1861. Ex parte Secondly; because there had been no petition for the adoption of the Act which embraced or comprised the said property in his occupation, and the order had been therefore made without jurisdiction. In consequence of that appeal the Secretary of State directed inquiry to be made into the circumstances of the case by the inspector. Such inquiry was made, and the result reported to the Secretary of State, who thereupon, under the provisions of the Act, by an order, dated 29th April, determined that the appeal be dismissed, and that The Local Government Act, 1858, should, after the expiration of one month from the date thereof, have the force of law within the District of Todmorden. It was stated, in the affidavits in opposition to the rule, that the alterations suggested in the report of the inspector, and adopted by the Secretary of State in his order, rendered the boundaries of the whole district more eligible and satisfactory than those originally proposed; and that the petition to the Secretary of State was signed by about one-fifth of the ratepayers residing within the boundaries as settled by him. Manisty shewed cause.-The first question is whether the Secretary of State could alter the boundaries proposed in the petition. By the 1st and 2d paragraphs of sect. 16 of The Local Government Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98., " any place not having a known or defined boundary," may petition one of the Principal Secretaries of State "to settle its boundaries for the purposes of this Act." And the petition shall state the proposed boundaries, and shall be signed by one-tenth of the ratepayers resident within the proposed boundaries. By the 5th paragraph the Secretary of State "may upon consideration of the matter, either dismiss the petition altogether, or make order as to the boundaries of the place: he may also make order as to the costs of the proceedings under this section and the parties by whom such costs are to be borne." By the 6th paragraph, "any place the boundaries of which have been settled in pursuance of the foregoing provisions shall thenceforth, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a place with a known and defined boundary, and may adopt this Act accordingly." The petition with the proposed boundaries is only to set the Secretary of State in motion: it is a mere suggestion that the place in which the petitioning ratepayers are resident would be a convenient place to be brought within the operation of the Act. Under the 5th paragraph of sect. 16 the Secretary of State may make what order he pleases as to the boundaries of the place;" he may therefore adopt the proposed boundaries or reject them. By the 6th paragraph, after the Secretary of State has made an order, there is to be a meeting of the ratepayers to decide as to the adoption of the Act. [Cockburn C. J. If the new boundary, adopted by the Secretary of State upon the report of the inspector, added a considerable number of ratepayers who were not before within the district, their votes might turn the scale at the meeting to decide as to the adoption of the Act. Blackburn J. The number of ratepayers who signed the petition to the Secretary of State might not be one-tenth of the ratepayers in the extended district. But the term "to settle its boundary" seems to give the Secretary of State power to alter it.] It is as objectionable that he should diminish, as that he should increase, the area of the proposed district. [Wightman J. In the former case, 1861. Ex parte no ratepayer who objected would be brought under the operation of the Act.] Secondly, the applicant, by resorting to sect. 18, which gives an appeal to any owner or ratepayer who disputes. the validity of the vote for the adoption of the Act, has waived all objections anterior to the time of the passing of the resolution adopting the Act. He might have availed himself of sect. 17, which gives a right to petition the Secretary of State "if any number, being not less than one-twentieth of the owners and ratepayers of such place. ... are desirous that the whole or any part of such place should be excluded from the operation of the Act." Thirdly, this application is too late. By sect. 20, whenever any resolution adopting the Act has been passed, the Act shall at the expiration of two months from the date thereof; or, in the event of an appeal, then at such time as may be mentioned in the order made on such appeal, have the force of law within such place. In this case the order of the Secretary of State dismissing the appeal, directed that The Local Government Act, 1858, should, after the expiration of one month from the date thereof, have the force of law. By sect. 81 all orders made by the Secretary of State, "in pursuance of this Act, shall be binding and conclusive in respect of the matters to which they refer." Welsby, who was with him, was not called upon. Wheeler Serjt. and Aspinall, in support of the rule. · First, there having been no petition of the ratepayers resident in part of the District included in the original order of the Secretary of State, and in respect whereof exemption is claimed from the operation of the Act, that order is void, and all proceedings taken under it with respect to the settlement of the boundaries are irregular and illegal. This objection, though stated in the appeal to the Secretary of State was not open to the applicant on that appeal. Secondly, it is not too late to obtain a certiorari. There is no appeal against any part of the order of the Secretary of State settling the boundary. The appeal given by sect. 17 is against the resolution adopting the Act. Section 18 only gives an appeal where "the validity of the vote for the adoption of the Act" is disputed; and applies to cases in which there is a dispute whether the meeting had been duly summoned, or whether the vote had been regularly taken—not where the objection is to the order, which is the authority for holding the meeting. By sect. 20, indeed, "whenever any resolution adopting this Act has passed in any place," the Act shall, after the expiration of a certain time "have the force of law within such place:" but that means a place the boundary of which has been legally settled. Thirdly, there is no limitation of time within which an order of the Secretary of State may be questioned by certiorari. The limitation in sect. 21, by which "no objection whatever in respect of the matters mentioned in this section shall be admissible at any trial or in any legal proceeding after the expiration of six calendar months from the date of the constitution of the district," does not apply to this case. [Cockburn C. J. I have considerable doubt whether, on an appeal against the vote for the adoption of the Act, the boundary settled by the Secretary of State may be questioned: any ratepayer who is within that boundary would be entitled to vote at the 1861. Ex parte meeting. And then there is no remedy except by coming to this Court. The vote for the adoption of the Act is unobjectionable so far as the boundary is concerned, because it was fixed by the order of the Secretary of State.] WIGHTMAN J. I am of opinion that this rule must be discharged. It may be that the Secretary of State exceeded his power and proceeded irregularly in fixing the boundaries of this district so as to include property not originally comprised within the proposed boundaries ; and he may, on consideration revoke, or he may make another order varying the original one. It may be a question whether he has power, under sect. 16 of The Local Government Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98., to make an alteration in the boundaries proposed in the petition of the ratepayers. But, admitting that the order was irregular in that respect, there has been a resolution of the ratepayers for the adoption of the Act within the District. If the resolution was bad on the ground of the mode in which the boundary was fixed, that was matter of appeal under sect. 18; but, if not, the resolution remains unappealed against. Sect. 20 of stat. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98., which I most rely upon, says that the Act shall, "at the expiration of two months from the date of the passing of such resolution, or, in the event of an appeal .. then at such times as may be mentioned in the order made on such appeal have the force of law within such place." The two months mentioned in sect. 20 having been suffered to clapse, it is now too late to question the regularity of the vote for the adoption of the Act. Whatever objection might have been made at an earlier stage in |