it illegally as an inducement, the purity of the donor's motive will not avail to save him from the consequences of his agent's malpractice.

The circumstances connected with a gift may also be of vital importance where the motive of a gift is (1) doubtful, i. e., where the motive is to seek; or (2) mixed, i.e., where the candidate appears to have been moved to the gift by a feeling of charity, mingled, at the same time, with a desire for his own advantage; for in either of these cases the circumstances attending the gift (e. g., the time at which it was given, the value of the thing given, the occasion of the giver to give at all, &c.) must be looked to in order to determine its true character.

A candidate who desires to steer a clear and fair course should avoid all questionable cases. He will do well also to bear in mind that profuse charity, especially in view of an election, is always suspect, and, in the case of a petition, is certain to be looked askance upon by the Court.

The only rule, it is suggested, for a candidate to follow, who wishes to pursue a course at once honourable and absolutely safe, is to restrict his gifts within the constituency he means to contest to those objects to which he can fairly say he would have been likely to be asked to contribute, and to which he would have been likely to give, had he not been a political candidate.

:

The following judicial utterances are in point: "Charity at election times ought to be kept by politicians in the background. In truth, I think, it will generally be found that the feeling which distributes relief to the poor at election time, though those who are the distributors may not be aware of it, is really not charity, but party feeling following in the steps of charity, wearing the dress of charity, and mimicking her gait" (The Wigan Case, 4 O'M. & H. 14, per Bowen, J.).

"It has been over and over again held that an unfair and improper donation, with the view, motive, and in

tention of securing a vote, is corrupt within the meaning of the Corrupt Practices Act" (The Boston Case, 2 O'M. & H. 163, per Grove, J.).

Similarly, lavish expenditure by a candidate in his household or neighbourhood, though in itself indifferent, yet, if it be incurred with a view of influencing a particular vote, it becomes a corrupt practice (The Hastings Case, 1 O'M. & H. 218).

"If such an expenditure is made at a place with a tacit understanding of this kind, I will incur bills and spend my money with you if you will vote for me, that being not the side on which you intended to vote,' if it is intended to produce that effect upon the vote, it is bribery" (ib., per Blackburn, J.; cf. 21 L. T. 234).

In connection with this subject it may be added that many shifts, all more or less discreditable and to be avoided, have been tried with a view to evade the wholesome stringency of the law. Wagering, for example, has sometimes been adopted; but to lay a wager may be bribery (Allen v. Hearn, 1 T. R. 59, 60; The New Windsor Case, K. & O. 191; The Worcester Case, ib. 255).

Thus, if a candidate or his agent lay a bet with an elector that he does not vote for such candidate, it is clearly a bribe (Anon., Lofft, 552).

A more modern device is the sham banquet. A dinner, say, is arranged, ostensibly in honour of the sitting member, the tickets for which are sold at a merely nominal price, the main cost being borne by the member or his agents, and the real object being to influence the electors present at the dinner, and through them the electors generally, in the member's favour. There can be little doubt that if such facts were proved before an Election Court they would suffice to upset an election following upon them; for if the mere promise of refreshments in futuro is equivalent to a bribe, as it has been held to be (The Bodmin Case, 1 O'M. & H. 124), the actual entertainment with a corrupt motive, however it may be disguised, must be equally a malpractice.

Those who resort to such devices must rely for safety upon difficulty of proof. Whether it is worth while to

risk so much for the chance of so little must be left to each man to decide for himself. No one who respects the spirit of the constitution, the electors whose suffrages he solicits, or himself, will stoop to such a mode of filching votes. The main purpose of election law is to secure to the elector the free exercise of the franchise with which, in the interests of the state, he has been entrusted. The object of all such shifts, on the other hand, is to defeat this purpose by debauching the judgment of the electorate.

The following recently-delivered opinions of the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, in reply to questions put to them in the House of Commons, illustrate the importance of "motive," and may, therefore, be appropriately appended here:

A. "

Q. Whether a promise made by a parliamentary candidate in the course of a parliamentary election that he will in future employ only trades union workmen when he has previously employed non-unionists, is contrary to the provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act ?" Upon the facts stated in the question, and assuming that the promise was made in order to influence voters, I am of opinion that such promise is contrary to the provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act" (per Sir R. Webster, A.-G., 23rd January, 1891; 349 Hans. 900).

Q. "Whether a political league violates the Corrupt Practices Act by providing free food and drink to voters at meetings called in support of a candidate, or where such candidate is present for the purposes of his candidature?

A. "The answer depends upon the simple question of fact whether there has been any intention of corrupting voters" (per Sir E. Clarke, S.-G., 26th January, 1891; ib., 1026.)

Q. "Whether the conduct of a member of a School Board, who at a parliamentary election canvassed a person in the employment of the Board, and threatened him with serious consequences if he did not vote for the Liberal Unionist candidate, was contrary to the pro

visions of the Corrupt Practices Act or any other Act?" A. " Assuming that threats were in fact used in order to induce or prevail upon the elector to vote for a particular candidate, such conduct would in my opinion be contrary to the provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act?" (per Sir E. Clarke, S.-G., 349 Hans. 1026.)

When Responsibility begins.

When candidature begins, so as to load a candidate with responsibility for acts committed before a contest actually commences, may be at times a point difficult to determine; but it is clear that there are acts for which a candidate would be held accountable, although these may have been done before even the issue of a writ of election, or before any declaration of candidature has taken place.

By 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, s. 63, sub-s. 1 (amending 21 & 22 Vict. c. 87, s. 3), the expressions "candidate at an election" and "candidate respectively mean (unless the context otherwise requires) any person elected to serve in Parliament at such election, and any person who is nominated as a candidate at such election, or is declared by himself or by others to be a candidate, on or after the day of the issue of the writ for such election, or after the dissolution or vacancy in consequence of which such writ has been issued.

Sect. 3 of the amended Act above mentioned was practically the same as this enactment, and it was held under it that a candidate guilty of "treating" before a dissolution is liable to the penalties attached to that offence (The Youghal Case, 1 O'M. & H. 293, more fully reported, Ir. Rep. 3 C. L. 530).

[In this case the following facts were proved :-The respondent arrived in Youghal on July 29, 1868. It was then expected that a dissolution would take place in a

few months. On his arrival the respondent declared himself a candidate. The election actually took place on November 19 and 21. Between July 31 and November 11 the respondent, by his agents and other persons in his behalf, corruptly caused drink to be given to various voters of the borough.]

To make the application of the decision clear, sect. 1, sub-sect. 1, of 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, must be read with sect. 63, sub-sect. 1, thus:—Any person who is nominated as a candidate, &c., who corruptly, by himself or by any other person, either before, during, or after an election, directly or indirectly gives, or provides, or pays, wholly or in part, the expense of giving or providing any meat, drink, or entertainment or provision, to or for any person, for the purpose of corruptly influencing that person, or any other person, to give, or refrain from giving, his vote at the election, &c., shall be guilty of "treating."

The same reasoning holds good of every other offence which may be committed before an election. This observation in the case of bribery, the duration of which is practically unlimited, is particularly apt. Thus, it has been laid down that "if any man commits bribery in any constituency in the first week of a parliament, and if he asks for the suffrages of the constituency in the last week of the seven years of that parliament, if it lasted so long, that act committed six years before can be given in evidence against him, and his seat would be forfeited" (The Sligo Case, 1 O'M. & H. 302, per Keogh, J.).

It is thus obvious that a candidate may not only be infected with corrupt practices in respect of certain acts committed prior to formal candidature, but that he may also be similarly infected in consequence of acts committed after the declaration of the poll, if these partake of the character of retrospective rewards.

It should, therefore, be made a rule, to be sedulously observed, that a candidate cannot be too circumspect in his conduct towards the constituency with which he has to do, both before any announcement of his candida