viz. personal, or only constructive possession, i. e. by his bailiff, agent, or servant, they must be stated to be his (t). Again, if goods are laid as belonging to one who is only servant to the true owner (u), or is a married woman (x), the prisoner must be acquitted. If the real owner steals his own goods from his bailee, they must be described as the bailee's (y). If the party in whom the ownership is laid be mistaken or misnamed, the prisoner will be entitled to an acquittal (z). If the owner be unknown, they may be laid as "the goods of a person to the jurors unknown," for it is the queen's suit, and the felony must be punished (a). So, if in an indictment for receiving stolen goods, the principal felon be unknown, he may be described in like manner; but if the name of the owner or principal felon appear in evidence before the grand jury, and his name is on the back of the bill, such an indictment cannot be supported (b). But goods may be laid as belonging to any person who had a special property in them at the time of the theft, e. g., a carrier (t) R. v. Remnant, R. & Ry. C. C. R. 136; R. v. Wymer, 4 C. & P. 391; e.g. goods belonging to a guest and left at an inn, R. v. Todd, 2 East's P. C. 653; or entrusted to a person for safe keeping, R. v. Taylor, 1 Leach, C. C. R. 356. (u) 2 East's P. C. 652; R. v. Hutchinson, R. & Ry. 412, for the servant's possession is that of his master, and not special like a bailee's. See ante, p. 243. (r) For in law she is incapable of a separate ownership of chattels, 1 Hale, 513; and this even though she is living apart from her husband on an income arising from property vested in trustees for her separate use, for the goods are not her trustees', and cannot be her own, French, R. & Ry. 491; R. v. Wilford, id. 517. However, if after goods are stolen from a feme sole she marry before indictment, the goods may be described as hers by her maiden name, R. v. Turner, 1 Leach, 536. R. v. owners laid in the first count, and on the second count, Richards, C. B., held he could not say the owners were unknown. And prisoner was acquitted. He quoted a case at Chester, where the property being laid in a person unknown, it was clear at the trial that he was known, and might easily have been ascertained. Lord Kenyon directed an acquittal. In R. v. Caspar and others, 2 Mood. C. C. 101; 9 C. & P. 289, S. C. (golddust case). The Caspars were indicted in different counts as accessaries before the fact, by an indictment which charged "that a certain evil-disposed person feloniously stole certain goods, and that Caspar feloniously incited the said evildisposed person to commit the said felony, and that C. D. and E. F. feloniously received the said goods, knowing them to be stolen." This was held bad as against the Caspars: for though in the case of receiving stolen goods (first assimilated to the offence of an accessary after the fact, by 3 W. & M. c. 9, s. 4, and now by 7 & 8 G. IV. c. 29. s. 54), the whole offence may be brought home by tracing the goods, without identifying the person of the thief; it is different in the case of an accessary before the fact, where the identity of the person to whom the accession is charged must be made out by naming and showing him to the jurors in the indictment, or stating as an excuse for the omitting his name, that he was unknown. But it was held good against the other to whom they were entrusted for conveyance (c), a pawnee with whom they were left in pledge (d); a laundress who received them to wash them; or the agister of cattle (e). Clothes and necessaries provided or children under full age may be laid either as the property of the children (f), or of the father who provided them (g); but if the clothes be furnished by the father in pursuance of indentures of apprenticeship, by which his son is bound to him, they must be laid to belong to the son (h). Goods let with a ready furnished lodging, if stolen by any one except the lodger, must be described as the goods of the lodger, not as the goods of the landlady, who has parted with the right to the possession of them, and could not have maintained trespass if the taking had been other than felonious (i). As there is no property in a dead body, it is not larceny to remove it from the grave; but it is larceny to take the shroud or coffin, which, in such case, should in general be laid as the property of the executors, &c. of the deceased, or of those who were at the expense of the funeral (k). At common law, where goods were the property of the partners, trustees, or a public body, it was necessary to state all the parties so interested correctly; but this was rendered unnecessary in various cases by several statutes, the provisions of which have been consolidated and extended by 7 G. IV. c. 64, s. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, the substance of which will be found in a former section (1). Goods seized under fi. fa. may be described as the property of the party against whom the writ issued; for though they are in custodia legis, the original owner's property in them continues till they are sold (m). So, if B.'s goods are stolen from him by A., and again from A. by C., the goods may be described as either of B. or of A.; of B., because his property as true owner is not divested by the tortious taking; or of A., because A. had a possession good against C. (n). persons charged as receivers as for a substantive felony, without stating the name of the principal felon. The 7 & 8 G. IV. c. 29, s. 54, confirms the old law as to accessaries, though it also gives another mode of proceeding for a substantive felony, S. C. (c) R. v. Deakin, 2 East's P. C. 658. (d) 2 Hale, 181; 1 id. 513; 2 East's P. C. 652. (e) R. v. Woodward, 2 East's P. C. 653. (f) Seems best, R. v. Forsgate, 1 Leach, 463. (g) R. v. Hayne, 12 Co. 113; 2 East's P. C. 654. (h) R. v. Forsgate, 1 Leach, 463; Reg. v. Hughes, 1 C. & Mar. 593, Patteson, J. (i) R. v. Belstead, R. & Ry. 411; R. v. Brunswick, 1 Moo. C. C. 26. If the larceny is committed by the lodger, they may by statute be described as the property of the owner or person letting to hire, 7 & 8 G. IV. c. 29, s. 45. (k) See further, ante, p. 216; 1 Hale, 515. (1) Ante, p. 215, 216. As to stating the property in goods of guardians of a union under the poor law act, 4 & 5 W. IV. c. 76, see 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 69, s. 7, ibid. (m) R. v. Eastall, 2 Russ. 158. 3. The Statement of the Offence.]-The words which designate the offence are "feloniously did steal, take, and carry away;" but where horses or cattle are stolen, the words lead or drive may be substituted for carry (o). Where the prisoner has unlawfully milked a cow, and taken away the milk (which if done with intent to steal it, is larceny) (p), the following description of the offence may be used: Form of an Indictment for stealing Milk. A. B. four quarts of milk, of the value, &c. of the goods and chattels of C. D., there then found and being, feloniously did steal, take, and carry away. The following form of indictment for stealing goods, the owner of some being known, and the owner of others unknown, may be readily adapted to either occasion. -one pair of snuffers of the value of of the goods and chattels of C. D. and two plated tea spoons of the value of of the goods and chattels of some person or persons to the jurors aforesaid unknown, there being found, feloniously did steal, take, and carry away, against the peace, &c. Punishment of Simple Larceny.]—By 7 & 8 G. IV. c. 29, s. 3, it is enacted, "that every person convicted of simple larceny, or of any felony thereby made punishable like simple larceny, shall (except in the cases thereinafter otherwise provided for) be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be transported beyond the seas for the term of seven years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years; and if a male, to be once, twice, or thrice publicly or privately whipped (if the court shall so think fit), in addition to such imprisonment." Hard Labour or Solitary Confinement.]—By section 4 of the same act, the court, whenever they sentence a party convicted under it to imprisonment, are empowered to direct the offender to be kept to hard labour or in solitary confinement, subject to 7 W. IV. and 1 Vict. c. 90, s. 5, as to solitary confinement, post, Ch. VII. s. 15. (0) 2 Hale, 184. "Lead away," without "take," would be bad. (p) Milking cows and stealing the milk is felony, for it is equally felony to steal the produce of the animals as the animals themselves, 2 East, P. C. 617; R. v. Martin, 1 Leach, 171. By all the judges, ante, p. 253. S SECTION III. OF LARCENY OF PUBLIC OR PRIVATE SECURITIES. Larceny of Securities.]-At common law the stealing of securities which had no intrinsic value was no larceny, at all events none beyond the value of the substance on which they were written (q). But as their protection has become of great importance, in consequence of the introduction of bills and paper currency, they have been protected by several statutes. These have been consolidated and extended by 7 & 8 G. IV. c. 29, s. 5, which enacts,-" that if any person shall steal any tally, order, or other security whatsoever, entitling or evidencing the title of any person or body corporate to any share or interest in any public stock or fund, whether of this [viz. united] kingdom, or of Great Britain, or of Ireland, or of any foreign state, or in any fund of any body corporate, company, or society, or to any deposit in any savings' bank, or shall steal any debenture, deed [see post, sect. 28], bond, bill, note, warrant, order (r), or other security whatsoever for money, or for the payment of money, whether of this kingdom or of any foreign state, or shall steal any warrant or order for the delivery or transfer of any goods or valuable thing, every such offender shall be deemed guilty of felony, of the same nature and in the same degree, and punishable in the same manner, as if he had stolen any chattel of the like value with the share, interest, or deposit to which the security so stolen may relate, or with the money due on the security so stolen or secured thereby, and remaining unsatisfied, or with the value of the goods or other valuable thing mentioned in the warrant or order; and each of these several documents hereinbefore enumerated, shall throughout this act be deemed for every purpose to be included under, and denoted by the words "valuable security." The following is the Indictment for Stealing Securities for Money. That A. B. [describing him], on, &c. with force and arms at, &c. aforesaid, one bill of exchange for the payment of fifty pounds, and of the value of fifty pounds, one promissory note for the payment of fifty pounds, and of the value of fifty (q) Stealing stamped pieces of paper. See Stra. 1133, R. v. Westbeer, and p. 259, n. (b). (r) Acceptances in blank on stamped paper without sum or name of drawer, are neither bills of exchange nor orders for payment of money as subjects of lar ceny within 7 & 8 G. IV. c. 29, s. 5, for being only in an embryo state, they furnish only the means of making bills at a future time. R. v. Hart (Minter), 6 C. & P. 106 (by three judges). pounds, one promissory note, called a bank post bill, for the payment of fifty pounds, and of the value of fifty pounds (8), and divers, to wit, nine notes of the governor and company of the bank of England, for the payment of divers sums of money, amounting in the whole to the sum of one hundred pounds (t), and of the value of one hundred pounds, the said bill of exchange, promissory notes, and notes of the governor and company of the bank of England, at the time of the committing the felony aforesaid, being the property of C. D., and the said several sums of money payable and secured by and upon the same respectively, being then and there due and unsatisfied to the said C. D., the proprietor thereof, feloniously did steal, take, and carry away, against the form of the statute (u) in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. Points relative to Indictment.]—It was held on the statutes in force before this act, that it was not necessary, in an indictment for stealing written instruments, to set them out as in an indictment for forgery; but that it was sufficient to bring them within the description of the statute (x), and the same rule will apply to the present more extended provision. It seems that notes, bills, and other securities, ought not to be described as goods and chattels, but as the property of the prosecutor; where, however, they were laid to be" the property and chattels of C. D.," the word "chattels" was rejected as surplusage, and the indictment sustained (y). Halves of notes, if stolen, should be so described (z). An unnecessarily minute description of an instrument may be fatal; as where an indictment for stealing a bank note alleged it to be "signed for the governor and company of the bank of England, by J. Booth," and no evidence of Booth's signature was given, the judges held the prisoner entitled to an acquittal (a); and therefore it is best to describe it as simply as possible. Where there is any doubt of the genuineness or validity of a written instrument stolen, it is right to add a count, charging the prisoner with stealing the paper and the stamps, on which it seems he may be convicted (b); but describing a (8) 3 Ch. Cr. Law, 947, 1st ed. (t) See R. v. Johnson, 3 M. & S. 539. (u) Essential, R. v. Pearson, 1 Moo. C. C. 313; S. C. 5 C. & P. 121. (x) R. v. Johnson, 3 M. & S. 539. (y) R. v. Sadi and Morris, 2 East, P. C. 601; and see R. v. Aslett, 2 Leach, 954, case of exchequer bills not shown to be signed by the proper person; and R. v. Austin, 2 East's P. C. 602. (z) R. v. Mead, 4 C. & P. 535. (a) R. v. Craven, Russ. & Ry. 110. (b) R. v. Aslett, 2 Leach, 958. In R. v. Clark, 2 Leach, 1039; R. & Ry. 181, S. C., the fourth count charged that prisoner feloniously did steal 135 |