1856. Rolls. PORTER V. sents? I am of opinion that the Court should not make such consents rules of Court. The 20th and 27th General Orders of 1851 appear to me to be of considerable importance in preventing those delays which were such a discredit to the Court of Chancery. Several ARCHBOLD. attempts have been made to get rid of the effect of these Orders. Judgment. The first attempt was to apply by special motion to reinstate, and I uniformly refused those motions, where the delay arose from the neglect of the petitioner or his solicitor. There was an appeal in one of the cases; and the Lord Chancellor, having concurred with the view I had taken, affirmed the order, and thus that mode of setting aside those General Orders was got rid of. The next course adopted, which I accidentally discovered last Term, was to apply to amend the petition. Having been thrown off my guard in Trinity Term 1855, by the circumstance that the motion was not opposed, although Counsel for the respondent appeared, and the fact that the petition stood dismissed having been concealed from the Court, I made the order, and the cause was set down in the Lord Chancellor's list for last Michaelmas Term ; the clerk in the Registrar's office naturally considering that an order to amend was equivalent to an order to reinstate. It is not improbable that this course has been adopted in other cases; but it shall not occur again, as I shall not in future make any order to amend, except on the production of the Rolls certificate, or (in cases under the 15th section) of the Lord Chancellor's order referring the case to the Master. The next course adopted to evade those General Orders was to allow the cause to be struck out of the Lord Chancellor's list, without any application to his Lordship to postpone, and then to produce a consent to the Registrar, to show it was struck out on a consent to postpone. And in one case (to which Mr. Sugden, I believe, called the Lord Chancellor's attention), Mr. Long directed the case to be again set down. That proceeding was quite irregular, as it was in fact setting aside the provision in the 20th and 27th General Orders, that the cause should only be reinstated on "a special application." In general, however, the officers in the Registrar's office have 1856. Rolls. PORTER บ. Judgment. declined to act on consents not made rules of Court, and the parties are now obliged to apply at the Rolls; and the question is, should I act on such consents? I am of opinion I should not. In the case ARCHBOLD. of Overend v. Overend (a), a motion was made before Mr. Blackburne, then Master of the Rolls, to make a consent a rule of Court, to allow a receiver poundage and costs. Mr. Blackburne refused to make the consent a rule of Court, and said :—“ As to that part of the consent which relates to the allowing the poundage to the receiver, I shall make no rule upon it;" and he adds afterwards :-"Even on the consent of the parties, I will not make an order by which I may appear to sanction a breach of the General Order, whose observance is of such vast importance to the suitors of the Court, and so beneficial to receivers themselves and their sureties." The result of that decision, which I have very frequently followed, is this: Where a General Order is made, which it is the interest of the suitors and a matter of public policy that it should not be evaded, the Court will not, on the consent of parties, set aside the provisions of such General Order. If parties, and their solicitors having the conduct of proceedings, are at liberty to consent to postpone and delay causes, to suit their own convenience, the effect before two or three years will be that the 20th and 27th General Orders will become of no avail as a remedy against the public grievance of Chancery delays. I shall be no party to the setting aside of those General Orders, either by consent or in any other manner. If there is any just reason for postponing a cause in the Lord Chancellor's list, there will be no difficulty in having it postponed, if proper grounds are laid before his Lordship; and if there is any just ground for reinstating a cause petition, irrespective of a consent, I shall do so on a motion for that purpose; but I shall not act on a consent, unless the Lord Chancellor shall decide otherwise. I shall make no rule in each of the three matters. (a) 6 Ir. Eq. Rep. 387. ACCUMULATIONS. By a deed of family settlement, execu- By a deed of family settlement, execu- The trusts of the 1000 years' moiety of the produce of the accumu- The immediately thereupon should By deed of 1819, executed on the mar- A died; B died without issue; C and E der to his first and other sons in tail, with remainders over. The S. lease expired in the year 1853, in the lifetime of C and E.-Held, that the jointure and portions provided by the deed of 1819 were charges upon the accumulations provided by the deed of 1818. Held also, that notwithstanding the resettlement of the D. estates by the deed of 1846, C was, at the time of the expiry of the S. lease, seised of the D. estates, by virtue of the deed of 1794; and that the trust for raising £2000, and for accumulating the produce of the accumulations, took effect. C. Londonderry v. Londonderry 361-2 ACQUIESCENCE. A was trustee of B's will, by which real estate was devised to the separate use of C for life, and after her death to her children as she should appoint; and was also a simple contract creditor of B, for a sum paid by reason of B's default in a receiver matter. After B's death, C, who was B's executrix, and A and his cotrustee, joined in mortgaging the real estate so devised, and personal property, to a trustee for A, to secure his debt; and C and the co-trustee covenanted that the property was free from incumbrances, except certain specified judgments. By a cotemporaneous deed, C appointed to her children, and among others to D and E, who had obtained judgments prior to the mortgage against B. D and E were parties to the deed of appointment, and by it ratified and confirmed the mortgage, and all the covenants, &c., therein contained, as if they had been parties to and executed the same. Held, that A's mortgage, though subsequent in date, should have priority over the judgments of D and E. P. C. In re King 300 ADMINISTRATION SUIT. 1. The fact of assets, consisting partly of stock, will not give the Court jurisdiction to order service out of the jurisdiction in an administration suit. R. Freeman v. Freeman 39 2. In an administration suit the Court does not before decree order the executor or administrator to bring money into Court, unless on a distinct admission that he has assets in his hands. Therefore, where in a case referred to the Master, under the 15th section of the Court of Chancery (Ireland) Regulation Act 1850, an executor de son tort by his discharge stated that he had not any sum whatever of assets in his hands, but on the contrary was in advance beyond any sum which had been realised out of the assets, it was Held, that an order made by the Master, directing him to bring money into Court, was irregular. R. Glenny Woolsey 636 ADMINISTRATOR. See ADMINISTRATION SUIT, 2. AGREEMENT. matters not put in issue by the petition or discharge. In this case, such affidavits were admitted by consent. Tressilian v. Caniffe AGREEMENT. R. 399 See FRAUDS (STATUTE OF), 1, 2. SALE UNDER THE COURT. The petitioner and respondent had entered into a series of agreements to act as partners in obtaining contracts for the supply of goods for various branches of the public service. The respondent, during the continuance of some of these agreements, entered into secret arrangements with other persons, by virtue of which he was to share in the profits of similar contracts The petitioner if obtained by them. claimed a right to share in the profits of all such secret arrangements; but the Court Held, that the petitioner could not sustain such claim by merely proving his own agreement, and the existence of such secret arrangements, and directed an inquiry into the parC. ticulars of such arrangements. 188 Lock v. Lynam AMENDMENT. In future, no order to amend a cause petition will be made except on production of the Rolls certificate or the Lord Chancellor's order, referring the matter to the Master under the 15th section of the Court of Chancery (Ireland) Regulation Act 1850. R. Porter v. Archbold ANNUITY. See ACCUMULATIONS. APPEAL. See AFFIDAVIT, 4. CONTRIBUTION, 1. CHANCERY REGULATION 651 1. "It is not the course of the Court in general to allow evidence to be read on an appeal which has not been read before the Master, the more especially as to matters not in issue; but as William M'Creight and wife do not object to the affidavits being ARREARS OF INTEREST. 659 read, and as it will save expense that I should decide the case without sending it back to the Master, I shall now advert to the facts stated in those affidavits."-Per SMITH, M. R. Tres409 silian v. Caniffe 2. Semble. An appeal lies to the House of Lords from an order made under the Renewable Leasehold Conversion Act. R. Layard v. Lord Donegal 450 APPORTIONMENT OF RENTS. 1. The 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 22 (Apportionment of Rents Act), does not apply to rents reserved on tenancies from year to year, without writing. R. In re Alexander a minor 257 Held, 2. One seised in fee, subject to tenancies from year to year, by a will dated in 1840, devised to A for life, remainder without over; A lived for some years determining the tenancies. that the rents were not apportionable under the 23 & 24 G. 3, c. 46 (Ir). Ibid 3. The testator devised the legal estate in other lands, held in fee-farm and for lives renewable, to trustees, in trust for A for life, remainder over. Held, that the rents reserved on the tenancies from year to year, created by the testator and reserved by leases before the passing of the 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 22, were not apportionable under that Ibid Act. |