Hospital, as directed by the charter in "learning and exercising honest sciences and occupations," such as shoe-making, tailoring, baking, brewing, and rope-making, washing, household and needle work.

The raw materials necessary for the purpose are purchased by the governors. No more goods are manufactured than are necessary for the teaching practically the sciences, occupations and trades in which the inmates are instructed. Some of the articles so manufactured are sold to the public; but the only articles sold are those which are not required for consumption in the hospitals of Bridewell or Bethlem, such as the surplus of the twine and mats not used. The money, about 2007. a-year, received from the sale to the public of the articles which are not consumed in the hospital is brought into the general funds of Bridewell Hospital, and forms part of the fund for the purchase of other materials to be also manufactured by, and in teaching the inmates; and the governors do not derive any profit or advantage whatever from the sale of any articles manufactured as aforesaid. The whole of the funds of the hospital are applied solely for the purposes of the charity, and for none other; and none of the governors do or have receive or received, derive or derived, nor by the regulations and laws of the said last-mentioned hospital, or by the constitution thereof, could or can they receive or derive any compensation, emolument, profit, advantage, or benefit whatsoever, having no interest whatever, being governors appointed. under the authority of the charter.

On the hearing of these appeals, it was contended, on the part of the appellants, that Bethlem Hospital, and the house of occupations, respectively, were not rateable on the following, amongst other grounds: that they were charitable institutions, used and occupied entirely for charitable purposes, and not beneficially, or as a source of profit or emolument; that they were public institutions, used and occupied entirely for public purposes, and not beneficially, or as a source of profit or emolument; that they were royal foundations, or part and parcel of royal foundations, instituted, used, and occupied for public purposes only; and that the appellants were mere trustees without beneficial interest.

rated as occupier, holder, or possessor of the premises, or as using them, the occupation, holding, possessing, or using them, must be beneficial to the person so rated. It has been settled by several cases, that the possessors or occupiers as trustees of property, otherwise rateable, the profits of which they were bound by act of parliament to apply to public or charitable purposes, were not rateable to the poor in respect of such propertyThe King v. the Salter's Load Sluice Company (3), The King v. the Liverpool Dock Company, and The King v. the Trustees of the River Weaver. The general rule of law upon the subject is stated, by Lord Ellenborough, in The King v. Terrott (4), and adopted by the Court in The Queen v. Shee: "The principle to be collected from all the cases on the subject is, that if the party have the use of the building or other subject of the rate as a mere servant of the Crown, or of any public body, or in any other respect, for the mere exercise of a public duty therein, and have no beneficial occupation of, or emolument resulting from it, in any personal or private respect, then he is not rateable." If this rule is applicable to the present case, the appellants would not be rateable. They They possess and use the premises in the exercise of a public duty, and have no beneficial occupation of, or emolument resulting from it in any personal or private respect. But it was said that the present case was not within the general rule, but came within the distinction taken in The King v. Agar, The King v. St. Giles's, York, and The Queen v. Sterrey. In the case of The King v. Agar, the pews in the chapel sought to be rated were let at a rent, and the profits were applied to repairs and salaries of preachers, &c. In The King v. St. Giles's, York, a profit was derived from wealthy patients, and the income exceeded the expenditure, so that a fund accumulated. In both these cases an actual profit was made from the occupation, and the disposal of the funds was not controuled by any statute or royal charter. They were institutions of a private and not of a public character. In the present case no profit is made at all; and the poor generally, and

(3) 4 Term Rep. 730. (4) 3 East, 506.

not of any particular place or district, are entitled to the benefits of the hospital as far as they can be afforded. Those cases therefore are clearly distinguishable. The case of The Queen v. Sterrey was strongly relied upon by the respondents; who contended that, although the benefits of the hospital are in the first instance open to all poor persons, not deemed incurable, for whom there might be room without payment, yet, that as payment was made for some of the patients received as incurable, though not to an amount leaving any profit, the occupation or possession of the appellants must be deemed beneficial, as decided in that case. That case, however, is distinguishable also in most important particulars. In The Queen v. Sterrey no person was admitted to the benefit of the institution

who could not pay 127. a-year. The institution was private, limited to the Society of Friends, and in no sense could be considered a public charity. The object of the institution of Bethlem Hospital is the gratuitous reception and maintenance of lunatic paupers; the charity is open to the public generally; the reception of criminal lunatics, maintained by Government, is in the public service; and the receiving in some cases a contribution from parishes and friends of incurable patients applied as it must be to the general funds and public purposes of the hospital, makes this an intermediate case between those which have been decided, but does not, we think, take it out of the general rule applicable to public charities. The case of The Queen v. the Trustees of Taunton Market was also relied upon for the respondents. In that case, the parties rated were trustees under an act of parliament, which directed them to dispose of the funds they received from the market for the benefit of a particular parish in Taunton, by binding out poor children of the parish as apprentices. The Court, however, were of opinion that this was not a public purpose, but merely for the partial benefit of another parish than that in which the premises were situate, and for the relief of the poor of which the rate was made; it would, in effect, be assisting one parish at the expense of another if the trustees were held not rateable. It is not easy to reconcile all the authorities, or to apply all their distinctions to such a case as that in question,

which differs, in many essential particulars, from all the cases that were cited in the argument. Upon the whole, however, we think that notwithstanding the payment, in some instances, made in the case of incurable lunatics, this is a public charity, instituted by royal charter for public purposes, and that the appellants are occupiers or possessors for public purposes only, and therefore not rateable to the poor in respect of their occupation or possession of the hospital.

The case of the same appellants against the same respondents, in respect of the rating of Bridewell Hospital, does not differ in principle from that of Bethlem Hospital, and we have come to the same conclusion in both cases, in substance upon the same grounds.

Orders of Sessions confirmed.

Poor Removal Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66.Construction of 1st section-Mandamus.

An order of removal was made before the passing of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66; but no removal took place till after the act had passed. After the removal an appeal was entered against the order, and the chief ground was, that the pauper had resided in the respondent parish five years next before the application for the warrant. The Sessions refused to hear the appeal on the ground that the order was before the act, and the removal after it, and the statute gave no right of appeal against the removal.

The Court granted a mandamus commanding the Justices to hear the appeal.

An order for the removal of Sarah Norman, a pauper, was made on the 17th of July 1846, which was before the passing of the act of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, relating to the removal of the poor: but no removal in fact took place till after the passing of the act. After the removal, an appeal was entered against the order; and the principal ground of appeal was founded upon the first section of the new act, stating that the pauper had resided in the respondent parish for five years next before the application for the

warrant, excluding such time as she might have been a prisoner or might have fallen within the other exceptions named in the

statute.

On the appeal coming on for hearing, the respondents objected that, as the order was made before the statute, and the act gave no right of appeal against the removal, the proper course would have been to indict for disobedience of the statute, and that the Sessions could not hear the appeal. On this ground the Quarter Sessions refused to hear the appeal.

Pashley having obtained a rule calling upon the Justices to shew cause why a mandamus should not issue, commanding them to enter continuances and hear the appeal,

Bodkin and Boothby (June 10) shewed cause. The ground of appeal relied on is obscure. It gives no sufficient information. It merely states a residence, not saying where, or in what particular place. What is the meaning of "next before"? Certain times were excluded if certain contingencies happened, but the ground of appeal does not shew whether any of those contingencies did happen, nor when they happened.

[WIGHTMAN, J.-Was it necessary to introduce the proviso into the ground of appeal?]

To say that a party had resided would not be sufficient. The exceptions must be negatived, as they occur in the same clause of the act; but whether they ought to have been introduced or not, they have been introduced here, and the allegation concerning the time has been rendered obscure by them.

[WIGHTMAN, J.-Your remarks apply to an appeal against the removal; but the appeal is against the order. Is there any ground of appeal against the order?]

None whatever. Besides, the information given by the ground of appeal is insufficient as to time and place- The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Whitley Upper (1), The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Bridgewater (2), The Queen v. the Justices of Sussex (3). The order is a perfectly good order, which could not

(1) 11 Ad. & El. 90; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 12.

become invalid on account of a subsequent provision as to removability, and the new statute gives no right of appeal for removal. The principal objection is, that the enactment in question is not retrospective in its effect that it does not apply to cases of a residence for five years before the passing of the act, and the Sessions were therefore right in refusing to hear the appeal.

Pashley, in support of the rule.-The question of construction, as to the retrospective effect of the statute, is one of such importance and difficulty that it ought not to be decided on motion, but should be discussed on a return to the mandamus. The removing parish have no right to cause the removal till they have sufficiently ascertained that the pauper is not within the provisions of the act. The order is invalid,

because the act of parliament makes it inoperative by ex post facto matter, which shews that it ought not to exist. It is no answer that a subsequent matter is relied upon as ground of appeal. In The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Brixham (4), an order, good in itself, was held of no effect, on account of subsequent matter. It has been suggested, that there is no appeal under the new act, but the 8th section of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. expressly incorporates that act with the Poor Law Amendment Act, and provides that they shall be construed as

one.

[WIGHTMAN, J.-My opinion is, that you may appeal either against an order of removal, or against the removal itself. The state of the case seems to be this: you do not choose to appeal till after the removal, and you appeal against the order not because it is bad, but because it has been used for a purpose which is illegal.]

As to the objection to the form of the ground of appeal-it was not necessary for the appellants to refer to the exceptions in the statute at all, as they come by way of proviso-Thibault qui tam v. Gibson (5), Simpson v. Ready (6). The allegation of the place of residence is sufficient-The

Rate Tenants in Common · Distress Warrant Separate Jurisdiction-Notice of Allowance.

A distress warrant may issue against any one of a number of tenants in common refusing to pay the amount of a rate assessed on all of them.

In a notice of allowance of a rate it is not necessary to shew how the rate was allowed. Therefore it was not held necessary, where it appeared that the rate was allowed by a police magistrate, to allege that he had made the allowance at a police court.

A rate is not invalid under 6 & 7 Will. 4. c. 96. s. 2, for not following in precise words the prescribed form, if it is duly signed by the churchwardens and overseers before it is allowed.