1847. KEEN v. The QUEEN. considered and adjudged, by the Court, here that the said John Keen do enter into recognizances to our lady the Queen in the sum of £200, and two sureties in the sum of £100 each, to appear and receive the judgment of the Court at the next general quarter sessions of the peace to be holden in and for the said county, if called upon; and to keep the peace towards the Queen and all her liege subjects, and especially towards Sophia Keen, his wife, for the space of twelve calendar months. And thereupon the said John Keen, together with W. A. of &c., and T. W. of &c., sureties &c., severally acknowledge themselves to be indebted to our sovereign lady the Queen. And because the Court here is not advised what judgment to give of and upon the said several premises in the said indictments respectively mentioned, judgment is respited thereon until the next general quarter sessions of the peace, &c. And a day is given for the said John Keen to appear then and there in his own proper person, to hear and receive the judgment of the Court of and concerning the several premises aforesaid, and the said John Keen is allowed forthwith to depart the Court free. At which said next general quarter sessions holden at &c., on &c., before &c., because the said last-mentioned justices are not yet advised what judgment to give of and upon the said several premises in the said indictments respectively mentioned, judgment is further respited thereon until the next general quarter sessions; at which said next general quarter sessions, holden at &c., on Tuesday the 30th of June, before &c., cometh the said John Keen in his own proper person, and the Court here being now advised, and all and singular the premises in the said indictments respectively mentioned being seen, and by the Court here fully understood, it is considered and adjudged by the Court here, that the said John Keen, for each and every of the offences in the said indictments, and in each count thereof respectively mentioned, be imprisoned in the gaol of Springfield, in &c., six calendar months; each and all of such several terms of imprisonment to commence on the same day and end on the same day; and that, for the said offence in the first count of the first of the said indictments mentioned, the said John Keen do also pay a fine to our sovereign lady the Queen of £50, of &c., and do also enter into his own recognizance in the sum of £100, and find two sureties in the sum of £50 each, for his good behaviour towards our lady the Queen and all her liege subjects, and especially towards Sophia Keen, his wife, for the further term of twelve calendar months from the expiration of this sentence; and be further imprisoned in such gaol until he pay such fine, and until such recognizances shall be entered into; and the said John Keen is forthwith committed &c." The grounds of error assigned were, first, that a court of quarter sessions has no authority to respite a judgment from one sessions to another; and that the judgment at the Midsummer sessions was, therefore, without jurisdiction. Secondly, that it appeared on the record that the sessions had pronounced two distinct judgments, and that the latter, therefore, was without jurisdiction. Peacock, for the plaintiff in error.-First, as to the second point. The case of Regina v. Dunn (a) shows, that where justices sentence a defendant to be committed to prison in default of his entering into recognizances to keep the peace, that is a part of their judgment, and may be reviewed by this Court; and in Rex v. Bourne (b), it was held, that a judgment of an inferior court, though clearly erroneous, was so far final that it could not be (a) 12 A. & E. 599. (b) 7 A. & E. 58. 1847. KEEN v. The QUEEN. 1847. KEEN v. The QUEEN. sent back to them to be reconsidered, and that the defendant must be discharged. If, then, those cases are to be considered as authorities, and the court of quarter sessions had already pronounced a judgment in this case when the defendant below (plaintiff in error) had pleaded guilty, and had entered into recognizances, this Court will order him to be discharged. [Patteson, J.— It was on the defendant's (plaintiff in error) entering into recognizances that the sessions respited their judgment; judgment would have been given at the time, if he had not entered into them.] The words on the record, "it is considered and adjudged," would shew that a judgment was given. In Rex v. Kenworthy (a), it was held, that the words "it is ordered" alone, amounted to an order only, and not a judgment; and it was said that the judgment was incomplete for want of the words "it is considered." [Erle, J.-The introduction of those words, "considered and adjudged," cannot alter the legal effect of what took place in fact. We must look at the whole record, and by that it plainly appears that the judgment was respited.] Then, as to the first point: It is submitted that a court of quarter sessions has no power to respite their judgment from one sessions to another. In Dickenson's Quarter Sessions, 5th edit., p. 61, it is said, "Justices may, before the actual close of the sessions, on whatever day, alter their orders of sentences, but they cannot do so after the session is closed, e.g., at the next sessions." " Again, if an indictment cannot be disposed of after verdict of guilty, owing to the justices present being equally divided in opinion as to the sentence, or from any other cause operating on the court, so that no judgment is given, an adjournment of the session should be entered by the clerk of the peace to some day previous to or not (a) 1 B. & C. 711. later than that appointed for the next ensuing original general or quarter sessions, so as to enable the justices to reconsider the question." "But if no such adjournment of the sessions be made (for it cannot be made of the matter itself only), no subsequent session has any power to make an order in the case." And the case of Rex v. Grince is cited from Vin. Abrid., vol. 19, p. 358. [Coleridge, J.-The power of adjourning appeals is given to the sessions by statute in cases of insufficient notice; but could not they do so on other grounds, for instance, the absence of a material witness? We adjourn cases from one assize to another, though we sit under a different commission.] That case is especially provided for by the 1 Edw. 6, c. 7, s. 2. Marsh, contrà.-In Rex v. Bourne (a) and Regina v. Dunn (b) no point arose as to the power of one quarter sessions to deal with the record of a previous sessions; they do not apply to either of the questions raised by the plaintiff in error. As to the general power of quarter sessions to postpone till a subsequent sessions their judgment on an indictment tried at a former, the argument on the other side rests on the authority of Dickenson. The cases, however, there cited, do not in any way support the passage which has been quoted. Rex v. Cuckfield (c), is one; there, and in Pridgeon's case (d), which is another, there had been no adjournment, and consequently one sessions was held incompetent to reverse what had been done by another. In Rex v. Grince (e), a judgment was held bad because it was passed on a day subsequent to the holding of the next sessions after that from which the case had been 1847. KEEN ข. The QUEEN. (a) 7 A. & E. 58. (b) 12 A. & E. 599. (d) Cro. Car. 341. (c) 2 Salk. 477. 1847. KEEN v. The QUEEN. adjourned. Rex v. Fowler (a), however, shews that a subsequent sessions may deal with the record of a former sessions, as there was no formal adjournment, but the hearing of the case was merely postponed from one sessions to another. Peacock, in reply.-In Rex v. Fowler the case was directed to be brought on and heard afresh, because there had been a mis-trial. That was not like an adjournment. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-It appears to me that the argument of the plaintiff in error rests on a fallacy. It assumes, that the second court is not the same as the first. The court of quarter sessions is composed of the whole body of the justices; it is true, that it acts only at intervals, but such a court must have the power of adjourning a case if it thinks proper, and there can be no better reason for doing so than here, where the justices had not made up their minds as to their judgment. Defendants, too, should have time and an opportunity for entering into recognizances. PATTESON, J.-I am of the same opinion. I was at first struck with the passage cited from Dickenson, but it does not appear that it is founded on authority. The stat. of 1 Ed. 6, c. 7, was passed to provide for the nonabatement of process, where the names of the same justices of assize did not appear in successive commissions. The court of quarter sessions, however, is always under one and the same commission, and must, therefore, be taken to have the power of adjourning cases from one sitting to another. COLERIDGE, J.-The court of quarter sessions is a (a) 4 B. & A. 273. |