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defendants, besides, had not superintended its working as the plaintiffs had. As to the question of delay, the plaintiffs' solicitor had urged on the completion of the purchase, and the plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled to a specific performance. The only question was, whether the defendants were entitled to an inquiry when the title was first shewn. It was not usual to insert a direction to this effect where the contest was the right to a specific performance, and it was not a contest on the question of title only.

BEYOND NUMBER IN ORIGINAL DEED.

An order was made under the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 32, for the appointment of two additional trustees, although there were only two in the original deed, where the trust property had considerably augmented, and the parties beneficially interested desired such appointment.

G. Lake Russell appeared in support of this petition, praying the appointment of two additional trustees, although only two had been appointed by the deed of settlement, on the ground that the trust funds had considerably augmented, and that the parties beneficially interested were desirous of such appointment.

By the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 32, it is enacted that, "whenever it shall be expedient to appoint a new trustee or new trustees, and it shall be found inexpedient, difficult, or impracticable so to do without the assistance of the Court of Chancery, it shall be lawful for the said Court of Chancery to make an order appointing a new trustee or new trustees, either in substitution for or in addition to any existing trustee or trustees."

The Vice-Chancellor made the order as prayed.

Court of Queen's Bench.
Sprye v. Porter. Nov. 18, 25, 1856.

AGREEMENT MAINTENANCE-CHAMPERTY-
PLEA OF INSOLVENCY.

Where by an agreement the plaintiff and another person agreed to furnish documents in order to establish the defendant's claim to certain property and to supply evidence in support thereof, and if he succeeded in consequence that they should each have one-fifth of the property recovered, and it appeared that proceedings were pending in which the defendant was a claimant: Held, that the agreement was illegal.

Held, also, upon the plaintiff's insolvency, his right of action, if any, passed to his assignees. THE declaration in this action alleged that the plaintiff and one Rosaz were possessed of certain documents and information in their possession, and that the defendant was entitled to certain property in the hands of the Crown, of which he was not aware, and it was proposed that the plaintiff should give up the same to the defendant, and that he and Rozas should receive one-fifth each of the property in case he should, by means of the same, come into possession of the same. An agreement to

this effect was signed, which also contained a provision that the defendant should not be compelled to take any proceedings at law or in equity, that the defendant should not make the documents known without the plaintiff's consent, and that if he did not think proper to take steps for the recovery of the property, he would return them to the plaintiff, and the deed should be cancelled. The defendant pleaded several pleas, setting out the agreement to supply evidence, and also that the work and labour done were in pursuance of an illegal agreement, and that proccedings were pending in court in which the defendant was claimant, and that the parties agreed to maintain the defendant therein. There was also a plea of the plaintiff's insolvency, and that his right of action, if any, passed to his assignees. The case now came on upon demurrer to the pleas.

Bovill and Lush in support; Temple, M. Chambers, H. Hill, and Milward contrà.

Cur. ad. vult.

The Court said there was nothing on the face of the declaration to shew that the agreement was tainted with maintenance and champerty. No authority had been cited to shew that this agreement was illegal. No suit was pending, and the agreement contained no stipulation for commencing any. The plaintiff had the documents, which, it must be assumed, were genuine, and which made out a conclusive title, and the property could be recovered without litigation. There was no agreement to furnish money or evidence, or in any way to maintain the defendant, and it was not vitiated by maintenance or champerty, or as being contrary to public policy. There was, however, the plea setting out the agreement to give such information and evidence as should become necessary, and that if, by means thereof, the defendant should recover the property, the defendant agreed to pay both of the parties onefifth of the property. This shewed that, although they were not to employ an attorney, nor to advance money, they were to supply that on which the event of the suit must depend, viz., evidence. Such an agreement was calculated to lead to perjury and the perversion of justice, and came within the principle of Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369; and the plea setting out that certain proceedings were pending in court, made the case stronger. On the other plea of the plaintiff's insolvency, the defendant was also entitled to judgment.

Judgment accordingly.

In re Benjamin Chandler, gent, one, &c.
Nov. 25, 1856.

ATTORNEY-STRIKING OFF ROLLS, WHERE STRUCK
OFF IN CHANCERY FOR MISCONDUCT.

A rule was made absolute to strike off the Rolls an attorney who had been struck off the Rolls of the Court of Chancery for misconduct, upon an affidavit that such person so struck off was the same person now sought to be removed from the Rolls of this Court.

THIS was a rule nisi granted on November 17 last to strike off the rolls of this court one Benjamin Chandler the Younger, of Sherborne, Dorsetshire, who had been struck off the rolls of the High Court of Chancery for misconduct, by an order of the Master of the Rolls, dated 16th April last. It appeared that he had been admitted an attorney of this

court in Trinity Term, 1842.

The rule was obtained on an affidavit that the person so struck off was the same person as was admitted on the above date.

H. J. Hodgson, for the Incorporated Law Society, in support.

The Court made the rule absolute.

No cause was shown against the rule.*

Queen's Bench Practice Court.

(Coram Crompton, J.)

Exparte Jones. Nov. 22, 1856.

ARTICLED CLERK-SERVICE TO PALATINE ATTORNEY -ADMISSION IN SUPERIOR COURTS.

Application under the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 59, s. 7, granted that the service of an articled clerk to a County Palatine solicitor, and whose articles had been duly enrolled in the Palatine Court, and the duty of £60 paid, should reckon from their execution, in order to his admission in the superior courts, and not from their enrolment, upon payment of the additional duty.

Ir appeared that the applicant, Mr. Theophilus E. Jones, was articled in February, 1852, to an attorney at Manchester, and that his articles were duly enrolled in the Court of Pleas for the County Palatine of Lancaster, and the stamp duty of £60 paid. On Nov. 7 last, the articles were enrolled in this court, and the additional duty was paid. This motion was now made under the 16 & 17 Vic. c. 59, s. 7, that the time of service under the articles might be computed from the date of the articles.

That section enacts that "where any person shall have become bound as a clerk in order to his admission as an attorney or solicitor in any of the courts of the counties palatine by articles or contract stamped with the said duty of £60, then upon payment of such further sum of money as with the said duty of £60 will make up the full stamp duty, which at the date of such articles or contract was payable by law on articles of clerkship in order to admission in any of the courts at Westminster, it shall be lawful for the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, and they are hereby required to stamp the said articles or contract with a stamp or stamps to denote such further duty, and thereupon such articles or contract shall be as valid and effectual for entitling such person to admission in any of the courts at Westminster as if the same had been duly stamped with such full duty in the first instance." Hughes in support.

The Court granted the application.

* A rule obtained on November 17, to strike off Cheslyn Hall, of New Boswell-court, Lincoln's-inn, who was admitted in this court in Hilary Term, 1835, and had been struck off the rolls of the Court of Chancery, by order of the Right Honourable the Vice-Chancellor Sir John Stuart, on June 27, 1856, for misconduct, was also made absolute on Nov. 25 -no cause being shown.

H. J. Hodgson, for the Incorporated Law Society, appeared in support.

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ATTORNEY-MISREPRESENTATION-COSTS OF ACTION -REFUNDING OVERPAYMENT.

The clerk of the plaintiff's attorney, in an action on bills of exchange, had received from the defendant costs for judgment and execution, which he represented untruly to have been signed and issued. It appeared, however, that the attorney himself did not know of such representation, although he received the money. The attorney was ordered to refund the overpayment, and to pay the costs of a rule to answer the matters of affidavits which had been obtained.

THIS was a rule nisi on Mr. Eyre, the plaintiff's attorney in this action on two bills of exchange, under the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67, to answer the matters of the affidavits. It appeared that the defendant, upon being served, had gone to Mr. Eyre's office, when he was informed by a clerk that judgment had been signed and execution issued, whereas such was not the case, and the defendant paid £5 10s. on this representation.

Phipson shewed cause against the rule, which was supported by Macnamara.

The Court said that the clerk had received the sum in excess of what he was entitled, but it did not appear that the matter was brought home to the knowledge of the attorney. Under these circumstances, the rule would be discharged upon repay

ment of such excess and the costs of this rule.

Court of Exchequer.

Legg v. Tucker. Nov. 25, 1856.

ACTION FOR DAMAGES TO HORSE-CONTRACT-TORT -COUNTY COURT ACT-COSTS.

Held, that an action on the case to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff's horse, which he had delivered to the defendant, a livery stable keeper, to be taken care of in a separate stall, and which had sustained such injuries by being put in with other horses, is an action of contract and not in tort.

Where, therefore, a less sum than £20 was recovered, held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to costs under the 13 & 14 Vic. c. 61, s. 11.

THIS was an action on the case to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff's horse, which he had delivered to the defendant, a livery and bait stable keeper, to be taken care of in a separate stall. It appeared that the horse was put in a stall with other horses and sustained the injuries in question. The defendant pleaded not guilty, and on the trial before Martin, B., the plaintiff obtained a verdict with £7 damages. Judgment for the costs having been entered on the postea this rule nisi was obtained to strike out so much as awarded such costs. Lush shewed cause.

The Court (without calling on Prentice in support) said that the action was substantially for a breach of contract, and that as the verdict was for a less sum than £20, the plaintiff was, under the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 11, not entitled to costs, and the rule was accordingly made absolute.

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Fraudulent transfer-Sale of goods under market value-Act of bankruptcy.—A sale by a trader of his goods at prices considerably below their market value is not of itself a fraudulent transfer within the 67th section of the Bankrupt Act, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. To render the transaction fraudulent within

that act the seller must have intended by such sale to defeat or delay his creditors, and the purchaser

must have had reason to know that such was the object of the seller.

Therefore where a trader from time to time during several months sold his goods to the defendant at prices from £40 to £50 per cent. less than he paid for them and afterwards became bankrupt, Held, in the Exchequer Chamber, that it was properly left to the jury to say whether the dealings between the defendant and the bankrupt were real sales by the bankrupt to the defendant, each endeavouring to make the best bargain he could for himself, and, if so, such sales were not an act of bankruptcy as fraudulent transfers. Lee v. Hart, 10 Exch. 555; 11 Exch. 880.

BOND.

As to mode of carring on trade-Validity of-Restraint of trade.-A bond was made by eighteen persons, in which each obligor was described as a cotton-spinner of W. or of H., and by which each was bound to plaintiff in a separate sum of £500. The condition recited that the obligors were respectively owners of spinning mills in W. and H., and employed in them many workpeople; that there were societies and combinations among divers persons, whereby persons otherwise willing to be employed were deterred by fear of social persecution and other injuries from hiring themselves to work, and whereby the legal control of the obligors of their property was injuriously interfered with; that these combinations were sustained by funds arbitrarily levied and extorted by way of tax or rate on the persons employed by and receiving wages from the obligors; and in the opinion of the obligors it had become necessary to take measures for vindicating their legal rights to the control of their property, which would also best sustain the rights of the labourer to the free disposal of his skill aud industry: therefore the obligors had agreed to carry on their works, in regard to the

amount of wages, the times of the engagement of workpeople, the hour of work, the suspending of work and the general discipline and management of their works, in conformity to law for twelve calendar months in conformity with the resolutions of a majority of the obligors present at any meeting to be convened; that for the purpose of carrying the agreement into effect the obligors entered into the bond; and the condition was that, if the obligors, for twelve calendar months, should carry on or wholly or partially suspend carrying on their works in regard to the matters aforesaid in conformity with the resolutions of a majority of the obligors present at a meeting to be held as mentioned, then the bond as to each person so performing to be void; and the days, place, and other circumstances of the proposed meeting were set out; the obligor to hold the money recovered in trust for all the obligors; with power for a majority of the obligors present to release the obligors from performance.

An action being brought on this bond against one of the obligors, he, by plea, set out the bond and condition and alleged that there was no consideration except as appeared by the condition.

On demurrer to the plea :

Held, by Lord Campbell, C. J., and Crompton, J., (dissentiente Erle, J.) that the bond was void as being in restraint of trade; and judgment was given in the Queen's Bench for defendant.

Judgment affirmed in Exchequer Chamber. Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 Ellis and B. 47, 48.

Transfer of shares-Registering-Calls—Indemnity to transferor. The plaintiff, the owner of 500 shares in a cost-book mine, according to the rules of which the person registered as owner in the cost-book was subject to the payment of calls in respect of the shares so long as he continued registered as the owner, sold his shares to the defendant, and delivered to him a document addressed to the secretary of the mine, by which the plaintiff requested the secretary to enter a transfer of the shares from his name to that of the transferee, subject to the rules, but leaving a blank for the name of the transferee to be filled up by the holder of the document which also contained at the foot an agreement on the part of the transferee to accept the shares subject to the rules, with a blank also left for the name of the party so agreeing. The defendant did not cause the shares to be registered in his name; and the plaintiff in consequence of his name being continued in the costbook as the owner was compelled to pay some subsequent calls.

Excessive, for arrears of rent-Right of action Tender-Replevin.-A declaration alleged that the plaintiff held certain premises as tenant thereof to the defendant, and that the defendant wrongfully distrained upon the premises certain goods of the plaintiff, as a distress for alleged arrears of rent, to wit, the sum of £6 3s., by the defendant then pretended to be due and in arrear; and the defendant wrongfully remained in possession of the said goods under colour of the said distress until the plaintiff was compelled to pay, and did pay, to the defendant the pretended arrears of rent and costs of the distress,

in order to regain possession of the goods; whereas, in truth, a small part only, to wit, £1 16s. 9d., of the said pretended arrears was due: Held, in the Exchequer Chamber, that the count disclosed no cause of action, for, as the distress was lawful, the defendant was entitled to a tender of the amount really due, and upon his refusal to accept that sum the plaintiff's course was to replevy the goods. Crompton, J., dissentiente. Glynn v. Thomas, 11 Exch. 870.

Dilapidations-Exchange of livings-Simony.To a declaration by A. an incoming against B. an outgoing incumbent for dilapidations to the rectory house and premises, B. pleaded that A. being rector of C. and B. incumbent of D., it was agreed between them with the consent of their respective patrons and diocesans, that they should exchange their respective livings in their then state and condition, and that the plaintiff should not call upon the defendant to pay for the repairs in the declaration mentioned or for any or either of them: Held, by

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the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas that the plea did not necessarily disclose a simoniacal contract. Goldham v. Edwards, 18 Com. B. 389.

INDEMNITY.

See Cost-book mine.

INSOLVENT.

Trover by assignee-Conversion-Evidence-Warrant of attorney-Fraudulent preference.-Trover by the assignee of F., an insolvent debtor for a conversion in the time of the insolvent. Pleas amongst others, Not guilty and a plea justifying the conversion, as being a seizure under a fi. fa. issued before the insolvency on a judgment against F. in favour of the defendant. Replication that F., within three circumstances, with a view of petitioning the court, months before his imprisonment, being in insolvent fraudulently charged his estate in favour of defendant being a creditor by a warrant of attorney void within stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 59, and that the judgment was on that warrant of attorney. Issue was taken plaintiff on all the issues; and he had judgment. on the replication. The verdict was found for the Error was brought on the record, and also on a bill it appeared that the judgment was on a warrant of of exceptions, which set forth the evidence. By this attorney, voluntarily given with a view of petitioning the court, and that defendant had disposed of the goods seized before the insolvency. The judge ruled that this was evidence of a conversion, to which ruling there was an exception.

Held, by Jervis, C. J., Alderson, B., Cresswell, J., and Martin, B., with whom Sir W. Maule, before his retirement from the Bench, agreed, that the warrant of attorney was under stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 59, wholly void and not merely voidable, that the assignee might sue and that trover for a conversion of F.'s goods before the insolvency was a proper form of action; that therefore the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench was right and the ruling unexceptionable.

Held, by Williams, J., and Crowder, J., with whom Lord Wensleydale, before his retirement from the Bench, agreed, that the warrant of attorney was not absolutely void but valid until the assignee elected to avoid it. That there was consequently no wrongful conversion before the insolvency, and that the plaintiff, if entitled to recover at all, could not recover in trover; and that there ought to be a venire de novo on the bill of exceptions on the ruling as to not insufficiency of the replication to the special plea. guilty and judgment non obstante veredicto on the

On the bill of exceptions it appeared that the plaintiff had tendered in evidence an adjudication of the Insolvent Court discharging F. after he had been in custody for one year, and had proved that immediately afterwards he was allowed to go free by the defendant, who was his only detaining creditor. The defendant's counsel offered to admit that such an order was made, but objected to its being read. The judge ruled that it might be read; to which the defendant excepted. It was read; and it stated the detainer for a year to be on the ground that the warrant of attorney was a fraudulent preference.

Held, by the whole Court, that the adjudication was admissible, not as evidence of the truth of the ground on which it purported to be made, but because that adjudication, followed by the immediate discharge of F., was evidence of defendant's complicity with F., and that the plaintiff was not bound to take the defendant's admission of its effect.