rative will shew, were issued, and the conse- men, of whom nearly two thirds were regular quent indecision which seemed to characterize troops."* many of the movements during the campaign of 1812 and '13.

British force along the time of General Brock's

Niagara frontier at the

return from Detroit.

Here was a force of regulars amounting to four thousand men, opposed to one of six hundred; yet it will be shewn that various attempts have been made by American writers, to assign the inferiority of numbers, as the reason why the attack on Queenston so signally miscarried.

General laer's plans.

The whole British force along a frontier of nearly thirty-six miles in extent, did not, at the date of General Brock's return from Detroit, amount to more than twelve hundred men, at As it was quite out of the question for Genleast half of which were militia. These troops Van Ranse eral Brock, in the preswere disposed of in the following manner :ence of so superior a At Chippewa, a small detachment of the 41st, force, to adopt any other than precautionary under Capt. Bullock, and the flank companies and defensive measures, we will lay before of the 2d Lincoln militia, under Capts. R. the reader a sketch of what were really Hamilton and Rows;-at Queenston, Capts. General Van Ranselaer's views. This we are Dennis and Williams, with the flank compan-enabled to do by means of a pamphlet publishies of the 49th, with a small body of militia, ed by Col. S. Van Ranselaer, his nephew and were stationed; nearly all the remainder of aide-de-camp. the force was at Fort George, under General Sheaffe, with the exception of a few militia scattered here and there along the line. It will thus be seen how inadequately so extended a frontier was defended, and how the few troops scattered along the line were exposed to be cut off in detail by an energetic or enterprising enemy.

force of.

The American army, commanded by Major The American Army- General Van Ranselaer consisted, according to their own official returns,* of five thousand two hundred and six men. This amount includes all the reinforcements which had ar

rived at the date of the battle of Queenston,

but is exclusive of three hundred field and

The instructions from General Dearborn, on which General Van Ranselaer had to base his plan of operations, were as follows:

"At all events, we must calculate on poss. essing Upper Canada before winter sets in. General Harrison will, I am assured, enter Canada by Detroit, with not less than from six to seven thousand men, exclusive of the troops necessary for guarding the frontier against Indian depredations.

"The force at Sackett's Harbour and that

vicinity, is over two thousand, including an old company of regular artillery, and a large company of old riflemen.

in operation in the navy department on Lake "I have great confidence in the exertions now Ontario. In fact, we have nothing to fear, and much to hope as to the ultimate success of measures now in operation with a view to Upper Canada; but much may immediately depend on what may happen at your post."

light artillery, with eight hundred of the 6th, 13th, and 23d regiments at Fort Niagara. This gives a total of over six thousand three hundred men. James disposes of this force as follows:-"Of this powerful force, sixteen hundred and fifty regulars, under the command of Brigadier General Smith, were at Black Rock,†—three hundred and eighty-six Ranselear felt confidence also, may be assummilitia, at the latter place and Buffalo,-nine ed from the admission made by his nephew, hundred regulars and twenty-two hundred Col. S. Van Ranselear. "He did not wish to and seventy militia at Lewiston, distant from be drawn from the object he had in view, by

Such was the confident tone of General Dearborn's instructions, and that General Van

Black Rock, about twenty eight miles,-at a controversy with General Smyth, particuFort Niagara, were eleven hundred more, giv-larly so, as he knew that the forces which by ing a force of six thousand three hundred this time had collected in his own immediate

Wilkinson's Memoris. Vol. 1, page 558.
Wilkinson's Memoirs, Vol. 1, page 555.

vicinity were amply sufficient for the purpose."

• Vide Wilkinson.

This admission is of importance, as shewing same writer, who in one case so touchingly depicted his helpless condition, in eight weeks asserting that "he knew that the forces under his command were amply sufficient for his purpose."

to enquire what was General Van Ranselaer's purpose. Fortunately, Ingersol's, Armstrong's, Wilkinson's, and Col. Van Ranselaer's works are sufficient to answer this question most satisfactorily.

what powerful reinforcements must have arrived between the middle of August, when Geo. Van Ranselaer arrived at the Niagara frontier on the 13th Oct. His situation in August is thus described :-" From the mo་་ As we have now established the fact that ment of his assuming the command, his posi❘ there was no lack of troops, we will proceed tion was one of the utmost exposure and danger. He lay within sight of a powerful enemy, separated from him only by a narrow river, for the crossing of which, that enemy possessed every facility. He had a line of thirty-six miles to guard, and his whole force was con- In his letter of October 8th, to General Dearsiderably less than one thousand men, many born, General Van Ranselaer thus details his of them without shoes, and all of them clam- plans:-" Under these circumstances, and the orous for pay-of ammunition there were not impressions necessarily resulting from them, ten rounds per man, and no lead. There was I am adopting decisive measures for closing not one piece of heavy ordnance in the whole the fall campaign. I have summoned Majorline, and there were no artillerists to man the General Hall, Brigadier-General Smith, and few light pieces which we possessed. Add to the commandants of the United States regithis, that the troops could not take or keep the ments, to meet me in a consultation; and I field for want of tents or covering; that the am well aware that some opinions, entitled to medical department, if one could be said to ex- great respect, will be offered for crossing the ist at all, was utterly destitute of everything Niagara, a little below Fort Erie, and pursuing necessary for the comfort of the sick or disa- | the march down the river. I think this plan bled; and that there was among the men that liable to many objections. The enemy have entire want of subordination, to say nothing works at almost every point, and even an infeof discipline, which always characterizes raw rior force might hold us in check, and render militia, and some idea may be formed of the our march slow; by taking up the bridges at condition of our army." Chippewa, they might greatly embarrass us: Here was a lamentable condition for an the cleared country is but a mile or two wide, amateur General to be placed in, especially one flank would be constantly liable to be when contrasted with the ease and comfort galled by Indians from the swamps; for a conwhich pervaded the British frontier. "The siderable distance, the rapidity of the current, condition of the forces on the opposite bank of and the height of the banks render transporthe river was in contrast with ours in every tation across the river impracticable; of course particular. There was a well-appointed and our supplies must follow the line of march, well-found army, under the most exact dis-with the trouble and hazard of them every cipline, and commanded by skilful and expe-day increasing, and should the enemy retreat rienced officers. Every important post, from from General Harrison, they would have a Fort Erie to Fort George, was in a defensible state, and the enemy had possessed himself of a very commanding position on the heights at Queenston, which he was rendering every day more secure and formidable. He had, moreover, the mastery of the lakes, and was at that moment industriously employed in using that advantage to increase his numbers, and add to his supplies at Niagara."

Let this statement be well considered, and the conclusion cannot fail to be arrived at, that General Van Ranselaer's reinforcements must have been very considerable, as we find the

double object in intercepting our supplies; and by falling on our rear, and cutting off our communication, we might experience the fate of Hull's army. Besides these, and many other objections, there is no object on that side, until we should arrive at the commanding heights of Queenston, which are opposite my camp.

"The proposal, which I shall submit to the council, will be, that we immediately concentrate the regular force in the neighborhood of Niagara, and the militia here; make the best possible dispositions, and, at the same time,

that the regulars shall pass from the Four-Mile We have been thus particular in making these Creek to a point in the rear of Fort George, extracts, as we are anxious to show that the and take it by storm; I will pass the river failure of the attack on Queenston is not to be here, and carry the heights of Queenston. attributed to any want of troops, nor must it Should we succeed, we shall effect a great dis-be considered as a hastily devised plan, as comfiture of the enemy, by breaking their line preparations had been making for it from the of communication, driving their shipping from period when General Van Ranselaer first the mouth of the river, leaving them no rally- assumed the command of the army. ing point in this part of the country, appalling the minds of the Canadians, and opening a wide and safe communication for our supplies. We shall save our own land-wipe away part of the score of our past disgrace, get excellent barracks and winter quarters, and, at least, be prepared for an early campaign another As soon as the result of the council shall be known, I shall advise you of it."

year.

This was a very feasible plan, and failed only, according to Colonel Van Ranselaer, through Brigadier-General Smyth's delay.

Brock.

A few days before the battle of Queenston, full instructions were Despatches of Gen. forwarded by General Brock to the officers in command of the posts along the frontier, for their guidance in case of attack, and a despatch to Sir Geo. Prevost, dated 12th October, shows that he was fully aware of the impending storm, though uncertain of the direction in which it might break: "Major-Gen. Brock to Sir Geo. Prevost, October 12th.

"The vast number of troops which have been this day added to the strong force previously collected on the opposite side, convince me, with other indications, that an attack is not far distant. I have, in consequence, di

the militia to two thousand men, but fear I shall not be able to effect my object."

What says Ingersol on the subject:-"Gen. Alexander Smyth commanded at Buffalo, only a few miles from General Van Ranselaer, fifteen hundred men of the regular army; but, as I was informed by a highly respectable offi-rected every exertion to be made to complete cer still living, was not invited to take part in the projected descent upon Canada, lest the glory of the day should be taken from General Van Ranselaer's cousin, Colonel Solomon Van Ranselaer, an officer in the militia; both of the Van Ranselaers being, perhaps laudably, though, as it turned out, unfortunafely, bent on monopolizing the credit of this affair for the militia, if not exclusively, at any rate in preferance to the regular army."

General Armstrong's remarks are much to the same effect-"The troops employed, or intended to be employed in this service, were principally militia; and, therefore, not better chosen than the object itself. Why this was so, is a problem not yet satisfactorily explained. If it originated in an esprit de corps, or belief of militia efficiency, there may be some color of excuse for the error; but if, as reported, the arrangement was made to gratify the ambition of an individual, the act was not merely injudicious but criminal. At the period in question, there were at the General's disposal more than three thousand troops of the line; from whom a corps might have been selected, which, well found, equipped, and commanded, would not have been either beaten or baffled."

General Brock's letter of instructions to Col. Proctor shows that the situation of the British troops was far from being as comfortable as Col. S. Van Ranselaer's statement would induce one to suppose. "The unfortunate disaster which has befallen the Detroit and Caledonia will reduce us to great distress. They were boarded while at anchor at Fort Erie, and carried off; you will learn the particulars from others. A quantity of flour and a little pork were ready to be shipped for Amherstburg; but, as I send you the flank companies of the Newfoundland, no part of the provisions can go this trip in the Lady Prevost. It will be necessary to direct her to return with all possible speed, bringing the Mary under her convoy. You will husband your pork, for I sm sorry to say there is but little in the country.

"An interesting scene is going to commence with you. 1 am perfectly at ease as to the result, provided we can manage the Indians, and keep them attached to the cause, which, in fact, is theirs.

"The fate of the province is in your hands,

mounted, and, waving his sword, climbed

The position of the parties was now thus: over a high stone wall, followed by the troops; The Americans occupied the heights at Queenplacing himself at the head of the light com-ston, with a force, certainly, exceeding eight pany of the 49th, he led the way up the hundred, and General Van Ranselaer admits, as mountain at double quick time, in the very will be seen in his letter to General Dearborn, teeth of a sharp fire from the enemy's rifle- that "a number of boats now crossed over, men-and, ere long, he was singled out by unannoyed, except by the one unsilenced one of them, who, coming forward, took deli-gun," consequently more troops were hourly berate aim, and fired; several of the men arriving. noticed the action, and fired-but too lateand our gallant General fell on his left side, within a few feet of where I stood. Running up to him, I enquired, “Are you much hurt, sir?" He placed his hand on his breast, but made no reply—and slowly sunk down. The 49th now raised a shout, "Revenge the General !" and regulars and militia, led by Colonel McDonell, pressed forward, anxious to revenge the fall of their beloved leader, and literally drove a superior force up the mountain side, to a considerable distance beyond the summit. The flank companies of the York Militia, under Captains Cameron and Heward, and Lieutenants Robinson, McLean and Stanton, besides many others, whose names I forget, eminently distinguished themselves on this occasion.

"At this juncture the enemy were reinforced by fresh troops, and after a severe struggle, in which Colonel McDonell, Captains Dennis and Williams, and most of our officers, were either killed or wounded, we were overpowered by numbers, and for ced to retreat, as the enemy had outflanked us, and had nearly succeeded in gaining our rear. Several of our men were thus cut off, and made prisoners-myself amongst the number."

Early in the afternoon, a body of about fifty Mohawks, under Norton and young Brant, advanced through the woods, took up a position in front, and a very sharp skirmish ensued, which ended in the Indians retiring on the reinforcements which had now begun to arrive from Fort George. This reinforcement consisted of three hundred and eighty rank and file of the 41st regiment, and Capts. James Crook's and McEwen's flank companies of the 1st Lincoln; Capts. Nellis' and W. Crook's flank companies of the 4th Lincoln; Hall's, Durand's and Applegarth's companies of the 5th Lincoln; Cameron's, Heward's and Chisholm's flank companies of the York Militia; Major Merritt's Yeomanry corps, and a body of Swayzee's Militia artillery, numbering in all between three and four hundred men. A short time afterwards, Col. Clark of the Militia, arrived from Chippewa, with Captain Bullock's company of the 41st; Capts. R. Hamilton's and Row's flank companies of the 2nd Lincoln, and volunteer Sedentary Militia.

The whole British and Indian force thus assembled, did not amount to more than one thousand rank and file, of whom barely five hundred and sixty were regulars. The artillery consisted of two three-pounders, under the command of Lieutenant Crowther of the 41st. The Indians now mustered, perhaps, one hundred men.

So far, Mr. G. S. Jarvis' account agrees with those received from Captain Crooks, Colonel Clark, Colonel Kerby, and Captain John McMeekin-all of whom were present on this occasion. It agrees, also, strictly with James' After carefully reconnoitring, Gen. Sheaffe, statement. Up to the period of the engage- who had now assumed the command, comment the numbers of the British regulars and menced the attack by an advance of his left militia had never reached three hundred, over flank, composed of the light company of the two hundred of whom now retreated, and 41st under Lieutenant McIntyre, supported by formed in front of Vromont's battery, there to a body of militia and Indians. After a volley, await reinforcements-while Gen. Van Ran- the bayonet was resorted to, and the Americans selaer, considering the victory as complete, right driven in. The main body now advanced crossed over in order to give directions about under cover of the fire from the two threefortifying the camp which he intended to oc-pounders, and after a short conflict forced the cupy in the British territory, and then recrossed Americans over the first ridge of the heights to hasten the sending over reinforcements. to the road leading from Queenston to the