Considérant que les changements faits plus tard dans ces livres ne peuvent affecter la cause, à moins que la Demanderesse ne prouve que c'est par erreur ou fraudeque le montant avait été ainsi chargé d'abord au mari seul, ce qui n'est pas prouvé dans l'espèce; Renvoie l'action de la Demanderesse quant à la Défenderesse, Dame Dosithée Dansereau, avec dépens. Mtre A. P. Vanasse, pour la Demanderesse. Mtre J. B. Brousseau, C.R., pour les Défendeurs. (A.P.V.) DISTRICT DE SAINT-HYACINTHE. Procédure. Examen préalable de la partie adverse.Examen avant adjudication sur Inscription en droit.-C. P. C. 132, 193, 195, 286. COUR SUPERIEURE, 5 janvier 1904. Coram: MADORE, J. C. S. GALIPEAU vs. PERREAULT. Jugé: Aux termes de l'article 286 C. P. C., une partie peut assigner l'autre à comparaitre pour examen préalable, en tout temps après la production de la défense, mais avant l'inscription. Comme l'inscription en droit doit être produite en même temps que la défense, qu'elle n'a pour effet que de suspendrel'inscription sur la contestation en faits, et que pour pouvoir interroger la partie adverse en vertu de l'art. 286 C.P.C. aucune inscription n'est requise, il y a lieu de permettre tel examen, même avant adjudication sur le mérite de l'Inscription en droit. Jugement. Attendu que la Demanderesse a assi-gné le Défendeur à comparaître devant le juge de la Cour Supérieure de ce district, ou devant le protonotaire de la dite Cour, pour être examiné au préalable. d'après les dispositions de l'article 286 du code de procédure civile, le 5 janvier 1904; Attendu que, le 5 janvier 1904, le Défendeur étant appelé, pour subir tel examen, a comparu, par son procureur, et s'est objecté à tel examen, alléguant qu'il avait produit une inscription en droit, sur laquelle aucune adjudication n'avait encore été rendue; Attendu que l'inscription en droit doit être produite en même temps que la défense. (Art. 192 C.P.); Attendu qu'une partie peut assigner l'autre à comparaître en tout temps avant l'inscription, mais après la production de la défense, pour être interrogée comme témoin. (Art. 286 C.P.); Attendu que l'inscription en droit ne suspend que l'inscription sur la contestation en faits (Art. 195 C.P.) et que pour pouvoir interroger la partie adverse, en vertu de l'article 286, aucune inscription n'est nécessaire ; Attendu que le défendeur a produit sa défense en cette cause; Le juge renvoie son objection; et, vu l'entente entre les parties, fixe jeudi, le 14 janvier courant, à dix heures et demie du matin, pour l'examen du Défendeur. Lussier et Gendron, Avocats de la Demanderesse. (J.R.) DISTRICT DE MONTREAL. Alienation of substituted property. Prohibition to alienate contained in wills and other deeds how affected by Statute of Quebec, 61 Vict. ch. 44C. C. 953. SUPERIOR COURT, 21st October, 1903. Coram: DOHERTY, J. S. C. Ex parte. PREVOST et al, Petitioners. Held: The enactment, contained in Statute of Quebec, 61 Vict.,. ch. 44, to the effect that substituted property may be definitively alienated during the substitution on the condition that alienation must be to the advantage of the institute and the substitute, is applicable to all property which, at the time such law was enacted, answered to that description, having been substituted by any prior gift or will, which had, at the time, become effective, as well as to property, which may have been substituted by subsequent dispositions, and this even if the deed creating such substitution contains an absolute prohibition to alienate. Per curiam. This is a petition for authorization to sell a substituted property. It rests on the allegation that an opportunity now presents itself to sell at a price which would make the transaction most advantageous to both institute and substitutes, and which, if not now availed of, may not occur again. The petitioners are the institute, and one of the two presumptive substitutes, children of the institute. The other presumptive substitute ist minor. The family council, with one exception-an uncle by marriage of the substitutes-are all agreed that in the interest of both institute and substitutes the proposed sale should be authorized. The objecting member of the council, while questioning the advantage to the substitutes of such proposed sale, rests his objection principally upon a clause in the will creating the substitution in which the testator expresses himself as follows: "Je veux comme condition expresse du legs d'usufruit par moi fait à mon dit enfant né et aux enfants à naître de mon dit mariage, de mes susdits biens.. 29 Que mes biens fonds ou immeubles de quelque nature et qualité qu'ils soient passent en nature à mes dits. petits enfants (the substitutes) et qu'en conséquence ils ne puissent être en tout ou en partie, vendus ou aliénés par quelque autorité que ce soit ni sous quelque prétexteque ce puisse être, même sous celui du plus grand avantage de mes dits petits enfants, car telle est mon expressevolonté à cet égard." If the will of the creator of the substitution is alone to be considered, this clause certainly makes amply clear his desire and intention. If he be absolute master and his expressed wish be absolute law as to the disposal of thesubstituted property, then there is no room for question, -the petition must be rejected. To this express will of the testator petitioners, however, oppose the dispositions of article 953a C.C., as enacted by 61 Vict., cap. 44, which declares that "the substituted property may likewise be definitively alienated during the substitution on the following conditions: 1. Such alienation must be to the advantage of the institute and the substitute." The other conditions enumerated are not material. If the petition be granted they will be complied with. If this disposition of law applies and is to govern, then the petition should, or at all events, may be granted. The will was executed in 1844, and the testator died long before the enactment of 61 Vict., cap. 44. I do not, however, understand it to be contended that this act does not apply to the property in question here, because the substitution was created, and the will creating. it, had become irrevocable prior to the passing or coming into force of this act. Such a pretention, were it made, would not, it seems to me, be sustainable. The act by its terms applies to all substituted property, that is all property which, at the time it was enacted, answered to that description, having been substituted by any gift or will, which had, at the time, become effective, as well as to property which might be substituted by subsequent dispositions. The law making no distinction, the court has no power to make any, between property substituted when the act came into force, and that to be substituted thereafter. The legislator had power to deal with such properties, and make them alienable though previously they were not so. He has seen fit to exercise that power, and it is for the court merely to apply the law whereby he has done so-even though applying it to property to which the legislator clearly meant it to apply, may alter or modify the effect of dispositions of property made prior to its enactment. What is urged, and most strenuously urged, is, that the terms of the will as above set forth, make this legislation inapplicable to the property now in question. To adopt this view one must necessarily hold that the will in question does something more than merely substitute the property transmitted under it. The objecting party finds this something more in the express prohibition of alienation. But does this in reality add anything to the substitution of the property? It is made merely, and the will so tells us, in consequence of the testator's desire that the property bequeathed should pass "en nature" to the substitutes. It is not in any sense in the interest of the institutes or of any person other than the substitutes. Any alienation that would not prevent the property so passing to the latter would not defeat its purpose, nor, in consequence, be a violation of it. |