strued as providing that the commissioner upon payment of the composition shall annul the adjudication, it would be intelligible. The commissioner would examine the bankrupt as to the amount of his debts, and upon payment into Court of the composition upon such amount, would annul the adjudication.] The Act assumes that the creditors will take care of their own interests. The true meaning of the fourth clause of the agreement may be that it is to be voidable at the option of the parties to it. They have chosen to affirm it. A creditor who has not signed cannot avoid the agreement; he has no rights under it.

POLLOCK, C. B.—We are of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. In order to render an agreement to accept a composition binding upon all the creditors of a bankrupt under the 230th section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, the offer of composition must be made to all the creditors and not to those only who subscribe the deed.

MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion. The case of Larpent v. Bibby (a) is almost conclusive upon the point.

BRAMWELL, B.-I agree with the rest of the Court on this point. I think also that the section in question applies only where the offer is of a composition in money, and that creditors cannot be compelled to take bills of exchange without their consent.

CHANNELL, B., concurred.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

(a) 5 H. L. 481.

1857.

TAYLOR

v.

PEARSE.

1857.

April 29.

CHARLOTTE SHILLING, Administratrix of JAMES SHILLING v. THE ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE COMPANY.

To an action, DECLARATION by the plaintiff, as administratrix a

by the executrix of J. S.,

on a policy of insurance, by which the defendants agreed with

J. S. to pay to bis executors 20007. on his death, the defendants pleaded that

the policy was made by T. S. in the name of

J. S., but for the use and benefit of T. S. and not for the

use or on ac

count of J. S.;

that T. S. had

not any interest

in the life of
J. S., and that
the policy was
a wagering
policy contrary

to the statute,
whereby the
policy was void.
Held a good
plea.

James Shilling, on a policy of insurance, by which the defendants, in consideration of 61. 15s. paid to the Com pany by James Shilling, agreed with James Shilling that i he should suffer or receive any bodily injury from any acci dent or violence, on or before the 11th of June, 1857, that subject to certain conditions, the capital of the Company should be liable to pay to the insured, his executors or administrators, in case the violence should cause his death, the sum of 20007., &c.; and that while the policy remained in full force James Shilling was accidentally drowned, &c.

Plea.—That the said policy of insurance was in truth and in fact made and effected by one Thomas Shilling in the name and on the pretended behalf of the said James Shilling; but for the use, benefit and on account and behalf of the said Thomas Shilling himself, and not for the use, benefit or on account of the said James Shilling; and the said Thomas Shilling had not at the time of making the said policy, nor before nor at the death of the said James Shilling, any interest in the life of the said James Shilling, and that the said policy was a gaming or wagering policy contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, whereby the said policy was and is wholly null and void. Demurrer and joinder therein.

Lush, in support of the demurrer.-A wife who procures her husband to insure his life may pay the premiums:

EASTER TERM, 20 VICT.

Reed v. The Royal Exchange Assurance Company (a). The object of the act is to prevent the making insurances on lives wherein the assured have no interest. The policy must be looked at to see who the assured is. Here it appears by the policy that James Shilling is the assured; and parol evidence is not admissible to shew that any one else is so. The plea is founded upon the second section of 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, which provides "that it shall not be lawful to make any policy or policies on the life or lives of any person, &c., without inserting in such policy or policies the person or persons' name or names interested therein, or for whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy is so made or underwrote." [Martin, B.- The case seems very closely to resemble Wainewright v. Bland (b).] In that case Lord Abinger's ruling on this point at nisi prius was not confirmed by the Court on the motion for a new trial (c). The case went off upon another ground. In Dalby v. The India and London Life Assurance Company (d), Parke, B., in delivering the judgment of the Court, points out that a contract to pay a fixed sum on the death of a person "would have been unquestionably legal at common law if the insurer had an interest therein or not." [Pollock, C. B.-I do not assent to that.] The second section of the statute in question applies only to policies effected by agents. Here the person legally interested is James Shilling, and his name appears on the face of the policy. He is the person to whom the money is payable, in other words the insured. It is consistent with this plea that there was an understanding between Thomas the son and James Shilling his father, that as the father's occupation was a hazardous one he should insure his life and the son should

(a) Peake Add. Ca. 70. (b) 1 Moo. & Rob. 481. (c) 1 M. & W. 32.

(d) 15 C. B. 365. 387. See also Cook v. Field, 15 Q. B. 460.

1857.

SHILLING

v.

ACCIDENTAL

DEATH INSURANCE COMPANY.

1857.

SHILLING

v.

ACCIDENTAL
ᎠᎬᎪᎢᎻ
INSURANCE

COMPANY.

pay the premiums, and that the father should leave the sum insured to the son by his will. The plea should have gone on to aver that the policy was made without the knowledge or consent of James Shilling.

Raymond, who appeared in support of the plea, was not called on.

POLLOCK, C. B.-We are all of opinion that this is a good plea under the 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2. It avers the existence of a state of things which, if proved, would dis

entitle the plaintiff to recover. It appears that the policy was not in fact the policy of the person whose name appears on the face of it as being the person interested, or made for his benefit. It therefore comes within the prohibition contained in the second section of the act. There must be judgment for the defendants.

MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion. The obvious meaning of the plea is, that Thomas Shilling went to the office of the defendants, pretending that he was authorized by James Shilling to effect a policy on his account, when in fact he had no such authority, but really effected it for his own benefit. This is exactly what the statute was intended to prohibit, viz., that one man should effect a policy on the life of another not having an interest in such life. If the facts suggested by Mr. Lush are the true facts of this case, I think that the plea would not be proved, and that the policy would in effect be the policy of James Shilling.

BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. This is a policy made on account of Thomas Shilling, who had no interest in the life of James Shilling. Mr. Lush says that

the defendant cannot plead that Thomas Shilling was the person interested. I think that is not so. Provision is made in the statute against any difficulty of that kind, by the enactment that it shall not be lawful to make any policy without inserting in such policy the name of the person "for whose use, benefit or on whose account such policy is so made." If the facts are as suggested by Mr. Lush, I agree with my brother Martin in thinking that the plea will not be proved.

CHANNELL, B., concurred.

Judgment for the defendants.

1857.

SHILLING

v.

ACCIDENTAL

DEATH INSURANCE COMPANY.

W. A. LYNDON v. T. STANDBRIDGE, Town Clerk of the

Borough of BIRMINGHAM.

April 27.

Improvement

Clauses Act,

CASE. The declaration stated that before and at the Sections 87 to time of the committing of the grievances, &c., and after 98 of the Towns the making and passing of the Birmingham Improvement Act, 1851, and after the council of the borough had taken upon themselves, entered into and undertaken the several powers, duties and authorities in the said Act contained

with respect to cleansing the streets in the borough, to wit, &c., the plaintiff was an inhabitant of the said borough,

1847, are under the general heading, "and with respect to cleansing the streets."

Sec

tion 87 enacts

(inter alia), missioners shall

"that the com

cause all the dust, ashes and rubbish to be carried away from the houses and tenements of the inhabitants of the town or district within the limits of the special Act at convenient hours and times." Section 50 of the Birmingham Improvement Act, 1851, enacts, "that, subject to the provision thereinafter contained the clauses of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1847, with respect to cleansing the streets, shall be incorporated with and form part of this Act." By the 57th section of the same Act, "the several clauses of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1847, numbered respectively 87, &c., shall not extend to any lands used as arable, meadow, or pasture ground only, or to wood lands or market gardens, garden allotments or nursery grounds, or to any bailings or deposit on such lands, or to any roads or footways intersecting the same respectively." Held, that under these sections the commissioners were not compellable to remove from a manufactory, dust, ashes and rubbish arising from the combustion of coal, and otherwise in the course of the manufacture of edge tools within the borough.