TENANT. cottage, rented by a millowner for families employed in the mill. Some of the children of the former worked in it. The agreement was that 28. a-week should be deducted from the children's wages as rent. The pauper worked as a husband

man.

Held, that the relation of landlord and tenant existed. "There was," as Williams, J., observed, “a renting by one who was not servant."

R. v. Ponsonby (1841), 3 Q. B. 14; 6 Jurist, 642. The occupiers of apartments in Hampton Court, who reside there with their families and provide their own furniture, rateable.

Hughes v. Chatham (1843), 5 M. & G. 54; 1 Lutw. R. C. 51. A master ropemaker occupied a house in a Government dockyard. He paid no rent for it, and held it as part remuneration for his services. No part of the house was used for public purposes, and he had the exclusive control of it. The distinction to be deduced from the settlement cases, Tindal, C. J., took to be this :-If a servant is not permitted to occupy as a reward, in the performance of his master's contract to pay him, but required to occupy in the performance of his master's contract to serve his master, his occupation is that of his master. As nothing in the facts of the case showed that the master ropemaker was required to occupy the house for the performance of his duties, or did occupy it in order to perform them, or that the occupation was conducive to that purpose more than any other house, held that the claimant occupied the house as tenant within 2 Will. IV., c. 45, s. 27.

Gambier v. Lydford (1854), 3 E. & B. 346. The governor of a prison rateable in respect of a coach-house and stabling within the precincts of the prison to the extent to which the occupation

NOT TENANT.

in default of payment by the plaintiff, to let the plaintiff enter into the premises and carry on therein the trade for the defendant until the agreement should be determined by the notice mentioned in the agreement. The plaintiff was to carry on business "in the place and stead in the same manner and with the same privileges as G. Utting hath heretofore done." The agreement proceeded, "whenever either of the said parties hereto shall be desirous of determining and putting an end to this agreement, he, the said F. Mayhew, shall and will, on receiving from the said G. Suttle one month's previous notice in writing of such desire, and without being paid, or requiring to be paid, any sum of money, &c., quit and deliver up to him, the said G. Suttle, the said trade or business, and the full quiet and peaceable possession of all and every of the said premises." Notwithstanding the provisions with respect to determination by notice, the Court thought that no tenancy had been created, and that the occupation was ancillary to the carrying on of the trade for the defendant.

Clark v. Bury St. Edmunds (1856), 1 C. B. N. S. 23; 26 L. J. C. P. 12. Keeper of the Guildhall at Bury St. Edmunds held to occupy house attached to it as servant because he was required to reside there for the performance of his duties.

R. v. Tiverton (1861), 30 L. J. M. C. 79. A Wesleyan minister, who lived in a house taken by the stewards of the circuit within which he officiated, paid the rates and taxes; but they were repaid by the stewards. It appeared to be the practice of the stewards to take houses for the ministers. No settlement gained. According to Crompton, J., the minister was very much in the position of servant to the stewards. This case appears pecu

TENANT.

was in excess of what was necessary for the performance of his duties. Outside the prison precincts were buildings occupied by the officers of the prison. None occupied more than was necessary for the discharge of their duties and the accommodation of their families; the dwellings were assigned to the officers by the directors, and they had no discretion as to the houses and apartments assigned to them. Held, by Campbell, C. J., and Wightman, J., that the residences outside the walls were rateable. Coleridge, J., dissented as to the latter point. It is submitted that the distinction taken between residences inside and those outside prison walls is not warranted by any of the previous decisions. See Congreve v. Upton (1864), 4 B. & S. 857; 33 L. J. M. C. 83.

Ford v. Harington (1869), L. R. 5 C. P. 282. Canon of a cathedral church and one of the chapter occupied a house with which the chapter could not interfere, and which the canon repaired. Held, that he occupied as canon and a corporation sole and not as one of the chapter, and that he could vote in respect of it.

Smith v. Seghill (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 422; 44 L. J. M. C. 114. S., a collier, resided in house belonging to his employers. He paid no rent; was not entitled to notice to quit, and the occupation would cease when S.'s service closed. The house was one of several which his employers filled at their discretion. It was not absolutely essential for workmen to live in those houses, though the owners preferred that the workmen should live near their work. An occupier within 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, s. 19.

NOT TENANT.

liar. (1) The minister does not appear to have been required to reside in the house; (2) it was not the house of the stewards; (3) he actually paid the rent to the landlord. (See remarks of Willes, J., in the following case.)

White v. Bayley (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 227. Plaintiff appointed librarian and storekeeper on these terms, inter alia: that the person to be appointed should have premises, rent and taxes free, in a good situation; that £35 per cent. should be allowed to the storekeeper on all books sold out of the shop, but not on donations or subscriptions, he making such arrangements with booksellers, agents of the society, as the committees should from time to time determine. To carry on a retail business in other New Church works and general literature for his own benefit. The society had purchased the lease, which was assigned to trustees for it. Held, that no tenancy existed. In the view of Willes, J., "no tenancy in the premises even to the extent of a tenancy at will ever did vest in the plaintiff." The agreement was one of service, and it made no difference that as a part of the remuneration he was to have liberty to carry on his own retail business. "I can quite conceive a case such as this, where the representatives of a society might go to a person having already a shop where he was carrying on business, and agree with him to become their agent for the sale of their particular publications, and to pay him a certain salary for his services, and in addition to pay the rent and taxes of the premises, and where a question might arise whether by this arrangement an interest in the shop vested in the society. The proper answer in such a case would seem to me to be that it would not."

R. v. Spurrell (1865), L. R.

PARTNER.

Grace v. Smith (1775), 2 W. Bl. 998.

Waugh v. Carver (1793), 2 H. Bl. 235. Two shipping agents agreed to share in certain property, the profits of their respective commissions and discounts on tradesmen's bills; held liable as partners to those with whom either contracted, though the agreement prescribed that neither should be answerable for the acts or losses of the other.

Dry v. Boswell (1808), 1 Camp. 329. Action by B. for work and labour in regard to the repair of a lighter. Ellenborough, C. J., directed the jury, that if R., the sole owner, and B., agreed that the nett profits should be equally divided among them, they were partners in the concern, so as to be liable to third parties; but not so, if the agreement were to give half the gross earnings, that being only a mode of paying wages of labour.

Ex parte Hamper (1811), 17 Ves.

403.

Cheap v. Cramond (1821), 4 B. & Ald. 663. Merchants in London, who became bankrupt, recommended consignments of goods to a house abroad. It was agreed that all commissions on the sales of goods recommended or "influenced" by the one house to the other should be equally divided without allowing a deduction for expenses; the bankrupts were partners quoad hoc with the firm abroad.

Heyhoe v. Burge (1850), 9 C. B. 431. A. and B. agreed "for services performed," to give to C., the defendants, one-fourth part of the clear profits arising from a contract for making a certain railway; C. liable as a partner to third persons.

NOT PARTNER.

Wilkinson v. Frasier (1802),"4 Esp. 182. Action by seaman for wages; contended that he was a partner on the ground that the produce of the voyage was to be divided in certain proportions; not a partner.

Hesketh v. Blanchard (1803), 4 East, 144. A. having neither ready-money nor credit, proposes to B., the plaintiff, that if he will order along with A., certain goods to be shipped on a joint adventure, B. shall have half of any profit for his trouble. B. ordered the goods on their joint account and afterwards paid for them; no partnership between them, though B. as a partner was liable to third

persons.

R. v. Hartley (1807), R. & R. C. C. 139. Defendant employed to take coals from F.'s colliery and sell them; to be paid for the labour by allowing him two-thirds of the difference between the price at which he sold them and the price charged at the colliery; a servant and not a partner.

Mair v. Glennie (1815), 4 M. & S. 240. Mair, owner of a ship, bound on a voyage to Havannah, with a cargo belonging to him. Young, the master of the ship, was party to an agreement with Mair that Young should have in lieu of all wages, primage, &c., one-fifth share of the profit or loss of the intended voyage, and was to follow Mair's instructions.

Geddes v. Wallace (1820), 2 Bligh, 270. The deed of copartnery of a certain company was subscribed by Geddes, who was to have oneseventeenth share without advancing any capital. Article 3 stated that," in the said capital stock the partners shall be interested in the

PARTNER.

Greenham v. Gray (1855), 4 Irish C. L. R. 501. Agreement between plaintiff and defendant to carry on the business of cotton spinners at defendant's mill. Plaintiff to have the full control and management of mill, and to give his whole time to it; to direct all departments; to have the exclusive power of dismissing servants; to be paid for his management, &c., £150, and to receive one-fifth part of the nett profits. Plaintiff and defendant partners.

NOT PARTNER.

profits or loss in the following proportions. . . the said John Geddes, one seventeenth share.” By an agreement referred to in the articles of copartnery, he was to receive £100 besides his seventeenth share of the profit or loss. The House of Lords, looking to the whole of the articles, and to the conduct of the parties, decided that as between him and them, he was not a partner.

Smith v. Watson (1824), 2 B. & C. 401. A., a merchant, bought whalebone through B., a broker. It was agreed that, as remuneration for his trouble, B. should receive one-fourth of the profits arising from the sale, and bear an eighth proportion of the losses. Although B. might be liable to third persons, there was no partnership with A.

Pott v. Eyton (1846), 3 C. B. 32. Eyton's name appeared over door of shop kept by Jones, and he received per-centage of profits; goods purchased in Eyton's name; no evidence of credit given to Eyton; not a partner as to third persons.

Rawlinson v. Clarke (1846), 15 M. & W. 292. Plaintiff sold to defendant his business as a surgeon and apothecary. Plaintiff agreed to continue to reside at his place of business and to carry on the profession as before for a year, and to introduce defendant to his patients. Defendant to allow plaintiff during the year a moiety of the clear profits; the deed did not create a partnership.

Stocker v. Brockelbank (1851), 3 Mac. & G. 250; 20 L. J. Ch. N. S. 401. Agreement between plaintiff and defendant that the plaintiff would serve the said "partners" as "manager," and that the plaintiff should have the conduct and management of the business, and should receive for his services such a sum as would be equal to £40 per cent. upon the nett profits; no partnership existed.