his predecessor began to tell; and the growing commercial prosperity of the young colonies of the Transvaal and Orange River, due in a large measure to the use of Delagoa Bay, created much anxiety at the Cape and in Natal. Tariffs and railway rates caused considerable tension in the relations between the colonies-a tension not free from the danger of counter-steps, reprisals, and ultimately even of open hostilities.

General Botha was fully alive to the gravity of the situation. An Inter-Colonial Conference was held, but failed to find a solution of the problems. When it became evident that some form of political union was the only panacea, Lord Selborne contributed a very able paper to the public discussion then taking place in the press and on the platform. Want of space forbids any critical examination of the burning questions of the time. The general opinion seemed to incline towards some system of federation, but the objection to that form of union was obvious. The retention of colonial boundaries involved the annual publication of budgets which would have exposed the manner in which each colony was materially affected; and this condition alone might, and probably would, have sown the seeds of future disappointment, dispute, and even of disruption. Lord Selborne's sane outlook and unquestioned honesty of purpose were of great value at this critical juncture.

The National Convention assembled on Oct. 12, 1908, and culminated in the Union of South Africa. A truly remarkable feature of the Convention was the spirit of good fellowship that reigned. All racial animosity seemed to have vanished; the lion and the lambBritish Jingoism, on the one hand, and Dutch nationalism on the other-lay down together; and all was peace and amity. Many difficulties of the most serious character, arising from the different characters of what are now the respective Provinces and affecting their welfare in different ways, had to be surmounted. The wealthy Transvaal had to make concessions to its less fortunate neighbours, each of whom in its turn surrendered something. On the whole, it is unquestionably fortunate that complete union was agreed to. General Botha took a broad conciliatory line throughout the negotiations.

The Convention spirit was active, and public men of every party made speeches extolling the Union and uttering pæans of congratulation at the burial for all time of racial animosities. But the test of practical politics put an end to pious aspirations and comforting dreams. Elections for the Union Parliament took place in 1910, and it may be interesting to recall a dramatic incident. The seat at Standerton was a safe one for General Botha, but he decided, unwisely, as it turned out, to contest the Pretoria East constituency against Sir Percy Fitzpatrick. After an exciting fight, he was beaten by 95 votes, and, for the moment, he took the rebuff greatly to heart. The polls, however, were quite decisive, giving the South African Party 67 seats-a majority of thirteen over the rest of the House-which comprised, in addition, 37 Unionists, 13 Natal Independents, and 4 Labour members. The success of his Party restored General Botha's equanimity, and he then accepted the Losberg seat and became Prime Minister of the Union.

Aspirants for the fame and flesh-pots of office abounded; and no Cabinet of workable size could have been created that would not have left a good many ambitions unsatisfied, with the inevitable foundation for opposing factions to build upon. Still, the principles at stake were vital, and the psychological moment presented itself for a really great statesman to have taken the risk of drawing a diagonal line across racial boundaries once and for all. A man with the strength of character and vision of Lord Chatham would have taken the plunge, even had he been overwhelmed in consequence. General Botha preached goodwill and conciliation in season and out of season, but he failed at that moment to put into practice the one effective step towards harmony by disregarding the racial origin of his Ministers. While it is true that the seven members of the Cabinet were not exclusively Dutch South-Africans, they were predominantly so; and, with the exception of Mr Hull, who became Treasurer, they had all been, in previous days, exclusively identified with the South African Party. The one man whose inclusion in the Cabinet would have been accepted as the true emblem of racial union, Sir Starr Jameson, was omitted.

Thus it came about that the first elections for a Union parliament, held in September 1910, were fought practically on the old lines; and to-day we appear to be as far from the 'one-stream' policy as we were then. But appearances may be deceptive. Experience and education, not unmixed with lessons of the Great War, are at work; and, although no practical steps have yet been taken to bridge the gulf, there are not wanting signs of an impending change. The Dutch themselves have recently split into two factions; the one, styled the Nationalist Party, under General Hertzog, wishes to disregard the pledges given at Vereeniging; the other, called the South African Party, under General Smuts, respects them. The latter party, on account of its loyal attitude and more progressive outlook, has attracted to its ranks considerable support from the inhabitants of British birth or origin, with the general result that the English-speaking section has partly lost its identity in the South African Party, and is otherwise about equally represented by the Unionist and Labour members.

It is devoutly to be wished for South African progress and happiness that some means may be found of speedily bringing about more stable conditions in the political arena. The republican propaganda need not be viewed with undue apprehension, because a considerable section of the Dutch, born and bred under the British flag, would be against its disappearance. The whole of the English, of course, are of the same mind; and the natives would be most unquestionably opposed to the formation of what they would regard as a Dutch Republic. They have have a lively recollection of their description as scepsels (creatures) in the old Transvaal grondwet (constitution). I am impelled to say at this point that Mr Bonar Law could hardly have given weighty consideration to the statement he made in the House of Commons on March 30 of this year (in the debate on Irish Home Rule), that, if the self-governing dominions chose to-morrow to say, "We will no longer make a part of the British Empire," we would not try to force them.' The Cape of Good Hope is one of the most important strategic points in the whole Empire; and its secession would probably be viewed at home and in the rest of the British Empire somewhat in the same light

as that in which the North viewed the proposed secession of the South from the United States of America.

General Botha came over to England to attend the Imperial Conference in 1907 and 1911; and upon these as on all other occasions his romantic figure marked him out for special popularity in this country. The keynote of his attitude in regard to Imperial affairs has been freedom of action for the Dominions in their domestic policy, and unity in all external matters. His quarrel with Hertzog originated over the latter's unbridled antiimperial speeches, particularly in connexion with the South African contribution to the Navy, and his 'twostream' policy, under which he advocated racialism of the worst kind. Botha finally expelled him from his Cabinet. From that event sprang the consolidation and rise of what is now known as the Nationalist Party, led by Hertzog and represented in the House of Assembly to-day by no less than forty-four seats. It would be incorrect to say that the whole of the Nationalist Party would like to see the British flag expelled from South Africa. Some at least of the followers of Hertzog are sufficiently versed in the world's affairs to realise the defenceless position of a country like South Africa, in its present state of population and development, against attack by any first-rate Power, without the support of the British Empire. Still, the great majority of the members of that party are unsophisticated farmers from the back-veld, with little knowledge of the world, a belief that South Africa is the hub of the universe, a partiality for the patriarchal views of President Kruger, and a conviction that the Dutch of South Africa are exclusively the people' and should be endowed with exclusive rule. Power in the hands of a Government set up by such a party would bring about a repetition of many of the errors that led to the troubles of the past and might end in civil war.

In the Johannesburg labour troubles of July 1913, Botha at first failed to realise the penalty that always waits upon supineness on the part of the Government. The forces of disorder were allowed to accumulate, and the gold-mining industry was brought to a standstill. Extremist sections marched from mine to mine and forced the workers to come out on strike, until by the

end of the week everything was closed down and the market-square at Johannesburg, which holds tens of thousands of people, contained a seething mass of strikers and sight-seers, inextricably mixed up. At nightfall on the evening of Friday, July 4, the turbulent and destructive elements burned down the Park Station and the 'Star' offices, and were only prevented from wrecking the Corner House by the police using their fire-arms. On the following day, General Botha and General Smuts came over to the Rand and found that order could not be restored without a great expenditure of innocent blood besides that of the disturbers of the peace. Botha, not having realised the effect of previous inaction, was, I think, justified in refusing to face the horror then confronting him. He, therefore, surrendered to the strikers. Work was resumed on the following Monday under conditions better imagined than described. The white miners, who regard themselves as the workers, in spite of most of the work being done by the natives, were masters of the situation and did exactly what they liked. Within six months, a further strike was threatened, and indeed begun; but, profiting by the experience previously gained, the Government took adequate precautions, and the stoppage of the industry lasted only half a day. On this occasion, the leaders of the movement did not succeed in gaining anything by the turmoil they had created. The strikes of July 1913, and of January 1914, are remarkable examples of the effect of weak or of strong government; and no one, I think, grasped the situation more clearly than Botha.

While it would be out of place here to discuss at length the subject last referred to, it is worth while to point out that the white man in South Africa (who enjoys the position of a supervisor, on the one hand, but claims, on the other, all the rights of combination, copied from the procedure in England) is placing himself in a very dangerous situation, because he has but to teach the native worker (which he is doing) to follow his example, and some day he will find himself as well as his fellow-citizens in a most precarious position.

So much has been written of General Botha's course