ADDENDA.

COURT OF KING'S BENCH.

BEFORE ABBOTT, C. J., BAYLEY AND HOLROYD, JS*.

In Bank.

DEAN v. Brown, Esq. and Others.

(See, ante, p. 62.)

1826.

THE motion for a new trial in this case now came on to April, 22nd. be argued.

Scarlett and Comyn shewed cause, and contended, that whether the horse and chaise were, at the time of the making of the settlement, "articles belonging to Miss Tyler, in and about her business," was a question of fact; and that, as such, it had been properly left to the Jury.

Gurney and Holt, contra.-The stock of feathers could not be put into the schedule, but the horse and chaise might be as easily inserted in it as articles of furniture; a horse and chaise were not necessary to the trade of a plumassiere; and what is to pass under the words of a deed, is a question not of fact but of law; and even if it were a question for the Jury, it was clear, that if the horse and chaise had been intended to pass, they would have been specified.

ABBOTT, C. J.-The horse and chaise are articles that may belong to any trade; and the Jury have found as a fact, that they did belong to Miss Tyler in and about her business.

* Mr. Justice Littledale was sitting in the Bail Court.

1826.

DEAN

BROWN.

BAYLEY, J.-After the decided cases, it is impossible to question the validity of these deeds. The schedule only includes furniture, but the deed contemplates the stock, and things "in and about" the business. The question is, can a horse and chaise be used in such a business? That is a fact. In this case, they were used principally by the wife. If it had been proved that the wife had only occasionally used them for her trade, it might be different; but, on the evidence, the Jury have found that they were used by her in and about her business.

HOLROYD, J.-I am of opinion that it was a question of
Rule discharged.

fact.

April 26th.

BRYAN C. WAGSTAFFE.

(See, ante, p. 195.)

THE Court, after hearing an argument, and taking time to consider of their judgment, made the rule absolute for reversing the judgment of outlawry.

PRINCE and Another v. LEWIS.

(See, ante, p. 66.)

THE rule for a new trial in this case now came on to be argued; and the Court concurring in the opinion given by the Lord Chief Justice at the trial, discharged the rule.

SKYRING v. GREENWOOD.

(See, ante, Vol. I. p. 517.)

THE rule for a new trial in this case having been argued, the Court discharged it (a).

(a) See 6 Dow. & Ry. 401. S. C.

LLOYD V. ASHBY.

(See, ante, p. 138.)

THE points raised in this case have been turned into a special case, which has not yet been set down for argu

ment.

DENN on the demise of BULKELEY v. WILFORD.

(See, ante, p. 173.)

THE rule for a new trial in this case was never argued.

1826.

COURT OF KING'S BENCH.

Before Abbott, C. J., BAYLEY, & littledale, JS.*

In Bank.

GOLDSTEIN v. Foss and Another.

(See, ante, p. 252.)

THE rule for arresting the judgment in this case came on to be argued.

Scarlett, for the plaintiff, submitted, that if there were one good count in the declaration, that would be sufficient

BAYLEY, J.-No. As the judgment is entire, if any one count is defective, the judgment must be arrested.

1

Scarlett then shewed cause. The first count states that this was a society for the purpose of protecting persons in trade from swindlers and sharpers. That the plaintiff was concerned in trade, and that the defendant published that the plaintiff was unfit to be a member of that society; and on this, even if the words do not of themselves convey clearly the imputation that the plaintiff

• Holroyd, J. was absent from indisposition.

1827.

Jan. 27th.