Lord TENTERDEN, C. J.If men were not bound by

such bargains as this, business could not go on.

Denman, C. S., and Chitty, for the plaintiffs.

Taunton and Russell, for the defendant.

[Attornies-Amory & Coles, and T. White.]

1827. WINKFIELD

V.

PACKINGTON.

Sittings in London after Easter Term, 1827.

ROGERS v. HUNTER.

The

ASSUMPSIT for demurrage. Plea-General Issue.
It appeared that the ship Thirza sailed as a general
ship from Bremen to London; and that the defendant had
shipped a quantity of oats and beans on board her.
bill of lading was put in, and at the bottom of it was writ-
ten "to be discharged within twelve running days after
the vessel's arrival, or to pay 21., British stirling, demurrage,
for every day longer detention."

It was proved that the ship arrived in the river Thames on the 11th of December, 1826, and was reported on the 12th, and therefore, as the plaintiff contended, the twelve running days commenced on the 13th, and ended on the 28th of that month; however, in point of fact, the corn was not all landed till the 2d of January, 1827.

Marryat for the defendant.-We are in a condition to shew that from our goods being under those of other persons, who had also goods on board, we could not get at them so as to discharge them, till the 26th of December; and I submit that the number of days for discharging does not begin to run till we are enabled to get at our goods.

This was proved; but the witnesses admitted that the corn might have all been landed in a smaller number of days.

1827.

ROGERS

V.

HUNTER.

Lord TENTERDEN, C. J.-It seems to me that the defendant cannot be said to detain the vessel, before he can get at his goods; but when he can, he is bound to use all reasonable diligence. I do not think that the defendant is, at all events, entitled to the same number of days, after the goods can be got at, as is specified in the contract; and the question will be, whether, adverting to all the circumstances, the defendant ought to have taken the goods out of the ship in a smaller number of days than he did.

Verdict for the plaintiff.-Damages 8l., being for four days' demurrage.

Scarlett, A. G., and Platt, for the plaintiff.

Marryat, for the defendant.

[Attornies.-Warne & Son, and B. Lewis.]

May 29th.

a bill payable to his own order, before it is in

DOD v. EDWARDS.

If the drawer of ASSUMPSIT on a bill of exchange, dated September, 13, 1826, payable three months after date, for 967. 11s. 7d. drawn by a person named Hobson, and accepted by the defendant, payable to the drawer's order, and by him indorsed to the plaintiff.

dorsed, give the acceptor a gene

ral release; this

is no defence to

an action by an indorsee against the acceptor, unless there be proof that the

indorsee knew of the release.

The plaintiff rested on the formal proofs.

Brougham for the defendant.-I am in a condition to shew that the bill was indorsed on the 21st of November, and that, on the 4th of October, the drawer put it out of his power to indorse, by giving a general release to the defendant.

'Lord TENTERDEN, C. J.-You must shew that the plaintiff knew it. If you cannot shew that the plaintiff was aware of the release, your defence fails; if it were not so, you would put an end to the circulation of bills.

Brougham.The party, by the release, puts all right out of himself.

Lord TENTERDEN, C. J.-It is quite clear that you must trace it to the plaintiff's knowledge.

Verdict for the plaintiff.

Scarlett, A. G. and Hutchinson, for the plaintiff.

Brougham, for the defendant.

[Attornies-Reeves, and Cornthwaite.]

1827.

DOD

V.

EDWARDS.

REX V. RAMSDEN and Others.

June 2d.

for the defendant, in cross

INDICTMENT for a conspiracy to sue out a fraudulent If the counsel commission of bankrupt against two of the defendants. The petitioning creditor, who was called on the part of the prosecution, stated, that he bought the debt upon which he became petitioning creditor six months ago.

In his cross-examination, F. Pollock, for the defendant Ramsden, put a paper into his hand, which he acknowledged to be of his handwriting, and then asked him if he had not bought the debt nine months before; which he admitted he had.

examination,

put a paper into

the witness's

hand, to refresh his memory, the opposite counsel has a right to

look at it, without being bound to read it in

evidence. And the opposite counsel may

also ask the witness when it was written, without being

in.

Scarlett, A. G., for the prosecution, wished to look at bound to put it the paper.

F. Pollock. I submit that my friend has no right to see it, unless he will read it in evidence.

Lord TENTERDEN, C. J.-You put the paper into the witness's hands to refresh his memory. It is very usual for the opposite counsel to see it, and examine upon it, and I think he has a right to see it.

1827.

REX

v.

RAMSDEN.

Scarlett, A. G.-Having looked at the paper, asked the witness if he would swear that it was written at the time it bore date.

F. Pollock.-I submit that this question cannot be asked without the paper being read.

Lord TENTERDEN, C. J.—I think it may. You put the paper into the witness's hand, and I think the other side may ask when it was written, without being bound to read it.

The Jury found the defendants Ramsden and Clark guilty, and the defendant Cooke not guilty.

Scarlett, A. G., Gurney, Montague and Busby, for the prosecution.

Denman, C. S., F. Pollock, Brougham, Hutchinson, and D. F. Jones, for the respective defendants.

[Attornies-Hughes, for the prosecution; and Humphries and Isaacs, for the respective defendants.]

In Hardy's case, 24 How. Stat. Trials, 824, Eyre, C. J. said, "It is always usual and very reasonable, when a witness speaks from memorandums, that the counsel should have an opportunity of looking at those memorandums, when he is cross-examin

ing that witness. If there is any thing that you (the witness) say, upon your oath, does not relate to that subject, but to some other subject, to be sure it is impossible to be asked that that should be seen."

Adjourned Sittings at Westminster, after Easter
Term, 1827.

1827.

SMALL V. GRAY.

CASE. The first count of the declaration was, for a malicious arrest. The second count stated-that heretofore, &c., the defendant not having any reasonable or probable cause of action against the plaintiff, for the amount of the sum of money for which he caused the plaintiff to be held to bail, as thereinafter mentioned: but contriving &c., maliciously &c., caused and procured &c., a certain writ, &c., to be sued out marked for bail for 301. "And the same writ being so, marked and indorsed for bail as aforesaid, the said John afterwards, and before the said return thereof, to wit, on the same day and year last aforesaid, at Westminster aforesaid, in the county of Middlesex aforesaid, contriving and intending as last aforesaid, and without having any reasonable or probable cause of action whatsoever against the said Samuel, to the amount of 107. or upwards, falsely and maliciously caused the said Samuel to be held to bail, under and by virtue of the said last mentioned writ, for the said last mentioned sum of 30%., and thereupon the said Samuel was then and there forced and obliged to, and did procure certain persons to become bil for the appearance of him, the said Samuel, in the said Court, to answer the said John according to the exigency of the said last mentioned writ upon that occasionwhereas in truth and in fact he the said John, at the time of suing forth the said last mentioned writ, and of the said holding of the said Samuel to bail, had not any reasonable or probable cause of action against the said Samuel, to the amount of," &c. (it then stated the termination of the suit); by means whereof, &c. Plea-Not guilty.

1

It appeared that the writ was sued out, marked for bail as stated in the declaration, and that a person named

June 9th.

An action lies

for maliciously holding a party

to bail, although

he is never ar

rested, but is told that there

is a writ out

against him, and he goes to the sheriff's officer and gives bail.