Provisions to apply to masters of courts at Westmin to prothonotaries of Court of Common caster, and Court of ham, and their deputies, &c. As to proceedings in error. tution and peculiar circumstances; and from time to time to rescind, amend or alter such rules or orders; and that such rules or orders, subject to such power of rescision, amendment and alteration, shall have the same force as if the same were made by and embodied in this act. 232. "Provided always, that all the provisions of this act applicable to masters of the said courts at Westminster, shall apply to the respective prothonotaries of the Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster, and Court of Pleas at ster to apply Durham, and their respective deputies, who may singly exercise, with reference to matters and proceedings in the last-mentioned courts respectively, the powers hereby Pleas at Lan- given to any one or more of the masters of the superior courts at Westminster; and that such respective officers Pleas at Dur- shall record the proceedings of trials of causes depending in the said respective courts, and draw up and return posteas on records from the superior courts at Westminster, tried in the said counties palatine respectively, and officiate at the trial of such causes therein as heretofore." 233. "Provided also, as to proceedings in error, that the Court of Queen's Bench shall still be the Court of Error from the said Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster and Court of Pleas at Durham; and that it shall be sufficient to transmit to the said Court of Queen's Bench a transcript of the record of any judgment of proceedings in those courts on which error is alleged; and that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench thereon shall be certified by one of the masters of the said Court of Queen's Bench on the said transcript, or by the rule of court, as the said court may direct; and that thereupon such judgment shall be entered on the original record in the said respective Courts of Common Pleas at Lancaster and Pleas at Durham; and such further proceedings as may be necessary thereon shall be awarded by the said respective courts, subject to the right of either party to allege errors in the said judgment in the said Court of Queen's Bench, and proceed thereon as provided by this act in the case of errors alleged in actions depending in that court." Certain pro visions of 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 62, and 2 & 3 Vict. c. 16, repealed. 234. "From the time when this act shall commence and take effect so much of a certain act of parliament passed in the fifth year of the reign of his late majesty King William the Fourth, intituled 'An Act for improving the Practice and Proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas in the County Palatine of Lancaster,' and so much of a certain act of parliament passed in the second year of the reign of her present Majesty, intituled An Act for improving the Practice and Proceedings of the Court of Pleas of the County Palatine of Durham and Sadberge,' as relate to the duration of writs, and to alias and pluries writs, and to the proceedings necessary for making the first writ in any action available to prevent the operation of any statute whereby the time for the commencement of any action may be limited, shall be repealed, except so far as may be necessary for supporting any writs that have been issued before the commencement of this act, and any proceedings taken or to be taken thereon; but that the other provisions of the said last-mentioned acts of parliament, so far as they are not altered by or inconsistent with the provisions of this act, shall remain in force." 235. "In citing this act in any instrument, document Short title of or proceeding, it shall be sufficient to use the expression act. The Common Law Procedure Act, 1852.' 236. "Nothing in this act shall extend to Ireland or Act not to Scotland, except in the cases herein specially mentioned." The only sections in which they are named are sect. 18, by which persons resident in either Ireland or Scotland are excepted from the operation of that section, and sect. 227, by which they are declared not to be beyond the seas within the meaning of sect. 147 as to bringing writs of error. But for this enactment Ireland would have been beyond the seas, as in Lane v. Bennett (1 M. & W. 70), it was decided still to be "beyond the seas" within 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 9, although expressly declared not to be so by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 19, and 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 7. Where an act of parliament speaks of the United Kingdom the Isle of Man is not included. (Davison v. Farmer, 6 Exch. 242; 20 L. J. 177, Exch.) extend to Ireland or EJECTMENT. Form of Writ under sect. 217. Victoria, &c., to X., Y., Z., and all persons entitled to defend [describe the property with reasonable the possession of in the county of day of certainty] in the parish of to the possession whereof A., B., and C., some or one of them, claim to be [or to have been on and since the A.D. ] entitled, and to eject all other persons therefrom: These are to will and command you, or such of you as deny the alleged title, within ten days after service hereof to appear in our court of to defend the said property, or such part thereof as you may be advised; in default whereof judgment may be signed, and you turned out of possession. Witness, &c. NOTE. SCIRE FACIAS against Member of a Company. (See sect. 132, supra, 167.) The importance and comparative novelty of the proceedings against members of a joint-stock company will render the following statement of the principal decisions upon that subject useful. It is clearly settled that the public officer of a company must in all cases sue and be sued in the first instance. (See Stewart v. Greaves, 10 M. & W. 711; Davison v. Farmer, 6 Exch. 242; 20 L. J. 177, Exch.) As a consequence of the representative character of the public officer, he cannot plead in such actions any defence of a purely personal nature, as his bankruptcy or insolvency (Steward v. Dunn, 11 M. & W. 65), but the plaintiff may be required to undertake not to issue execution against him personally. (See Harwood v. Law, 7 M. & W. 203; Wood v. Marston, 7 Dowl. 865.) If a member, execution might be issued against him without a scire facias. (Harwood v. Law, 7 M. & W. 203.) A plea that he had ceased to be public officer would not be allowed, at least with any others, without an affidavit of its truth. (Wood v. Marston, ut supra.) Since the execution must follow the judgment, no execution can be issued against any member of a banking company sought to be charged by reason of a judgment against the public officer or the company collectively, without his being made a party to the record by scire facias, that is to say, now by a writ in the nature of a writ of revivor. (Sect. 132, supra, 157; Cross v. Law, 6 M. & W. 217; Bosanquet v. Ransford, 11 A. & E. 520.) The proceeding by suggestion would be applicable to collateral facts affecting the same parties, e. g. change of name, change of public officer, &c. (See Bosanquet v. Ransford, ut supra; Barnewall v. Sutherland, 19 L. J. 290, Exch.) copartner The 7 Geo. IV. c. 46, s. 13, enacts, "that execution upon Against any judgment in any action obtained against any public offi- members of cer for the time being of any such corporation or copartner- a banking ship carrying on the business of banking under the provisions ship. of this act, whether as plaintiff or defendant, may be issued against any member or members for the time being of such corporation or copartnership, and that in case any such execution against any member or members for the time being of any such corporation or copartnership shall be ineffectual for obtaining payment and satisfaction of the amount of such judgment, it shall be lawful for the party or parties so having Members primarily liable. Members secondarily liable. obtained judgment against such public officer for the time being, to issue execution against any person or persons who was or were a member or members of such corporation or copartnership at the time when the contract or contracts, or engagement or engagements, in which such judgment may have been obtained was or were entered into, or become a member at any time before such contracts or engagements were executed, or was a member at the time of the judgment obtained: provided always, that no such execution as last mentioned shall be issued without leave first granted on motion in open court by the court in which such judgment shall have been obtained, and which motion shall be made on notice to the person or persons sought to be charged, nor after the expiration of three years next after any such person or persons shall have ceased to be a member or members of such corporation or copartnership." Persons members at the time of the writ of execution issued are primarily liable, and to authorize the proceedings by scire facias against them no leave of the court is necessary (Ricketts v. Bowhay, 3 C. B. 889), and the scire facias may issue in the first instance against any one or more of those primarily liable as members for the time being, and more than one may be included in the same writ, or concurrent writs may be issued against them severally. (Fowler v. Rickerby, 9 Dowl. 682; Burmester v. Cropton, 3 Exch. 297 ; 18 L. J. 142, Exch.; Nunn v. Lomer, 3 Exch. 471; 18 L. J. 247, Exch.) The members secondarily liable are those who are partners at the time of the contract being entered into, that is, in the event of the execution against those primarily liable being unsuccessful. (Rickets v. Bowhay, 3 C. B. 889; Dodgson v. Scott, 2 Exch. 457; 17 L. J. 321, Exch.) But leave must first be obtained on motion in open court after notice to the person to be charged. To obtain this leave it is sufficient to show that every reasonable and proper effort has been made for the purpose of obtaining payment of the debt due from those primarily liable, for which purpose it is not essential that all of them should have been proceeded against, but the efforts must have been continuous, for if execution be taken out against some without success, and the proceedings allowed to stand over for a long period, this leave will not be granted. (See Dodgson v. Scott, 2 Exch. 469; Eardley v. Law, 12 A. & E. 811; Bank of England v. Johnson, 3 Exch. 598.) What would be the minimum of exertion to enforce the judgment against those primarily liable has not been decided, but it is clear that the mere existence of a collateral security for the amount recovered, which might by care be made productive, is no objection to the leave being granted. (Field v. M‘Kenzie, 4 C. B. 725; 17 L. J. 98, C. P.) As was said by Parke, B., in his elaborate judgment in Dodgson v. Scott, "all that is requisite is, that a scire facias should issue against an existing |