GAZETTES.-FRIDAY, July 20. BANKRUPTS. Whitchurch, Shropshire, surgeon, Aug. 6 at 11, Birmingham, aud. ac-Sophia Anne Aulton, Nottingham, smallware dealer, Aug. 2 at 11, Nottingham, aud. ac. CERTIFICATES. before the Day of Meeting. Michael Perry, Bloomsbury-market, Oxford-street, Middlesex, passe partouts manufacturer, Aug. 10 at 1, London. Henry Trenter, Ipswich, Suffolk, butcher, Aug. 10 at 11, London.-Paul Sampson, Hythe, Kent, boot maker, Aug, 10 at half-past 11, London.-Edmund Jones, Woodbine-villas, Bridge-road West, Battersea, Surrey, hosier, Aug. 10 at 1, London.-Charles Roach, Devizes, Wiltshire, hosier, Aug. 14 at 11, Bristol.-Alexander Waite, Berwick-upon-Tweed, draper, Aug. 15 at half-past 11, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.-J. Pooley, Liverpool, and Peterborough, Northamptonshire, contractor, Aug. 10 at 11, Liverpool.-Ephraim France and Henry France, Linthwaite, Almondbury, Yorkshire, woollen manufacturers, Aug. 13 at 11, Leeds.-Robert Brown, Great Driffield, Yorkshire, brewer, Aug. 15 at 12, Kingston-uponHull.-George Tomlinson France, Huddersfield, Yorkshire, cloth merchant, Aug. 27 at 11, Leeds. ROBERT KEMP PHILP, Great New-street, Fetter-lane, To be allowed, unless Cause be shewn to the contrary on or City, publisher, Aug. 2 at 1, and Aug. 30 at 12, London: Off. Ass. Johnson; Sols. Ashurst & Co., Old Jewry.-Pet. f. July 19. JOSEPH RAVEN, Fish-street-hill, City, wholesale stationer, (now a prisoner for debt in the County Gaol of Surrey), July 30 at 12, and Aug. 27 at 1, London: Off. Ass. Pennell; Sol. Keene, 77, Lower Thames-street, London.-Pet. f. July 6. GEORGE DIXON and JAMES CHARLES ADCOCK, (by the name of Charles James Adcock), Aldersgate-street, London, and Coventry, Warwickshire, coach lace manufacturers, July 30 at half-past 2, and Sept. 4 at 2, London: Off. Ass. Edwards; Sol. Mardon, Christchurch-chambers, 99, Newgate-street, London.-Pet. f. July 11. EDWARD RUSSELL, Long-lane, Bermondsey, Surrey, leather merchant, July 31 at half-past 11, and Sept. 4 at halfpast 2, London: Off. Ass. Edwards; Sols. Lawrance & Co., 14, Old Jewry-chambers, London.-Pet. f. July 19. JOHN WALKER and JAMES NEAVE, Southwark-bridgeroad, Surrey, builders, July 31 at half-past 2, and Sept. 4 at 1, London: Off. Ass. Edwards; Sol. Crowdy, 17, Serjeants'-inn, Fleet-street, London.-Pet. f. July 17. JOHN GREEN, Philpot lane, City, commission agent, July 30 at 1, and Sept. 4 at 12, London: Off. Ass. Lee; Sols. Miller & Horn, 9, George-yard, Lombard-street, London. -Pet. f. July 18. MANUEL LEOPOLD JONAS LAVATER, Strand, Mid- ALFRED FRANCIS WHITBURN, Enfield, Middlesex, WILLIAM HUGHES, Leicester, grocer, Aug. 2 and 23 at HENRY DUNINGTON, Nottingham, glove cloth manufac- WILLIAM APPLEYARD, Kingston-upon-Hull, plumber, JOHN MUIR, Kingston-upon-Hull, draper, Aug. 1 and 29 JOSEPH JUKES, Eyton Lodge, near Ruabon, Denbighshire, ironmaster, Aug. 10 at 30 at 12, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Turner; Sols. Evans & Co., Liverpool.-Pet. f. July 14. THOMAS YOUNG, Liverpool, coffee dealer, July 30 and Aug. 22 at 11, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Morgan; Sols. Miller & Peel, Liverpool; Wright & Bonner, 15, London-street, Fenchurch-street, London.-Pet. f. July 16. MEETINGS. Henry Harvey, Hatton-garden, Holborn, Middlesex, lamp manufacturer, Aug. 2 at 11, London, aud. ac.-Paul Sampson, Hythe, Kent, boot maker, Aug. 2 at 12, London, aud. ac.; Aug. 10 at half-past 11, div.-Louis Cook, Great Cambridge-street, Hackney-road, Middlesex, boot manufacturer, Aug. 2 at 12, London, aud. ac.-William Skerving Walker, Liverpool, shipbroker, July 30 at 12, Liverpool, aud. ac.John Hampson, Wrexham, Denbighshire, grocer, July 30 at 12, Liverpool, aud. ac.-John Kiddell Dawson, Liverpool, wine merchant, July 30 at 12, Liverpool, aud. ac.— -Walter Phillips Gunnyon, Liverpool, clothier, July 30 at 12, Liverpool, aud. ac.-Thomas Mills, Ashton-under-Lyne, Lancashire, chemist, July 31 at 12, Manchester, aud. ac.-Joseph Wall and Joseph Buxton, Manchester, wholesale grocers, Aug. 1 at 12, Manchester, aud. ac.-Henry James Wilson, To be granted, unless an Appeal be duly entered. James Smith Spencer, Great Russell-street, Bloomsbury, Middlesex, wine merchant.-John Parnell, Oxford-street, Middlesex, linendraper.-John Samuel Beale, Paddingtongreen, Paddington, Middlesex, surgeon.-Frederick Miller, Poland-street, Oxford-street, Middlesex, glass merchant. SCOTCH SEQUESTRATIONS. James Keir, Blaikie Mill, near Brechin, miller.-Henry Dobson Croft, Portobello, Edinburgh, grocer. TUESDAY, July 24. WILLIAM COOK, King-street, Regent-street, Middlesex, WILLIAM GOODALL GIBSON, Godalming, Surrey, tan- DAVID HUNTER, Cornhill, City, merchant, Aug. 3 at 11, JESSE ATTWOOD, Newington, near Sittingbourne, Kent, THOMAS LAURENCE and WILLIAM MORTIMORE, St. don.-Pet. f. June 26. Ro WILLIAM JONES, Aldershot, Hampshire, tailor, Aug. 7 at [For continuation of Gazette, see p. 283.] THE JURIST. LONDON, JULY 28, 1860. 721 THE bill before Parliament to effect a still further change in the constitution of the Court for Marriage and Divorce, by enabling the Judge Ordinary to act without the aid of other judges, invites attention to the character and proceedings of that tribunal; while the second edition of Mr. Macqueen's "Treatise on the Law of Marriage, Divorce, and Legitimacy, as administered in the Divorce Court and in the House of Lords," which has just appeared, furnishes some valuable materials to assist the judgment. It is not, however, our intention at present to go into the whole question of the advantages or disadvantages of the Divorce Court, which must now be looked on as one of the institutions of the land; we shall confine ourselves to what has been found in every age, and we venture to say ever will be found, the characteristic enemy of justice in all tribunals empowered to grant divorces à vinculo matrimonii-COLLUSION between the parties. With this view, we propose, first, to shew the nature and magnitude of the evil; and, secondly, to direct attention to the, to our mind, feeble and utterly insufficient guards which the Legislature has set up against it. The matter is simply this:-A., who is married to B., is desirous of getting rid of the matrimonial tie, in order to contract a fresh marriage with C.; while B. is equally desirous to dissolve the bond, either in order to enable her to contract some other marriage, or for some other reason. In order to effect this object, it is sufficient if A. can induce the Divorce Court to believe VICE-CHANCELLOR STUART'S COURT. By T. F. MORSE, Barrister at Law. Borton v. Dunbar. -(Will-Construction-Legacy— 66 Money and effects," bequest of residue of, to be expended in purchasing a suitable present for a godson-Reversionary interest in stock) In re Blake's Settlement, and in re The Settled Estates Act, 1856.--(Practice-Settled Estates Act-General Order XLI, r. 20-Petition-Advertisements) ........ EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. By G. J. P. SMITH, Barrister at Law. Macdonald v. Longbottom.-(Sale of wool-Contract -Subject-matter- Parol evidence- Statute of Frauds, s. 17-Mention of quantity-Tender) COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Phillips v. Whitsed.-(Replevin-Separate rents— Joint distress-Avowries-Pleas in bar) Schlumberger v. Lister.-(Infringement of patent — Equitable replication-Equitable rejoinder-Bill in equity- Common-law Procedure Act, 1854, 88. 83, 85). James v. Lord Harry Vane.-(Action for goods sold -Tender-Costs-Directions to the Masters, r.8, Hil. T., 1853).. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. By J. GRANT, Barrister at Law. Willis v. Palmer. - (Shipping - Freight - Passage money-Mortgagee's title to passage money before taking possession of ship-Power of attorneyMortgage of ship and freight-HypothecationBottomry bond-Master) .... 722 724 724 727 729 731 732 that B. has committed adultery; or, if the suit is instituted by the wife against the husband, that he has committed adultery, accompanied either by incest, or cruelty to, or desertion of her. Both parties being agreed to assist each other in bringing about this illegal and immoral end, there are evidently two ways of accomplishing it-first, by putting forward false facts to form the basis of the judgment of the Court; secondly, by putting forward for the same purpose facts which are true, but have been corruptly and fraudulently preconcerted. (Macq. 67). Nor is the danger from these sources at all a chimerical one. Even under the old system, when divorces à vinculo were necessarily much less frequent than at present, Lord Eldon, in 1800, said he was certain that nine out of every ten cases of adultery that came into the courts, or before the bar of the House of Lords, at that period, were founded on the most infamous collusion; and similar complaints were made in the year 1772 in the House of Commons: (See Mr. Roche's paper, "Some Points in the Law of Divorce," read before the Juridical Society). The prevalence of collusion under the new system is notorious enough, and some instructive instances of it are given by Mr. Macqueen :-" In Lloyd v. Lloyd and Chichester the petitioner changed his attorney; the first attorney had his costs taxed before the registrar; during the taxation he and the new attorney quarrelled. They made mutual charges against each other, of which the registrar wisely made a memorandum, and told them he should bring the matter to the notice of the judge. In consequence of this communication, the Court, at the trial, summoned the witnesses; the truth, shewing the grossest collusion, was elicited, and the petition was dismissed. | case, however, where the decision could stand without That case was undefended. It was presented to the any such dogma, that a divorce à vinculo matrimonii Court as an ordinary application for divorce. The mar- may be granted on a clear and unequivocal confession, riage was proved, and the wife's adultery was proved. without any other proof. Then the Court was asked to pronounce its decree dissolving the nuptial tie; and had it not been for the scene before the registrar, it would have done so as matter of course." (Macq., p.ix). At p. 70, also, he gives at length a very bad case indeed, in Scotland, in 1854, where a collusive suit was prosecuted successfully. And the presence of collusion in a large number of the divorce cases which daily present themselves in England is indicated by a fact thus stated by the same author, (pp. iii, iv):—“Since its institution, the principal occupation of the Divorce Court has been dissolutions of marriage and judicial separations. The method of proceeding for both is the same. But it is remarkable that trials for dissolution have hitherto been more expeditious than trials for judicial separation. When the Court sits to hear applications for dissolution of the matrimonial tie, so as to enable the parties to marry again, nine or ten cases are usually put in the paper for disposal; and seven or eight, or more, are generally got through in a day. When, again, the Court sits to hear applications for judicial separation, a single trial is often found enough, and more than enough, for the day. Two, three, and four days have been repeatedly spent on one case. A contest of this description, memorable though ridiculous, occupied for eight days the Court and a jury, besides having afterwards been made the subject of repeated applications productive of no result." We confess, however, we do not see anything remarkable in this; a separation suit is almost necessarily a real contest, while a suit for divorce à vinculo is too frequently a sham one. Such being the evil, we now proceed to consider the safeguards provided against it, both under the old law, and the modern system introduced by the Divorce Acts. In proceedings for divorce à mensâ et thoro, the Ecclesiastical Courts of this country acted on two rules of evidence, which seem deserving of notice:-1. That adultery could not be proved by the testimony of only one witness—a rule which was, however, only a branch of the general rule of civil and canon laws, requiring two witnesses in all cases. 2. By the canons of 1597, c. 6, and 1604, c. 105, no suit for adultery could be maintained on the unsupported confession of the party accused, even though on oath. The words of the latter are, "Nec soli extrajudiciali aut judiciali et juratæ partium confessioni fides habeatur:" (See Mortimer v. Mortimer, 2 Hagg. 310). And it is to be remembered, that a judicial confession can be made by allowing judgment to go by default, as well as by a more formal avowal of guilt. Both these securities are now at an end. The 48th section of the first Divorce Act, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, enacts-" The rules of evidence observed in the superior courts of common law at Westminster shall be applicable to, and observable in, the trials of all questions of fact in the court"-an enactment which has been construed to mean that the rule of the common law is, that the testimony of one witness, if credible, shall be sufficient in cases of adultery; and in Robinson v Robinson (1 Swab. & T. 632; 5 Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 392) it was held by the Divorce Court, in a Modern legislation and judicial decision having thus swept away the old securities, the following are the new ones provided by the Legislature:-1. By the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 41, "Every person seeking a decree of nullity of marriage, &c. shall, together with the petition or other application for the same, file an affidavit verifying the same, &c., and stating that there is not any collusion or connivance between the deponent and the other party to the marriage." As if a person, who is capable of deceiving a court of justice into a collusive dissolution of a marriage, would scruple to take a false oath to effect his purpose. 2. By sect. 29 of the same statute-"Upon any such petition for dissolution of a marriage, it shall be the duty of the Court to satisfy itself, so far as it reasonably can, not only as to the facts alleged, but also whether or no the petitioner has been in any manner accessory to, or conniving at, the adultery." It will be observed, that the Legislature do not say that the Court is "to be satisfied of the absence of collusion beyond all reasonable doubt," but that it shall satisfy itself of its absence "so far as it reasonably can," which is a very different thing. And by sect. 43, the Court may, if it shall think fit, examine the petitioner on oath. But, as Mr. Macqueen observes, (p. xiv), " A judge, having no clue, examines under great disadvantage; many of his questions are wide of the mark, which is kept out of sight. This provokes a smile from those who are in the secret." 3. There is the protection of trial by jury, "if the parties, or either of them, insist upon it," (sect. 28), or the Court itself thinks proper so to direct," (sect. 36); otherwise the matter will be determined by the Court. It is plain the Legislature did not think this much of a security against collusion, or they doubtless would have rendered it obligatory in all cases. 4. Petitions for divorce à vinculo matrimonii must be heard and determined by three judges at the least. (Sect. 10). The bill before Parliament proposes to take away the protection, whatever it may be, afforded by this clause, and to empower the Judge Ordinary to decide such causes alone. 66 In addition to these preventives of collusion supplied by the Legislature, numerous others have been recommended for consideration, of which the following are the chief:-First, prohibition of marriage between the convicted party and the accomplice in guilt, as is the case in the Scotch law; secondly, the intervention of the Attorney-General, or some other public officer, to see that the status and condition of the parties are clearly established, and to look to the interests of their children-a course adopted in France, the United States of America, and some other countries; thirdly, the not allowing proceedings towards divorce as matter of right, but compelling the party who complains to obtain authorisation to commence them from a judge, whose duty it should be to endeavour to reconcile the parties -a course also adopted in France; fourthly, the interposition of considerable delay before final judgment, in order to give the parties time for reflection and a locus pœnitentiæ, the idea of which is also taken from the Code Napoléon. The Divorce Acts seem based on the principle-to our mind a most vicious one-that adultery, and those other species of misconduct which constitute ground of divorce, are injuries to the party who claims the intervention of the Court, and to that party alone that so long as the divorce is not collusive, and provision is made for the custody of the children, and care taken of their property, the relations and friends of the parties, and society in general, have nothing to do with the matter. In support of this view it is constantly as serted that marriage is a civil contract, and nothing more. Civil contract it undoubtedly is, but it does not follow from thence that it can be dissolved by the parties at pleasure; for it is one, the indissolubility of which, except in certain aggravated cases, is upheld and encouraged by the policy of the law as essential to the peace, good order, and happiness of society, and, in the vast majority of instances, the welfare and happiness of the parties themslves. In this the law of England is in accordance not only with the religion of the land, and of all Christendom, but with natural law, of which Puffendorf (Jus. Nat. & Gen., lib. 6, c. 1, s. 2) truly, we believe, states marriage to be an institution, and calls it "generis humani seminarium." If this be so, any conduct which renders a party rightly amenable to the Divorce Court seems an offence against society, and should be treated as such. In other words, it may be a question whether that tribunal ought not to possess a criminal as well as a civil jurisdiction-a civil jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage on proof of the matters specified by law, and a criminal one to punish the party whose misconduct rendered necessary so strong an act. Persons who, obeying their depraved passions, would willingly, in order to free themselves from the matrimonial tie, commit a real, or confess a fictitious, adultery, would pause ere they committed or avowed an act which the law pronounced to be a crime, and visited with a severe and infamous punishment. Adultery has been punished criminally in some countries, and in our own during the Commonwealth; but the punishment attached to it being capital, those laws, like others of undue severity, fell into disrepute, and disappeared. The ecclesiastical law looks on adultery as a crime, as also did the common law-witness its action for criminal conversation-and the circumstance of the common law not having made provision for its punishment is explained by the fact that jurisdiction over the offence was usurped by the ecclesiastics. The Legislature has now condemned the principle of our ancient law, which pronounced marriage indisso luble under any circumstances; and has also put an end to the anomalous state of things which succeeded it, when the law held the marriage tie indissoluble, and yet systematically permitted its dissolution by a cumbrous, unsafe, and highly expensive process, partly judicial, partly legislatorial. But the Legislature having declared that for certain specified acts of misconduct a marriage may be broken ex debito justitiæ, society has a right to demand of the Legislature that effective guaranties be afforded against collusive divorces; and it is impossible not to see that those existing at present are most miserably weak and ineffective. That its decrees are "fabulæ, non judicia,” is a reproach to a judicial tribunal at any time; but that its machinery is systematically prostituted to the carrying out unlawful ends is the severest imputation, short of positive corruption, that can be cast upon it. Crimes in general are committed in defiance of the law, but when they are perpetrated through the instrumentality of the law itself, the immediate consequence is to shake confidence in the administration of justice, and the final consequence, to demoralise society. Correspondence. LIBRARIES IN THE EQUITY COURTS. TO THE EDITOR OF THE JURIST." SIR,-The popular idea of a court of equity is, that it sits, (as Selden has it)," a roguish thing," the Chancellor, like an Eastern Cadi, doing of his own mere motion what he thinks meet and just. Nor is it only among the vulgar that the notion is entertained. Dr. Samuel Johnson means something very like it when he says "The Chancellor hath power to moderate and temper the written law, and subjecteth himself only to the law of nature and reason.' Unhappily, Sir, as you are aware, equity is as much a creature of "precedent" as law, and principles established by successive decisions have in both the force of positive enactment. It is, therefore, necessary for counsel, on the argument of each cause, to have in his hands a copy of each report containing or leading to the principle he is contending for. A dozen volumes, picked from the publications of three centuries, are no uncommon companions of counsel on his leaving chambers to go into court. Here arises my grievance. One may any day lose a cause for want of a particular volume of Reports. Some months ago there appeared in The Times a complaint of some gentleman in practice as to the cost, and tardiness in appearing, of these same "authorised" Reports. He bought them all, and contented himself with grumbling. He was undoubtedly in good business. My business is very small, but I am not less bound than my more fortunate brother to cite my cases from Reports. The result is, that men situated like myself borrow, or, proh pudor!"get" the Reports (the big black owner's name across the outside of the books one sees in court is terribly suggestive) at a sad expenditure of time— and reputation. In the common-law courts there is a good library, I understand, in every court. Let us hope the "amalgamation" scheme will bring this idea eastwards with it. We shall then be able to work up our cases in the libraries of the various Inns-take merely our notes with us into court, and find our materials for argument upon the spot. That the consummation of so desirable a scheme may be speedy, prays your obedient, Chancery-lane. Review. J. C. A Treatise on the Law of Marriage, and other Family Settlements. With Precedents and Practical Notes. By JAMES PEARSE PEACHEY, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Royal 8vo., pp. 1041. [Sweet.] A WRITER who is fastidious, and succeeds in being correct, in his language, is likely to be careful and exact in dealing with his subject; and if his style is not only accurate, but easy and forcible, we may expect to find in the substance of his work also traces of a master's hand. The pleasure, therefore, with which we read the first chapter of Mr. Peachey's well-written book soon became associated with confidence in the author's powers, and prepared us for the conclusion, to which a careful examination has conducted us, that this must be placed in the first rank among modern legal treatises, supplying a want which has long been felt. With the exception of Mr. Atherley's very mediocre and now wholly obsolete treatise, and the late Mr. Jarman's able but incomplete sketch in the ninth volume of his work on Conveyancing, there is no professed treatise on the subject of marriage and family settlements; and though detached portions of the subject, such as the learning relating to powers, to portions, and to the rights of husband and wife in respect of property, have been separately treated by Lord St. Leonards, Matthews, Roper, and others, there are very many important matters the authorities upon which are nowhere collected or discussed except in the volume before us. The following is a brief outline of the contents of the work: : You' (the wife) shall not be reduced to the somewhat humiliating necessity of disclosing to me every want of a pound to keep in your pocket, or of taking my pleasure and obtaining my consent every time you want to go to the milliner's shop to order your dress; but you shall have so much, consistent with my estate and my income, which you shall retain apart from me, and exempt from my control.' Pin-money, in short, Ch. 1. Origin of settlements of real estate. Ch. 2. is a refinement which the law has introduced, peculiar As to restrictions upon the general capacity to make to the bargain or arrangement previous to and upon the settlements, and the validity of settlements of real and marriage, and the husband, exempting it from his conpersonal estate when made by infants. Ch. 3. Mar- trol, may be supposed to say, There shall be your riage agreements, and how far they are affected by the dress-money, your pocket-money, your fund for sepastat. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, and by fraud and misrepresenta-rate personal expenses set apart for you during the tion generally. Ch. 4. Settlements pursuant to mar- coverture.' riage articles and executory trusts in wills. Ch. 5. Settlements in derogation of marital rights. Ch. 6. Equity of the wife to a settlement. Ch. 7. Settlements as affected by the 13 Eliz. c. 5, and by the Bankrupt Laws. Ch. 8. Settlements as affected by the 27 Eliz. c. 4; and the validity of voluntary settlements generally. Ch. 9. Settling property to the wife's separate use. Ch. 10. Pin-money. Ch. 11. Limitations in settlements to tenants for life without impeachment of waste. Ch. 12. Jointure. Ch. 13. Powers to jointure. Ch. 14. Portions. Ch. 15. Double portions. Ch. 16. Covenants to settle after-acquired property. Ch. 17. Covenants to settle particular lands; to settle lands of a defined value; to lay out money in the purchase of lands; to give or assure to a child about to marry an equal share or portion. Ch. 18. Reformation and rectification of settlements. Ch. 19. Family arrangements and resettlements. Ch. 20. Deeds of separation. The practical value of the treatise is greatly increased by the addition of well-drawn precedents (twenty-four in number) of settlements and deeds of separation, illustrated by judicious notes; and at the end are printed the Settled Estates Acts, and the enactments relating to stamp duties on settlements, with notice of all the decisions. We extract a portion of the chapter on pin-money as an illustration of the writer's success in relieving the dryest subject by his mode of treatment-in the present instance, however, with the advantage of following Lord Brougham : "Generally speaking, in a modern settlement of a large family estate executed upon a marriage, the first limitation-always supposing the property intended to be settled belongs to the husband-is unto trustees, to the use of the husband, his heirs and assigns, until the marriage, and thenceforth to the use of trustees for a long term of years, upon trust to pay an annuity to the wife for her separate use. The annuity thus proposed to be raised is what is popularly called the wife's 'pinmoney,' and is a sum of money set apart for a specific purpose, due to the wife in virtue of a particular arrangement, payable by the husband by force of that arrangement, and for that specific purpose. It is, with respect to the personal expenses of the wife, for the dress and pocket-money of the wife; indeed, its very name indicates a connexion with the person. It means that which is employed to deck or attire the person of the wife, and, upon a somewhat larger construction, to pay her ordinary personal expenses. A person in a humble station of life pays his wife's bills as he pays A person in a station rather higher is accustomed to make, for common convenience, an allowance to his wife of so much for housekeeping expenses, if she be præposita rebus domesticis, and so much over for her own dress and the dress of her children. A person in a still higher station makes a general arrangement, which probably extends over years, if not over the whole coverture; and a person in a still more elevated station makes the arrangement of pin-money by the marriage settlement, which is, as it were, saying, his own. "The exact period when pin-money was first introduced in England is unknown. Lord Brougham inclines to ascribe its first introduction to a time when the wives of the great nobles of England had ladies in waiting, the wives and daughters of barons and esquires attending upon them, just as the Queen Consorts of the immediate predecessors of our own Sovereign Lady had in the early part of the present century; in fact, that pin-money was invented in the days when the wives of the great nobles of England were rather princesses than subjects. Lord St. Leonards, however, entertains a doubt whether pin-money can claim so remote an origin; and a learned and ingenious friend of his Lordship, in a note addressed to the noble author of the Treatise on the Law of Property as administered by the House of Lords, considers that pin-money came to England about the period of the Restoration, and quotes, as one of his authorities for that opinion, a paper in The Spectator, by Addison, who, in his character of "spectator," is called by one of his corre spondents to give his opinion whether there was any precedent for the usage of pin-money among our ancestors, or whether any mention of pin-money was to be found in Grotius, Puffendorf, or any other of the civilians. But Addison, who, as Lord St. Leonards' correspondent remarks, had, from that acquaintance with the Benchers of Lincoln's Inn of which The Spectator is made to boast, very ready means of answering the inquiry to the full extent, is unable to say more than that the doctrine of pin-money is of very late date; that it was unknown to our great grandmothers, and had not yet been received by many of our modern ladies; adding, moreover, that it would be greatly for the interest of both sexes to keep it from spreading. "Very little of authority is to be gleaned out of the books upon the subject of pin-money, notwithstanding its now occurring (and without producing the ill effects hinted at by Addison) almost every time that a marriage takes place among persons of large fortune. You cannot, indeed, it is observed by Lord Brougham, get from the books even a definition upon which you can rely; you cannot trace the line which divides it from the separate property of the wife with any distinctness; and as to authority, either of decision or dicta, of textwriters or of judges, there is nothing that furnishes a clear and steady light on the subject; the cases running from pin-money into separate estate, and from separate estate into pin-money, in such a way, that when a text-writer, and one of repute too, quotes a case -Brady v. Barry, for instance-in support of a doc trine touching pin-money, you look at the book, and find it has nothing to do with pin-money, and does not support the proposition for which it is cited." THE CHANCERY EVIDENCE RESOLUTIONS. WE have much pleasure in informing our readers that the Lord Chancellor has "taken action" on the resolutions reported by the Evidence Commissioners, |