false instrument; 2. The means of giving credit to it; 3. Uttering it; and, 4. The felonious intent.

1. As to the Indictment. The allegations in an indictment for forgery naturally distribute themselves under the following heads. 1. That the defendant did falsely make, utter, &c. 2. The particular instrument set forth. 3. With the intent

to defraud another: 1 Stark. Cr. Pl. 93. Upon the first of these heads, see Savage's case, 2 E. P. C. 985; Elsworth's case, id. 286. The instrument alleged to be forged must be set forth in words and figures, though there be no technical form of words for expressing that it is so set forth: 2 E. P. C. 975. But it must appear on the face of the indictment to be the thing prohibited to be forged. Thus, in an indictment for forging a receipt, either the instrument set out must appear to be a receipt on the face of it, in which case no further averment is necessary: Testick's case and Taylor's case, 2 E. P. C. 977, (where the instruments were respectively, "received the contents by me," &c. and, "received, W. Wilson ;") or there must be an averment of some fact, shewing that the instrument imported a receipt, and was intended to be used as a receipt by the prisoner: Hunter's case, Leach, 711. Therefore, where the name of the holder of a navy bill was signed without other words on a receipt stamp, and affixed to the bill, it was held that such an instrument did not, on the face of it, purport to be a receipt for money within the statutes, 2 Geo. 2, c. 25, and 2 Geo. 2, c. 2; but that, as it is considered as a receipt at the Navy Office, it might, by proper averments, be brought within the statutes: S. C. So, where the word "settled" was forged at the end of the bill, it was held that the indictment ought to shew that such word meant a receipt:

R. v. Thompson, 2 Leach, 110. So where a person is in the habit of drawing on his bankers by means of an order of a peculiar form, an indictment for forgery of such an order as an order for payment of money, generally, will not be sustained; but it must aver especially, that the forged instrument was intended for such an order : Ravenscroft's case, R. & R. 161. Gilchrist's case, and Jones's case, see post. may be referred to this principle. An indictment for forging a deed must aver that it was sealed: 3 Keb. 388. An indictment for forging an order for the delivery of goods must shew, either on the face of the false instrument, or by proper averments, that the party whose name is subscribed had authority to make such an order: Clinch's case, 2 E. P. C. 938; Foster, 119; and see Wilcox's case, R. & R. 50; and it must also shew, that the party to whom the order was directed had possession of the goods: Clinch's case.

The word "purport," in an indictment for forgery, imports what appears on the face of the instrument. Therefore, an indictment for forging an order for payment of money, stating that it purported to be directed to A. B. C., by the names of A. C. D., and setting forth the tenor as directed to A. C. D. was held bad: Gilchrist's case, 2 E. P. C. 982. On the other hand, an indictment for forging a bill of exchange was held bad, which stated it to be signed by H. H., instead of purporting only to be so signed: Carter's case, id. 985. Though it be doubtless sufficient to charge that the defendant forged such an instrument, naming it, and setting forth the tenor; yet the laying it to be a paper writing, &c., purporting to be such an instrument as the statute on which the indictment is framed describes, is good: 2 E. P. C. 980. Where the for

gery is by alteration, the indictment may charge that the prisoner forged the altered instrument, R. v. Teague, R. & R. 33; or that he altered by forging, for altering is forging: R. v. Elsworth, Bayl. Bills, 443, and see post. And discharging one indorsement on a bill of exchange and inserting another may be charged as altering the indorsement: R. v. Birkett, Bayl. Bills, 430. But the forgery of an addition which has not the effect of altering the instrument, but is collateral to it, as an acceptance, &c. must be specially alleged. See Archb. 190. The intent to defraud must be stated in the indictment, and the proof must tally with such averment; otherwise the prisoner will be entitled to an acquittal. But, in the case of a bill of exchange, it need not be averred that it was tendered to the party, with intent to defraud whom the offence is laid to have been committed: 2 E. P. C. 989. It is usual to add a count for uttering in every case.

To proceed to make a few observations on the crime itself, and, first, as to the form and nature of the false instrument. It is not material that the forged instrument should be of such a nature that, if genuine, it would be valid, provided it carries on the face of it the semblance of that for which it was counterfeited, and is not illegal in its very frame 2 E. P. C. 948. Therefore, forgery may be committed of a protection in the name of one as being a member of parliament, who is not so; of a conveyance, although the estate be described by a wrong name; or of a will, although the pretended testator be living, ibid. In all which cases, had the instrument been genuine, it would not have been valid. But, in order to bring cases of this nature within the crime of forgery, it is necessary that such a degree of deception be used

as may impose upon persons of ordinary caution. And where in a forged bank note the word "pounds" was omitted after "fifty," and there was no water-mark, it was held a sufficient resemblance of a note, to be left to a jury to say, whether it purported to be such or not, even independently of the £50 in the margin; but the last circumstance was considered to remove every doubt: Elliot's case, 1 Leach, 179. So, where the false instrument was in the form of a magistrate's order, but was signed in the name of a person who was not a magistrate, it seems to have been deemed a sufficient imposition on the treasurėr of the county to constitute forgery: Froud's case, R. & R. 389. So, uttering a forged bill, importing to be payable to the drawer's order, has been held to be a complete offence, though there was no indorsement on it importing to be the drawer's, and the want of such indorsement was not noticed by the taker: Wicks's case, id. 149. But see, contra, Randall's case, id. 195. But where the false instrument is on the face of it so incomplete, as to render it impossible for any person of ordinary caution to be deceived by it, the making of it will not constitute forgery; as where a note was set forth as purporting to be a bank note, and ran thus, "I promise to pay for self and company of my bank in England:" 2 E. P. C. 883. Or where the instrument was in the form of a scrip receipt, but was not filled up with the name of the subscriber, but left a blank, Lyon's case, 2 Leach, 597; or of a bill upon the treasurer of the navy, and signed in the name of a navy surgeon, but made payable to blank or order, Richard's case, R. & R. 193; or of a common bill of exchange, but made payable only to blank or order, id. 185. Again, where the false instrument is illegal in its frame, it

appears from a variety of cases that a prosecution for forgery cannot be sustained. As where the counterfeit imports to be a devise of lands, but is attested by only two witnesses, and there is no evidence to shew a chattel interest in those lands, Wall's case, 2 E. P. C. 953, or where it purports to be a bill of exchange, but appears to be drawn for more than 20s. and less than 5l. is not attested by a subscribing witness, and is without the other requisites of 17 Geo. 3, c. 30, Moffat's case, id. 954; or where it purports to be a magistrate's order to pay money, and the act of parliament on which the order is founded requires it to be under hand and seal, and it is under hand only, and does not otherwise conform to the provisions of the act: Rushworth's case, R. & R. 317, S. C.; 1 Stark. 396. And this principle seems to have been acted on in Chisholm's case, R. & R. 297. There the forged instrument purported to be a bill drawn by an acting lieutenant on the commissioners of the navy for pay; the 35 Geo. 3, c. 94, prescribes a particular form of draft upon such commissioners by certain persons therein mentioned. But, because that statute does not extend to a bill drawn by an acting lieutenant, the prisoner was held to have been properly convicted on the 2 Geo. 2, c. 25, for forging a bill of exchange. See also Randall's case, id. 195. Again, in Froud's case, id. 389, the prisoner was held to have been rightly convicted, on the grounds, that if the instrument (which purported to be a magistrate's order, under 48 Geo. 3, c.75), had been genuine, it would have been also legal in form. It must be admitted, however, that M'Intosh's case (see the last note,) is at variance with the principles just laid down. So also are Hawkswood's case and Morton's case, 2 E. P. C. 955, or 2 Russ. 1444; which were

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cases of forging bills and notes on unstamped paper. But it may be observed, that two or three of the judges in the latter case doubted the propriety of Hawkswood's case, though they thought it expedient to abide by it as a precedent.

2. The means of giving credit to the forged instrument. 1. It may be premised, that there must be some kind of false making, to constitute forgery. Therefore, where an indorsement on a bill was genuine, it was held not to be forgery to pass for the indorser, and thereby obtain credit in the name of another: Hevey's case, 2 E. P. C. 856; Bayley on Bills, 433. It was held, indeed, in a case preceding Hevey's case, that the uttering a note, as the note of another person, is forgery, though such note be made in the same name as that of the prisoner: R. v. Parke and Brown, 2 E. P. C. 963. The principles, however, upon which this decision rests, have been questioned by a writer of authority: 6 Ev. Stat. 580. And, indeed, upon perusal of that case, it will be found, that the instrumentin question, though fraudulent, was not upon the face of it false, and was only construed to be false, by means of extrinsic evidence.

Every alteration of a true instrument is a forgery of the whole; and every addition to a true instrument, though not a forgery of the whole, where only collateral to the instrument (as in the case of indorsements, acceptances, &c.), is nevertheless in itself a forgery. Therefore, altering a bill from a lower to a higher value is forgery: Teague's case, R. & R. 33. So is making a bill of exchange, for £8, appear to be for 80l., by adding a cipher to the 8, R. v. Elsworth, 2 E. P. C. 986; or inserting one's own name, as payee, in a blank bill of exchange, which has a genuine signature, Birkett's case, R. & R. 86; or indorsing a bill in a fictitious name, al.

though it would have been equally received, if indorsed by the prisoner in his own name, Marshall's case, R. & R. 75; or signing a bill under the same circumstances, Francis's case, id. 209; Whiley's case, id. 90; and see R. v. Taft, 1 Leach, 172; or altering a one pound Bank of England note, by substituting "ten" for "one," although, by such substitution, the denomination becomes" ten pound," not ten pounds: Post's case, R. & R. 101. So, also, where a note was made payable to a country banker's, or at his banker's in London, and the London banker failed, it was held to be forgery to alter the name of that London banker to the name of another London banker, with whom the maker made his notes payable, after failure of the first: R. v. Treble, 2 Taunt. 328. Forging in a false name, assumed for concealment with a view to a fraud, of which the forgery is part, is sufficient to constitute the offence; and, if there is proof of the prisoner's real name, it is for him to shew that he used the assumed name, before the fraud: Peacock's case, R. & R. 282. It may here be observed generally, that where a name is assumed for the purposes of forgery, it is immaterial whether it be that of a person living, or a mere fictitious person, who never existed.

3. Uttering the forged instrument. In order to constitute the offence of uttering, it must be done with know ledge of the forgery; which knowledge may come by the relation of another, as well as by the party's own observation: 2 É. P. Č. 973. It has been decided, that uttering a forged bill, importing to be payable to the drawer's order, with intent to defraud, is a complete offence, though there be no indorsement upon it, importing to be the drawer's: Wick's case, R. & R. 149. So, also, is uttering a forged bill, without indorsement, as a security for a

debt: Birkett's case, id. 86. So, also, is the disposing and putting away bank notes, though the person to whom they were disposed of, was an agent for the bank to detect utterers, and applied to the prisoners to purchase forged notes: Holden's case, id. 154. So, also, is uttering a forged stamp, although, at the time of uttering, certain parts of the stamp, not like the genuine stamp, are concealed; but all the parts that are visible are like a genuine stamp: Collicott's case, id. 229.

4. The felonious intent. It has been said, arguendo, and apparently agreed to by the court, that it is no answer to a charge of forgery to say that there was no special intent to defraud any particular person, because a general intent to defraud is sufficient to constitute the crime: Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 176; 1

Leach, 216. In Mary Mazagora's case, R. & R. 291, the prisoner was indicted for disposing of a forged bank note, with intent to defraud the Governor and Company of the Bank of England. It appeared in evidence, that the note was not likely to impose upon a bank inspector, though it might upon persons in general; and the jury, in returning their verdict, stated that they thought the prisoner had the intention to defraud whoever might take the notes, but not the bank in particular. Upon consideration of the case, the judges were unanimously of opinion, that the prisoner must be taken to have intended to defraud the bank, and consequently that the conviction was right. Where fraud is the immediate effect of uttering a forged instrument, such uttering will be deemed sufficient evidence of an intent to defraud; and the oath of the person to whom the forged instrument was uttered, that he believes the prisoner had no such intent, will not repel the presumption: Sheppard's case, R. & R.