but also a statement of the incapacitation of the candidate by reason of the fact; for although a voter may be aware of the fact, yet if he be not aware that the fact carries with it legal incapacitation, his vote would not be thrown away so as to seat the opposing candidate, notwithstanding that the candidate for whom it was given might be disqualified and unseated (R. v. Tewkesbury, L. R. 3 Q. B. 629). The notice may further (but this is not essential) contain a reference to the statutes, if any, imposing the disqualification, and should finally warn the electors that all votes given for the disqualified candidate after the notice will be thrown away. SUGGESTED FORM OF NOTICE OF DISQUALIFICATION. TO THE ELECTORS OF Notice of Disqualification. WHEREAS A. B., of a candidate in respect of the election now about to be held for the above-named county [or city, or town, or borough, or burgh, or district of burghs, or for the above-named division of the county, or city, or town, or borough, or burgh of as the case may be], is [or has, here state the grounds of disqualification]; AND WHEREAS, in consequence thereof, the said A. B. is by law incapacitated from being elected to serve in Parliament for the said county [or city, or as the case may be]. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that all votes given for the said A. B. at the election now about to be held will be thrown away and lost. day of 189 (Here sign) C. D., Election agent of E. F. There appears to be nothing to prevent any elector who chooses from publishing notice of incapacitation (The Wakefield Case, B. & Aust. 272; The Second Newcastle-under-Lyme Case, ib. 569; The Second Cheltenham Case, 1 P. R. & D. 234; The Second Horsham Case, ib. 245); but to carry as much weight with it as possible, the notice should be issued by the opposing candidate or his election agent, and of these two the latter seems pointed out by the duties and powers of his office as the more suitable person for the undertaking. REMARKS.—Votes given to a person who is notoriously ineligible and whom the voter must be presumed to know to be ineligible (e.g., a woman), are thrown away, although no notice be given (Gosling v. Veley, 7 Q. B. 439 (per Lord Denman, C. J.); Drinkwater v. Deakin, L. R. 9 C. P. 642 (per Brett, J.); King v. Blissel, Heywood, 537 (per Lord Mansfield)). Before issuing such a notice care should be taken to make sure of the fact of disqualification, for, although publication of a false notice is not an offence to which any statutory penalty is attached, yet, if committed wittingly, it is an act which would be in the highest degree dishonourable, and one, whether committed wittingly or unwittingly, which would expose its author to the risk of a serious action for libel. Where a false notice of disqualification has been published, a counter-notice should at once be issued by the candidate affected, and every possible means should be adopted by him to disseminate the contradiction. An apology should also be demanded from the author of the false notice, and, if obtained, published along with the counter-notice. Where the question of disqualification turns upon some legal point, and doubt is entertained, it would be well before publication to take the opinion of counsel upon the matter, and if that be in favour of disqualification, to fortify the notice by appending to it the opinion obtained. Notice of disqualification should in no case be made the cover for an attack upon the character of the candidate alleged to be disqualified. The notice should state the grounds of disqualification and no more, else the author of it, should an action for libel be brought against him and the facts alleged in it prove to be unfounded, may find himself deprived not only of the defence of privilege, which might otherwise possibly avail him, but also of any benefit in the way of mitigation of damages that might have accrued to him had he confined himself to the publication of such relevant statements as he had reasonable grounds for believing to be true, and bonâ fide believed to be true. Nor should publica tion exceed the occasion, for facts which may be privileged when published to those who may be entitled to know them, cease to be privileged when published to others (Duncombe v. Daniel, 8 C. & P. 222). Choice of Election Agent. Assuming eligibility, a candidate's earliest attention should be directed to the choice of an election agent. The appointment of an election agent is obligatory. The services of all other agents may be made use of or dispensed with as a candidate thinks fit, but an election agent must be nominated. A candidate may, if he likes, act as his own election agent; or he may choose to have some one else to act in that capacity for him; but in either case the appointment must be duly made and notified in conformity with the statutory provisions on the subject on or before the nomination day. If a candidate elects to appoint himself, he must bear in mind that in taking upon himself the office of election agent he assumes the duties and responsibilities attaching to it in addition to those of candidate. If, on the other hand, he determines to appoint some one else, he should remember that an election agent holds the fortunes of the candidate he represents largely in his hand, and that too careful discrimination cannot well be exercised in the choice of a person upon whom so much depends. As to the persons who may be appointed, how the appointment must be made, and what considerations ought to govern a candidate in appointing an election agent, vide sub tit. "Election Agent," infra, p. 63. Caution as to Unpaid Agents. In addition to using care in the choice of his election agent, a candidate ought to be constantly on his guard lest through some unconsidered act or attitude he should find himself held ultimately responsible for the conduct of persons as agents whom it may never have crossed his mind to employ in such a capacity. This subject will be found fully treated in its proper place (v. sub tit. "Unpaid Agency," p. 136); but the matter is of so much moment to candidates that, even at the risk of some repetition, it must be touched upon here, lest otherwise it should escape the attention of those whom most of all it concerns. A candidate, then, must never forget that his responsibility is not necessarily limited to the acts of regularly appointed and paid agents (such as the election agent, sub-agents within their districts, and agents within the scope of their prescribed authority who may be appointed and employed for payment to act on his behalf by his election agent or sub-agents), but that agency of a binding character may subsist where there has been neither formal appointment nor payment of any kind. It is in these facts, and in the impossibility of determining precisely what constitutes agency, or evidence of agency, that a candidate's danger chiefly lies. Two general rules only can be formulated with certainty on the subject, namely (1) A candidate is responsible for the acts of persons A ratification after an act is equivalent to an authority given at the time, where, that is to say, the person sought to be made liable as principal is acquainted with the character of the act when he ratifies (The Tamworth Case, 1 O'M, & H, 81), H. A candidate, therefore, by the subsequent adoption of an act of a volunteer, may constitute the volunteer an agent quoad, at least, the particular act so ratified. The question whether a person, who has been promoting in some way or other the election of a candidate, is or is not an agent for whose actions the candidate is accountable, if it does not plainly fall within either of these two rules, must remain indeterminate until it has been decided by an Election Court; and, as the decision of the Court depends upon the view that the judges who happen to be appointed to try the case may take of the facts proved in evidence, and as these in combination are capable of infinite variety, it is obviously impossible to lay down rules that will relieve a candidate from the necessity of thinking for himself and of exercising a wise discretion in particular instances that may occur within his experience. But although no rules of universal application can be drawn up for the guidance of candidates, invaluable assistance may be derived from a careful consideration of decided cases and judicial utterances bearing upon the subject. The attention of candidates is, therefore, specially directed to the observations of Blackburn and Lopes, JJ., infra, pp. 137 and 144, and to the cases illustrating the doctrine of "unpaid agency," which will be found scattered throughout the pages under that title. The greatest risks, of course, spring from the employment of, or countenance lent to, associations, committees, and canvassers. These are fully and separately treated under their respective heads, vide infra, pp. 139, 145, and 159. It is enough here to say, by way of warning to candidates, that by accepting the services of an association or committee they may render themselves liable for the acts of all the members individually as well as collectively; and that by employing a canvasser who, while acting within the scope of his authority, is guilty of a corrupt practice, they may defeat their election, although the corrupt act in question may have been |