1827. MAUD from the expiration of the other, and this was the bill on the undertaking to pay which the plaintiff sought to recover. That undertaking was in the following words, WATERHOUSE. and was written at the foot of the former undertaking: "16th September, 1825.-The above having been renewed, I engage to hand Messrs. Maud & Co. the same amount on the 20th December." On the part of the defendant it was proved, that he was only an assistant in the house of Willis & Co., that he had no interest whatever in the goods sold, and that he only superintended the concern since the death of Mr. J. Willis, at the request of his son Mr. B. Willis, who was his administrator. It was also proved that no funds had come to the hands of the defendant on account of the concern, which he could apply to the discharge of the plaintiff's claim. Scarlett, for the defendant, upon this contended, that there was no consideration for the defendant's undertaking. He had no interest in the goods. He was merely employed as a clerk to wind up the concern, and not to make himself liable. Between the plaintiff, and defendant there was no consideration at the first.. The defendant is not the administrator, but was only employed by him. Gurney, for the plaintiff.—It is a sufficient consideration that the plaintiff forbore to press his demand against the house of J. Willis & Co. The defendant's letter states that he was employed to conduct the concern. If he had not intended to make himself personally liable he would have signed his undertaking on behalf of B. Willis the administrator. ABBOTT, C. J.-I am of opinion that there is a sufficient consideration to sustain the action. The arrangement V. 1827. MAUD V. ATERHOUSE. had the effect of preventing the administrator from being sued. I think the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. Verdict for the plaintiff. Gurney and Stephen, for the plaintiff. Scarlett and Payne, for the defendant. [Attornies-Forbes, and Cranch.] COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Second Sittings at Guildhall, in Hilary Term, 1827. BEFORE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE BEST. Feb. 1st. Trespass does not lie against a sheriff to re cover damages for the seizure of property by his bailiff, under a writ of levari facias issued on a suit in the county court, because the sheriff is, in such case, a judicial and not a mi TINSLEY V. NASSAU, ESQ. TRESPASS against the sheriff of Essex, to recover damages for the seizure of a horse which it was alleged belonged to the plaintiff. The horse was seized as the property of Joseph Tinsley, a brother of the plaintiff's, who had been sued in the county court of Essex; and it was taken under a writ of levari facias by the bailiff of the defendant. Brodrick, for the defendant.-This action cannot be nisterial officer. maintained against the sheriff, because there was an action brought in the county court, of which the sheriff is a constituent part and not a mere officer. And the bailiff in this case stands in the same relation with regard to the sheriff as the sheriff in any of the superior courts does with regard to the court itself. Holroyd v. Breare § Holmes (a), is in point upon this subject; and that case has been since acted upon by Mr. Justice Bayley, on the Northern Circuit. That is the case of a court baron; but the court baron and the county court are similar, as in both the suitors are the judges, and the sheriff in one case and the steward in the other are judicial officers. The writ was read. It was directed to the bailiff by the sheriff, commanding him to levy, &c., and ended with the words:" and have you there the said money," &c., the usual conclusion of an authority to seize given to a bailiff by the sheriff being "that I may have the said money," &c. Wilde, Serjt., for the plaintiff.-The form of the writ by the sheriff will not conclude the question. BEST, C. J.-I apprehend that the sheriff sits in the county court as the first freeholder in the county, the other suitors are also judges; but the sheriff is the principal, and a sort of chief justice. Wilde, Serjt. The sheriff is indemnified by the plaintiff. BEST, C. J.-That cannot make any difference. Nonsuit. Wilde, Serjt., and R. V. Richards, for the plaintiff. [Attornies-Jones, and North & S.] (a) 2 B. & A. 473. The steward of a court-baron is a judicial officer; and trespass will not lie against him, where his bailiff, by mistake, took the goods of B., un- 1827. TINSLEY บ. NASSAU. In an action on an annuity bond to a woman with whom he cohabits, the question for the consideration of the Jury is, FRIEND v. HARRISON. DEBT on a bond by which the defendant engaged to given by a man pay the plaintiff an annuity of 50l. a-year. The defendant pleaded first, non est factum; and secondly, that the said plaintiff ought not to have and maintain her action against him, because the said writing was executed and delivered by him the said defendant to the said plaintiff, in consideration of the said plaintiff's then and there agreeing with the said defendant unlawfully and immorally to cohabit and commit fornication with the said defendant, after the execution of the said writing. Whether at the time when it was given there was or was not an intention and agreement to continue the connection in future. For if there was such intention, and The bond was dated the 6th of January, 1824, and it appeared that the plaintiff, who was a common prostitute given in further at the time when the defendant first became acquainted with her, had cohabited with him for two years before the the bond was ance of such arrangement, not recover. the plaintiff can bond was given, and that she continued to cohabit with him till the end of February, 1824, when she went down to Folkstone, in Kent, and lived for three months with her friends. After this she came again to London, and renewed her connection with the defendant. BEST, C. J., in his summing up, said-It is important to the public that the principles should be well known upon which this case must be decided. If this defendant had seduced the plaintiff, and afterwards, wishing to discontinue his connection with her, and by way of atonement, and to keep her from the same way of life in future, gave her the bond in question, no person, in point of morality or of law, can have a stronger claim on the defendant's property than she has. But it is abundantly clear that there was nothing like seduction in this case. The defendant " found this woman a common prostitute. But if a man takes a prostitute, and cohabits with her, and afterwards, being desirous of putting an end to the connection, in order to prevent the woman from continuing in a course of prostitution, gives her an annuity bond, he will be answerable in an action upon it; therefore, if the defendant in this case acted with this intention, he is liable. But there is another view which may be taken of a case like this. Persons who connect themselves with women of this description often become extremely attached to them; and the women, aware of that, threaten to put an end to the connection, unless some permanent provision is made for them. If, therefore, the plaintiff obtained this bond from the defendant, intending at the same time to continue the connection, then I am of opinion that the special plea is proved. The learned Serjeant, for the plaintiff, says that you must be satisfied that there was an agreement when the bond was given to continue the connection: that is a matter of which you cannot have express evidence; but it may be made out from the other facts of the case. Lordship then left it to the Jury, who found a His Verdict for the plaintiff. Peake, Serjt., and Hutchinson, for the plaintiff. [Attornies-Blacklow, and Roberts.] 1827. FRIEND v. HARRISON. BUTLER V. TURLEY. FALSE imprisonment.-The defendant justified the imprisonment, on the ground that the plaintiff was offending 1 Geo. 4, c. 56 (commonly called the petty trespass act), as the owner of land on which the plaintiff was trespassing. It was held that to make out his justification he must give positive proof of actual damage being done, so as to enable the Jury to decide on the quantum of it; and that the Jury were not to presume damage from the mere fact of a trespass being committed. Semb. that the principle of this decision will apply to the substituted provisions of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, the above act of 1 Geo. 4, having been wholly repealed by the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 27. |
