those who had the power to displace him, before the expiration of forty days' residence, we are of opinion that an undisturbed residence on property, which the pauper claimed as his right, without any consciousness of wrong, conferred a settlement" (y). If a tenant from year to year dies intestate, his administrator has the same yearly interest in the land which his intestate had (z), and will acquire a settlement by subsequent residence in the parish for forty days after administration duly taken out (a). In an early case (b), it was held that after an undisturbed and exclusive possession of leasehold property by one of several next of kin, for very near twenty years, it must be presumed that the other next of kin agreed with him as to their respective shares. But no grant of administration was there presumed. In two later cases involving special circumstances of joint possession by several next of kin, who had not taken out letters of administration, it was held, that no settlements were gained (c). An equitable estate is sufficient to confer a settlement; so that a settlement may be acquired by the mortgagor, who has only the equity of redemption (d); but not, if being one of several mortgagors, he has sold his share of the equity of redemption (e). Where a father devised an estate to a trustee," in trust to let the same during his daughter's life," and, on his death, the daughter, who had lived with him, continued to reside on the premises, without interference from the trustee, for more than forty days, it was holden that she acquired a settlement (f); Lord Ellenborough observing, " that this species of settlement did not depend on any positive enactment of a statute, but on an excepted case, standing upon the rule that no person shall be removable from his own; in this case the pauper did not reside in the capacity of tenant, but under a claim of title, which, whether legal or equitable, conferred a settlement." On a sale of land before the full purchase-money is paid, the vendor (y) R. v. Staplegrove, 2 B. & Ald. 527, remarked on by Bayley, J., in 10 B. & Cr. 61. (z) Doe d. Shore v. Porter, 3 T. R. 13, as cited by Lawrence, J., 6 T. R. 298; and 2 Ad. & E. 110. (a) R. v. Great Glenn (Inh.), 5 B. & Adol. 188; R. v. Dorstone, 1 East, R. 296. Qy. If a person not bound or entitled to take out administration did so fraudulently, in order to obtain the settlement? ib. (b) R. v. Cold Ashton, Burr. Sett. C. 444; cited in R. v. Canford Magna, 6 M. & S. 355, and in R. v. Okeford (c) R. v. Canford Magna, 6 M. & S. 355; R. v. Okeford Fitzpaine, 1 B. & Adol. 254. See also R. v. Great Glenn, 5 B. & Adol. 188; and R. v. Barnard Castle, 2 Ad. & E. 108. (d) Per Lord Mansfield, in R. v. St. Michael's, Bath, Cald. 110; 2 B. & Adol. 877; 2 Ad. & E. 536. (e) R. v. Cregrina, 2 Ad. & E. 536. (f) R. v. Holm, East Waver Quarter, 16 East, 127. has a beneficial interest, and is something more than a mere trustee (g). Thus, where a written agreement was made for the purchase of an estate to be paid for by two instalments, the first payable within a few days after the signing the agreement, and the last in seven months, and the vendor was to make out a good title on payment of the last instalment, and to convey the premises, but the purchaser was to be let into possession on payment of the first. The purchaser paid the first, was let into possession, and continued possessed a year and a half; but the last instalment was never paid, nor any conveyance ever executed, and the purchaser afterwards gave up the contract on receiving back part of the first instalment. He was held not to acquire an equitable estate under this contract, so as to gain a settlement under 9 G. I. c. 7, s. 5 (h). A father of a girl, to whom, at the age of sixteen, an estate came by devise, was held not settled in respect of residence on it with her for five years as her supposed guardian in socage (i). Among the parties who may acquire this settlement by residing forty days in the parish where they occupy an estate, without regard to its value or duration (k), are, an executor, even before probate actually obtained (1); a widow, after her dower has been assigned, but not previously (m); a trustee in whom estates are vested, though for the purposes of sale (n); an administrator or administratrix, though the administration was taken out by a widow to her husband, in order to obtain a settlement by so doing (o); the husband of an administratrix (p); of a parcener (q); of a woman, whose estate is vested in trustees for her separate use (r); of a woman who was a tenant from year to year of (g) See per Bayley, J., in R. v. Geddington, 2 B. & Cr. 134; 3 Dowl. & Ry. 403. (h) R. v. Geddington, 2 B. & Cr. 129. (i) R. v. Sherrington (Inh.), 3 B. & Adol. 714. (k) See ante, p. 828. (1) R. v. Stone, 6 T. R. 295. See R. v. Axbridge, 2 Ad. & E. 520. In R. v. Stone, the probate was not taken out till after a lapse of three years' residence, and three days only before the removal. (m) R. v. North Weald Basset, 2 B. & Cr. 724; post. (n) R. v. Natland, Burr. S. C. 793. Doubted in Reg. v. St. Margaret's, Leicester (Inh.), 2 Q. B. 559, but qu. if with justice. (0) R. v. Great Glenn, 5 B. & Adol. 188. See also R. v. Barnard Castle, 2 Ad. & E. 108. In these cases the question of fact for sessions on an occupation by a widow of a tenant after the husband's death, was, whether she then commenced a new tenancy on her own account, or continued in possession entitled to take out administration to her husband, and by so doing to become tenant from year to year in his right. See Doe d. Shore v. Porter, 3 T. R. 13; and R. v. Cregrina (Inh.), 2 Ad. & E. 536. premises being under the annual value of 107. (s); or of a woman who after the passing of 59 G. III. c. 50, had become a yearly tenant of premises at a rent under 107. per annum (t); and a schoolmaster appointed by trustees, and residing in the school-house as part of the benefits of his office (u). But a settlement will not be acquired by any length of occupation which is merely permissive. Thus, where a party erected a cottage by the license of the lord of the manor, and enclosed a garden from the waste, rendering an annual rent of 10s. 6d. as a quit-rent, and resided upon the premises for a year and a half, and the entry of the license on the court rolls was the only evidence of title, this possession was held to confer no settlement, though it was contended that, even if this was a mere license, it was executed, and that equity would not allow the lord to disturb the tenant; for, as Lord Ellenborough observed, "a license is not a grant; but may be recalled immediately; and so might this be the day after it was granted. It is a mere personal license; the pauper never had a more perfect estate than the license gave him, viz. a mere permission to occupy "(x). The same was held where the land was taken in the character of a servant in lieu of wages (y). Where, after the attainder of a party, and his discharge from imprisonment under the sign manual, he purchased a copyhold, and lived upon it for several years, the court refused to inquire into his capacity to hold it, and said that, whether the crown could have impeached his title or not, he acquired a settlement by residing on it forty days without impeachment in fact, and communicated that settlement to his child (z). We now come to the further questions on 9 G. I. c. 7, the first of which was stated to be, What Estate is within the Restriction of 9 G. I. c. 7, as being acquired by "Purchase?"]-The term "Purchase" in the statute is not to be taken in its legal acceptation, but in its popular sense; and therefore it does not extend to devises or gifts, or other methods of acquisition, but is confined (in terms) to the particular case of a purchase for money (a). Thus, conveyances to relatives in consideration (8) R. v. Ynyscynhaiarn, 7 B. & C. 233. (t) R. v. North Cerney (Inh.), 3 B. & Adol. 463. (u) R. v. Oversley-le-Moor, 15 East, R. 356. (x) R. v. Horndon-on-the-Hill, 4 M. & S. 562. (y) R. v. South Newton, Wilts, 10 B. & Cr. 838. (z) R. v. Haddenham, 15 East, R. 463. (a) 2 Nolan, 74; and 3 Tyrwhitt's R. 916, Doe v. Meyrick. of natural love and affection (b), or for a mixed consideration of natural affection and an inadequate sum of money (c), are not within the act, and the parties to whom the lands are conveyed derive settlements from them. But if a pecuniary consideration, however small, be the sole foundation of the grant, it is to be considered as a purchase within the statute, and not as a voluntary gift. Thus, where the lord. of the manor granted a piece of the waste of the value of 30s. or 40s. "at a fine 1s. heriot 1s.quit-rent 1s." this was holden to be a "purchase" within the act, though part of the reservation was contingent, and part annual (d). It appears from many cases that a husband may acquire a settlement by possession of an estate in right of his wife, which came to him by marriage, whatever may be its value, and even though, being purchased by her for less than 301., she could have acquired no settlement by residing on it herself, had she remained single. Thus, where a woman, having purchased a leasehold estate for 61., married, and resided on it with her husband till he died, it was holden that he acquired a settlement, because the wife's estate vested in him, not by purchase, but by marriage: and though she gained no settlement in her own right, yet the husband derived one by her estate devolving on him, which he again communicated to her, and which she retained as his widow (e). The next question under 9 G. I. c. 7, was stated to be, What is the Construction of 9 G. I. c. 7, as to the Consideration Money requisite to a "Purchase" within it?]-The consideration money, where the estate is purchased, must in fact amount to 307.; but where it was expressed in the conveyance as 287., and 307. was in fact paid, the estate was holden to confer a settlement (ƒ). If the 301. be paid by the purchaser, as a consideration for the purchase, it is immaterial how it is to be distributed; so that it is no objection, where the estate is copyhold, that part was applied in payment of the fines and fees due on the transfer (g). But the sum paid by the purchaser of a copyhold estate to his own attorney for the transfer, is no part of the consideration for the purchase within the meaning of this act (h). (b) R. v. Marwood, Burr. S. C. 386. (c) R. v. Ufton, 3 T. R. 251. See R. v. Piddlehinton, 3 B. & Adol. 460; R. v. Hatfield Broad Oak, id. 566; R. v. Lydlinch, 4 B. & Adol. 150. Whether a voluntary conveyance will discharge a certificate has not been expressly decided, R. v. Cassington, 2 B. & Adol. 874. (d) R. v. Warblington, 1 T. R. 241. (e) R. v. Ilmington, Burr. S. C. 566. (f) R. v. Scammonden, 3 T. R. 474. (g) St. Paul's, Walden, v. Kempston, Foley's Poor Laws, 138; 4 Burn's J., 28th ed. 728, cited 1 T. R. 244. (h) R. v. Cottingham, 7 B: & C. 603; 1 Man. & Ry. 439, 469. If the money be paid to the vendor, it is immaterial whether the purchaser pay it out of his own funds or borrow it on credit (i); or though the consideration is a debt due from the vendor (k); or though part of the money be given to the vendee by the parish officers; for if without fraud, it is sufficient to satisfy the statute (). Nor is it any objection raise part of the money that the vendee mortgages the estate itself to which he pays; as, if he purchase for 391. and borrow 307. on mortgage to pay so that the full price is paid to the vendor (m). But the purchase of an estate subject to a mortgage is not sufficient for the purpose of gaining a settlement, unless the money actually paid for the equity of redemption amount to 301. (n). And if the original purchase be under 301. no subsequent improvements will be sufficient to satisfy the statute for the purpose of gaining a settlement (o). But if a purchaser for less than 307. improves the estate, sells it, and repurchases it again for more than 301., he may gain a settlement under the latter purchase (p). A pauper purchased a messuage for 521. under an agreement that the vendor should allow 401. of the purchase money to remain on mortgage of the premises. The mortgage was made, and only 121. paid by the pauper to the vendor, who kept the title deeds; but the pauper took possession, and resided some years on the premises. He afterwards sold them to a third person for 607., who paid 40l. to the original vendor, and the remaining 207. to the pauper, obtained the title deeds from the original vendor, and the execution of the pauper to the conveyance; after which period the pauper did not reside any longer on the premises, but delivered them up to the new purchaser. The court said, "The 407. paid by the new purchaser was for his own benefit, not for that of the pauper, who had in fact never paid more than 127., and never had any possession of the title deeds, and therefore had not made a purchase of any value, beyond the sum which was actually paid independent of the mortgage. That, in all the other cases of mortgagors which had been decided in their favour, if they had not actually paid the whole money from their own resources, they had at least credit to borrow it aliunde" (q). The two following cases peculiarly illustrate this principle :—J. C. having acquired a settlement by hiring and service in S., made a parol (i) R. v. Chailley, 6 T. R. 755. (k) R. v. Stockland, Burr. S. C. 169. St. Paul's, Walden, v. Kempston, Foley's P. L. 138, cited 1 T. R. 244. (m) R. v. Tedford, Burr. S. C. 57. (n) R. v. Mattingley, 2 T. R. 12. 553. (p) R. v. Stanfield, Burr. S. C. 205. (q) R. v. Olney, 1 M. & S. 387. |