1804. and Others versus HUBBARDA nees. When any one is put out by the order of the CHANCELLOR, that order is not sufficient to devest the BLOXAM title out of the old assignee until he has reassigned. The stat. 5 Geo. II. c. 30, s. 36, gives the CHANCELLOR the power in this case; but the order here does not pursue the directions of the statute. Secondly, the sale of the ship, in this case, is not a tortious conversion. It is clearly not so against the bankrupt himself; for this is a bonâ fide delivery of the ship by the bankrupt to the defendant, and the assignees stand precisely in his place. Thirdly, the assignees ought to have completed their title by obtaining a register. The assignment to them by the commissioners, is as much a transfer of property within the registry acts as any ordinary sale, and the assignees of a bankrupt are bound by the same rules with respect to conveyances of property, in order to complete their titles as other persons. In cases under the statute 13 Eliz. c.7, they must pursue the directions of the statute; in cases of copyholds, they must convey the same as other persons; Drury v. Man. Fourthly, the defendant has done every thing requisite to complete his title, and the decision in Heath v. Hubbard,‡ proceeded upon a mistake. The stat. of 7 and 8 W. III. c. 22, s. 21, directs a particular mode of transferring the property in ships in two cases. The first is, where there is a sale of the whole of the ship, or of part, to a person in another port; and the second where there is a sale of one or more parts or shares to another person in the same port. In the first case, it is to be done by delivering up the certificate of registry to be cancelled, and taking out a new one, and cannot be done by indorsement on the old certificate. In the second case, it is to be done by an indorsement on the old certificate. This statute has never been altered in these respects by any subsequent acts, and it is absurd to require that the sale should be witnessed by an indorsement on an instrument, which, as in the case of a 1804. BLOXAM and Others versus HUBBARD. transfer to another port, is directed to be delivered to . LE BLANC, J. Suppose the ship is to trade to the same port, but the owner resides at another port." SCOTT. "In that case the register may be at either port; but this 16th section cannot apply to the present case, because an indorsement is to be made on the old certificate when the ship returns to her port, whereas the ship here does not return to her port, and it would be absurd to require an indorsement to be made on an instrument which is to be delivered up to be cancelled. Section 15 only describes a certain form of indorsement, and the 16th section, referring to it, provides for the mode of indorsement in case the ship is at sea; which may, therefore be made ten days after her return." He contended also that the case of Moss v. Charnock, would not apply, because, in this case, a good title was made by the bill of sale from the bankrupt and the subsequent register, whereas there a good title was not made, previous to the bank ruptcy. He also made some observations upon the statute 34 Geo. III. c. 68, s. 22, and said that it could not apply to the case of a transfer to a foreigner, mentioned in the recital, because a foreigner could not be entitled to have a register de novo, which that clause directs to be taken out. And he concluded by relying principally on the two following points, viz. First, the order of the LORD CHANCELLOR did not give the plaintiffs such a title in the whole ship as to enable them to bring trover without the other assignee; and, secondly, this being the sale of a whole ship, transferred to another port, there was no act applicable to the case but the statute 7 and 8 W. III. c. 2, s. 2; and that statute required only a register de novo, which was obtained in this case. HALL, in reply, relied on Moss v. Charnock,† as an authority for the plaintiffs; for, admitting that a register de novo was sufficient to complete the defendant's title, yet that was not obtained till after the bankruptcy, and that case requires all the formalities to be performed before the bankruptcy, in order to complete the title, and if performed afterwards it says they have no relation back to any previous time when the bill of sale is made. That even the 7 and 8 W. III. c. 2, was not complied with ; for that statute was incorporated into, and in part altered by the subsequent statutes, which make further requisites. necessary, and the register de novo, required by the first act, cannot be obtained without pursuing all the additional formalities required by the latter acts; otherwise those acts would be perfectly nugatory. That by reference from the 16th section of 34 Geo. III. c. 68, to the 15th section of the same act, it would appear that it was 1801. BLOXAM and Others HUBBARD versus Mr. Abbott, in his Treatise on the Law of Merchant Ships, p 52, says, this clause is strangely drawn, and he is not clear that be understands it. + 2 East, 399. applicable to any alteration of property, whether in the whole or in part of a ship. He referred also to the case of Heath v. Hubbard, and again briefly noticed the other objections. Cur. adv. cult. And now the opinion of the court was delivered to the following effect, by Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. After stating the case; "Three objections have been taken in this case founded partly on a supposed defect in the title of the plaintiffs to bring this action, and partly in supposing that the defendant himself has a good title to the ship. These objections are first, that J. G. Johnston ought, notwithstanding the order of removal by the LORD CHANCELLOR, to have been joined as a plaintiff in the action, and that a new assignment by the commissioners, or a reassignment by him, was necessary to devest the property out of him; secondly, that there is no conversion to enable theplaintiffs to bring trover; thirdly, that the plaintiffs ought to shew a title in themselves by complying with the statutes concerning the registring of ships, by taking out a new register, even supposing the plaintiffs' right to recover not to be defeated by the sale from Ward to the defendant, and that the defendant had not a good right in virtue of his purchase under that sale. As to the first of these objections, it has only the effect of precluding the plaintiffs from recovering more than 3-4th parts of the amount stated in the verdict; for it is now well settled in the courts of law that the defendant cannot preclude the plaintiffs from recovering in tort for the conversion with respect to their shares, except by plea in abatement, as was decided in the case of Sedgworth v. Overend.* As to the second question, If in the result of this case it appears that the defendant had no title when he sold the ship by public auction, and afterwards assigned her to *7 Term Rep. 279; and see also Nelthorpe v. Dorrington, 2 Lev. 113, which is directly in point. 1.04 15: and b the purchasers, who sent her to sea, where she has been |