of Europe was supposed to depend, was thus constantly threatened by the irreconcilable pretensions of the two great divisions of the Ottoman Empire. The war again broke out between them in 1839, and the Turkish army was overthrown in the decisive battle of Nezib, which was followed by the desertion of the fleet to Mehemet Ali, and by the death of Sultan Mahmoud II.

In this state of things, the western powers of Europe thought they perceived the necessity of interfering to save the Ottoman Empire from the double danger with which it was threatened; by the aggressions of the Pasha of Egypt on one side, and the exclusive protectorate of Russia on the other. A long and intricate negotiation ensued between the five great European powers, from the voluminous documents relating to which the following general principles may be collected, as having received the formal assent of all the parties to the negotiations, however divergent might be their respective views as to the application of those principles.

1. The right of the five great European powers to interfere in this contest was placed upon the ground of its threatening, in its consequences, the general balance of power and the peace of Europe. The only difference of opinion arose as to the means by which the desirable end of preventing all future conflict between the two contending parties could best be accomplished.

2. It was agreed that this interference could only take place on the formal application of the Sultan himself, according to the rule laid down by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1818, that the five great powers would never assume jurisdiction over questions concerning the rights and interests of another power, except at its request, and without inviting such power to take part in the conference.

3. The death of Sultan Mahmoud being imminent, and the dangers of the Ottoman Empire having increased by a complication of disasters, each of the five powers declared its determination to maintain the independence of that empire, under the reigning dynasty; and as a necessary consequence of this determination, that neither of them should seek to profit by the present state of things to obtain an increase of territory or an exclusive influence.

The negotiations finally resulted in the conclusion of the con

vention of the 15th July, 1840, between four of the great European powers, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, to which the Ottoman Porte acceded, and in consequence of which Mehemet Ali was compelled to relinquish the possession of all the provinces held by him, except Egypt, the hereditary pachalic of which was confirmed to him, according to the conditions contained in the separate article of the convention.1

terference of

pean powers

in the Bel

gic revolu

The interference of the five great European powers § 11. In represented in the conference of London, in the Belgic the five Revolution of 1830, affords an example of the applica- great Eurotion of this right to preserve the general peace, and to adapt the new order of things to the stipulations of the tion of 1830. treaties of Paris and Vienna, by which the kingdom of the Netherlands had been created. We have given, in another work, a full account of the long and intricate negotiations relating to the separation of Belgium from Holland, which assumed alternately the character of a pacific mediation and of an armed intervention, according to the varying circumstances of the contest, and which was finally terminated by a compromise between the two great opposite principles which so long threatened to disturb the established order and general peace of Europe. The Belgic Revolution was recognized as an accomplished fact, whilst its legal consequences were limited within the strictest bounds, by refusing to Belgium the attributes of the rights of conquest and of postliminy, and by depriving her of a great part of the province of Luxembourg, of the left bank of the Scheldt, and of the right bank of the Meuse. The five great powers, representing Europe, consented to the separation of Belgium from Holland, and admitted the former among the independent States of Europe, upon conditions which were accepted by her and have become the bases of her public law. These conditions were subsequently incorporated into a definitive treaty, concluded between Belgium and Holland in 1839, by which the independence of the former was finally recognized by the latter.2

1 Wheaton's Hist. of the Law of Nations, pp. 563-583, [and note b, p. 21.] 2 Ibid. pp. 538-555.

§ 12. In

of the State

to its inter

ment.

Every State, as a distinct moral being, independent dependence of every other, may freely exercise all its sovereign in respect rights in any manner not inconsistent with the equal nal govern- rights of other States. Among these is that of establishing, altering, or abolishing its own municipal constitution of government. No foreign State can lawfully interfere with the exercise of this right, unless such interference is authorized by some special compact, or by such a clear case of necessity as immediately affects its own independence, freedom, and security. Non-interference is the general rule, to which cases of justifiable interference form exceptions limited by the necessity of each particular case.

13. Mediation of foreign States for the settlement of

The approved usage of nations authorizes the proposal by one State of its good offices or mediation for the settlement of the intestine dissensions of another State. When such offer is accepted by the contending dissentions parties, it becomes a just title for the interference of the Treaties of mediating power. (a)

the internal

of a State.

mediation and gua

Such a title may also grow out of positive compact ranty. previously existing, such as treaties of mediation and guaranty. Of this nature was the guaranty by France and Sweden of the Germanic Constitution at the peace of Westphalia in 1648, the result of the thirty years' war waged by the princes and States of Germany for the preservation of their civil and religious liberties against the ambition of the House of Austria.

The Republic of Geneva was connected by an ancient alliance

(a) [The difference between a mediator and an arbitrator consists in this: that the arbitrator pronounces a real judgment, which is obligatory, and that the mediator can only give his counsel and advice. The mediation, indeed, is often a simple formality to bring the parties together, and which is afterwards continued from respect to the mediator. Garden, Traité de la Diplomatie, tom. i. p. 436, note. The references, by treaty, of 1827, of the question respecting the north-east boundary of the United States by the British and American governments, to the King of the Netherlands, was a case of arbitration, though as the award did not profess to follow the submission, but merely recommended a conventional line, which it designated, it was not obligatory. Amer. Ann. Reg. 1830-1, p. 146.]

with the Swiss Cantons of Berne and Zurich, in consequence of which they united with France, in 1738, in offering the joint mediation of the three powers to the contending political parties by which the tranquillity of the republic was disturbed. The result of this mediation was the settlement of a constitution, which giving rise to new disputes in 1768, they were again adjusted by the intervention of the mediating powers. In 1782, the French government once more united with these Cantons and the court of Sardinia in mediating between the aristocratic and democratic parties; but it appears to be very questionable how far these transactions, especially the last, can be reconciled with the respect due, on the strict principles of international law, to the just rights and independence of the smallest, not less than to those of the greatest States.1

The present constitution of the Swiss Confederation was also adjusted, in 1813, by the mediation of the great allied powers, and subsequently recognized by them at the Congress of Vienna as the basis of the federative compact of Switzerland. By the same act the united Swiss Cantons guarantee their respective local constitutions of government.2

So also the local constitutions of the different States composing the Germanic Confederation may be guaranteed by the Diet on the application of the particular State in which the constitution is established; and this guarantee gives the Diet the right of determining all controversies respecting the interpretation and execution of the constitution thus established and guaranteed.3

And the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees to each State of the federal Union a republican form of government, and engages to protect each of them against invasion, and, on application of the local authorities, against domestic violence.1

1 Flassan, Histoire de la Diplomatic Française, tom. v. p. 78, tom. vii. pp. 27,

297.

2 Acte Final du Congrès de Vienne, art. 74.

3 Wiener Schluss-Acte, vom 15 Mai, 1820, art. 62. Corpus Juris Germanici, von Mayer, tom. ii. p. 196.

4 Constitution of the United States, art. 3.

§ 15. Inde

every State

to the

This perfect independence of every sovereign State, pendence of in respect to its political institutions, extends to the in respect choice of the supreme magistrate and other rulers, as choice of its well as to the form of government itself. In hereditary rulers. governments, the succession to the crown being regulated by the fundamental laws, all disputes respecting the succession are rightfully settled by the nation itself, independently of the interference or control of foreign powers. So also in elective governments, the choice of the chief or other magistrates ought to be freely made, in the manner prescribed by the constitution of the State, without the intervention of any foreign influence or authority.1

$16. Ex

ceptions

or other

of interven

The only exceptions to the application of these genegrowing out ral rules arise out of compact, such as treaties of alliof compact ance, guarantee, and mediation, to which the State itself just right whose concerns are in question has become a party; or tion. formed by other powers in the exercise of a supposed right of intervention growing out of a necessity involving their own particular security, or some contingent danger affecting the general security of nations. Such, among others, were the wars relating to the Spanish succession, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, and to the Bavarian and Austrian successions, in the latter part of the same century. The history of modern Europe also affords many other examples of the actual interference of foreign powers in the choice of the sovereign or chief magistrate of those States where the choice was constitu tionally determined by popular election, or by an elective council, such as in the cases of the head of the Germanic Empire, the King of Poland, and the Roman pontiff; but in these cases no argument can be drawn from the fact to the right. In the particular case, however, of the election of the pope, who is the supreme pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as a temporal sovereign, the Emperor of Austria, and the Kings of France and Spain have, by ancient usage, each a right to exclude one candidate.1

1 Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. ch. 5, §§ 66, 67.

2 Klüber, Droit des Gens moderne de l'Europe, Pt. II. tit. 1, ch. 2, § 48.