whole pregnancy, if he was absent at such a time as shows a natural impossibility that he could be the father (6). Where he has access, the criminal intercourse of his wife with others will not bastardize the issue (c).

If the child is born after the husband's death, but within the usual period of gestation (viz. nine, or even ten calendar months) (d), it is legitimate, if otherwise, not. The father or mother may be admitted to disprove his or her marriage (e), and the mother may prove her adultery. The declaration of a parent on oath, or otherwise, may, after his or her death, be adduced as evidence to disprove a marriage (ƒ). It is also evidence to prove the time of birth, but not the want of access (g), or the place of birth (h).

Forms of Order of Filiation—(See schedule annexed to 8 Vict. c. 10.)]—The order may, it seems, include more than one bastard child, if begotten by the same father on the same mother (i). As it can only be made on the complaint of the mother, or, as it seems, after her death, &c. by the overseers or guardians, such complaint (as well as the full jurisdiction to make the order) (k), must appear on the face of it, and cannot be supplied by affidavits. The sex of the child should, it seems, be set forth, or its name, if it has been baptized (1); but the parish of its birth need not (m). The child's chargeability to the parish by reason of the inability of its mother to maintain it, must be alleged (n), but a general allegation of such chargeability will suffice (o). The seven days' notice to the father of the intended application should be alleged, but an order of quarter sessions made thereon, the parties having entered into recognizance, under 2 & 3 Vict., need not state more than that he had" due notice to appear at the petty

(b) R. v. Luffe.

(c) Cope v. Cope, 1 M. & Rob. 269, the best report; see Reg. v. Mansfield (Inh.), 1 Q. B. 444; and R. v. Sourton, 5 Ad. & E. 180.

(d) Co. Lit. 124 b. Dr. John Hunter's evidence, stated in Hargr. and Butler's Co. Lit. 123 b. and the Gardner Peerage case, by Le Marchant.

(e) R. v. Bramley, 6 T. R. 330; Bull. N. P. 112; 2 Sess. Ca. 298.

(ƒ) Ibid.; and see per Bayley, J., Doe d. Warren v. Bray, 8 B. & Cr. 817; 3 Man. & Ry. 428, S. C.

(g) Herbert v. Tuckal, T. Raym. 84; 1 Nol. 335, 4th ed. See 7 East, 290. (h) R. v. Erith (Inh.), 8 East, 539. Approved in Reg. v. Rishworth (Inh.), 2 Q. B. 483, 485.

(i) R. v. Skinn, 1 Bott, 6th ed. pl. 470, 527.

(k) Per Patteson, J., 9 D. P. C. 177; R. v. Hants (Justices). See ante p. 1021, 1022.

(1) R. v. England, Stra. 502. In an order removing parents and children, an omission to state the children's names is not a defect apparent on the face of the order, R. v. Withernwick (Inh.), 6 Ad. & El. 273. Dict. per Coleridge, J.

(m) 1 Burn's J., 29th ed. 384. (n) See Comb. 30. Ex p. Martin, 6 B. & Cr. 80; R. v. Hartington, Upper Quarter, 4 M. & S. 559.

(0) Reg. v. Lewis, 8 Ad. & E. 881; 1 Per. & Da. 112, S. C.; Reg. v. Hants (Justices), post.

sessions.

The want of this last would not, it seems, be cured by stating the party's appearance in court (p), nor does his appearance or absence seem an essential averment. The order must then state, that evidence was given, and that the mother's, if given, was corroborated, at least, in one material particular (q), and must then expressly adjudicate, or state the court to be satisfied that the party is the reputed father of the child (r), without any words of recital, as, " whereas," or the like (s). To state reasons for adjudication is unnecessary, and if they are not suf ficient they will vitiate the order (t). A specific sum should be ordered for the maintenance to be allowed, and must be for maintenance only (u). The order must expressly limit the payment required to such time as the child shall attain the age of thirteen years, or shall die; or till the mother shall marry; and may properly add, "if the said child shall live to the age of thirteen years and continue to be chargeable to the parish :" for the father may at any time take and maintain it himself (x). An indefinite order to pay so much weekly is bad (y). An order to pay the money to the mother or other parties who make the application after her death, is good (z).

An order in bastardy, good in part, but bad in directing some additional unauthorized matter, may be quashed as to part, and affirmed as to the rest (a). So it might be amended under 5 G. II. c. 19, (ante, p. 849,) if erroneous, not for want of jurisdiction, but in point. of form merely (b). If the sessions affirm the order, their judgment is conclusive, except for matters on the face of the order for which it might be quashed on removal by certiorari into the queen's

(p) R. v. Carnarvonshire (Justices), 5 N. & M. 361; R. v. Clegg, 1 Stra. 475; R. v. Clayton, 3 East, 58; 2 Nol. 399. (q) Reg. v. Read, 1 P. & D. 413; 9 Ad. & E. 619.

(r) Reg. v. Lewis, 8 Ad. & E. 881; 1 P. & D. 112, S. C.

(8) R. v. Perkasse, 2 Siderfin, 363; R. v. Pitts, Doug. 661.

(t) The single fact of carnal knowledge of a wife by A. during a six years' absence of the husband B. was held a bad reason for inferring A.'s paternity of the wife's child born within that period, in R. v. Browne, Stra. 811.

(u) Thus it will be bad if it be also for putting out apprentice, Comb. 448; but see 1 Barnard, 261. As to amount of maintenance, see p. 1018.

(a) 1 Burn's J., 29th ed. 385, et seq. Newland v. Osman, id. 389; S. C. 1 Bott,

6th ed. pl. 514; R. v. Johnson, Comb. 69.

(y) R. v. Matthews, Salk. 475. See other cases, 1 Burn's J., by Chitty, 29th ed. 385.

(z) See R. v. Weston, Salk. 122.

(a) 2 Nolan, 312; Comb. 364. See acc. R. v. Stansfield, Burr. Set. Cas. 205. Other cases as to quashing order of sessions in part, R. v. Maulden (Inh.), 8 B. & C. 78; 2 Man. & Ry. 146, S. C.; R. v. Skinn, cited in R. v. Sweet, 9 East, 25; R. v. Butcher, Strange, 437; R. v. Madley, id. 1198; R. v.. Great Chart, Burr. S. C. 194; Reg. v. St. Nicholas, Leicester, 3 Ad. & E. 79..

(b) 1 Burn, 378, 28th ed. If they quash it for want of form, it seems a new order to try the meritsmay be made,, R. v. Periam, 1 Bott, 500.

bench; and if they quash it on the merits, the appellant is for ever acquitted (c).

Certiorari.]—A certiorari to remove an order of bastardy made under the old system in force before 4 & 5 W. IV. c. 76, was discharged, not having been applied for within six months (d). If the order was quashed in the queen's bench as bad, that court would bind the defendant by recognizance to appear at the next quarter sessions and abide their order (e); for which purpose it was said that he must always be in court at the time of the quashing (ƒ). Again, an order confirmed in the queen's bench on certiorari may be enforced by attach

ment.

For forms of applications to justices, as well as orders, &c. in bastardy, see the schedule annexed to 8 Vict. c. 10. Also sect. 1, ante, p. 1024.

SECTION II.

CHAPELS OF PROTESTANT DISSENTERS AND ROMAN CATHOLICS.

SECTION 2 of stat. 55 G. III. c. 155, the present toleration act of Protestant dissenters, which replaced 1 W. & M. c. 18, will be found ante, p. 170.

By 31 G. III. c. 32, (toleration of Roman Catholics,) it is enacted in s. 5, that no place of congregation or assembly for religious worship shall be allowed till the place of such meeting shall be certified to the sessions of the county or place, and there recorded: and the clerk of the peace shall give a certificate thereof, if demanded, for 6d.

SECTION III.

COUNTY BRIDGES.

THE obligation of counties, private bodies and individuals to repair common bridges situate in the queen's highway, and called from such repair, "county bridges," as well as three hundred feet of the high

(c) R. v. Tenant, 2 Ld. Raym. 1423; Pridgeon's case, 1 Bulst. 252; 19 Viner, 344, pl. 3.

(d) R. v. Howlett, 1 Wils. 35, ante,

tit. Certiorari.

(e) R. v. Gibson, Bla. R. 198.

(f) Id.; R. v. Matthews, 2 Salk. 475; R. v. Price, 6 T. R. 147.

way at each end, has been treated of in p. 398. If part of a bridge is in one "shire, riding, city, or town corporate," and the other part in another shire, &c., each shire, &c. repairs its own part (g). Quarter sessions may compel the county to widen a county bridge, or to rebuild it, either in the old site, or in any new one, more convenient to the public within two hundred yards of the old one (h). They may raise money on the credit of the county rates for altering, widening, repairing, improving, or rebuilding it (i); and may appoint two surveyors, with salaries, to see to its repairs (k). The same powers of getting materials for repairs, and preventing nuisances which exist in the case of highways, are extended to county bridges (1). Quarter sessions may assess on every town, parish, or place within their respective commissions, in the proportions which usually have been assessed upon each towards the repair of any such bridge; such money to be collected and paid over by the constables to the high constables, and by them to the treasurer appointed for that purpose by the sessions (m). The expense of repairs is to be paid out of the general county rate (n). No presentment of a grand jury is any longer necessary to authorize such repairs (o). The Easter sessions may appoint annually two justices acting for the division in or near which any county bridge is situate to superintend it; who on emergency may order immediate repairs to an amount not exceeding 201. (p). The payments for these repairs are provided for by the same act. The sessions may now contract for the repairs of a county or hundred bridge, and of the roads at the ends thereof to any extent, for a term not exceeding seven years, or less than one; and may order the amount to be paid out of the county rate, or by the bridge master of the hundred (q). They may also contract for repair of bridges, though not repairable by the county (r); and for buying lands, buildings, &c. to widen or divert bridges, or to build them anew (s).

SECTION IV.

COUNTY RATES.

BEFORE 1739, the various charges on counties for building and repairing gaols and bridges, passing vagrants, &c. &c. (and on parishes for the small contributions which were then payable by each county and place corporate for relief of the poor prisoners of the king's bench and marshalsea, and to such hospitals and almshouses as were in the county (t), &c. &c.,) were levied under separate acts of parliament. To prevent the trouble and expense attendant on this mode of collection, the justices in general or quarter sessions were then empowered (u) to make "one general rate or assessment " upon the county for all the above purposes, to be "assessed upon every town, parish, or place within the respective limits of their commissions, in such proportions as any of the rates heretofore made in pursuance of the said several acts have been usually assessed." The portion of this general county rate assessed on each parish or place where there is a poor's rate, is to be paid by the guardians of the union or of the single parish, or where there are no such guardians, by the parish officers, out of the poor's rates, to the high constable of the hundred or division (x), or if he has been appointed since 1st October, 1844, at once to the county treasurer (y). In places not rated to the poor, the petty constable is to rate and levy the sum payable by the parish, and pay it over to the high constable (z); unless he has been appointed since 1st October, 1844, in which case it is to be paid at once to the county treasurer (a). The high constables hand over the sums thus received to the county treasurer (b), and all these parties must account for them to the sessions (c). And now the justices in general or quarter sessions may issue precepts to parish officers to return the fair and just annual value of the rateable property within their parish, township, or place, to the justices of their division in petty sessions, who are to certify the true amount thereof, when settled to their own satisfaction, to the sessions, upon which the latter may assess a rate according to the fair annual value thus ascertained, and issue warrants to the high-constables, ordering