A.-Copyhold estates, leases at rack rent, and leases not exceeding twenty-one years, where the actual possession and occupation go along with the lease; also Chambers in Serjeants' Inn, the Inns of Court and Chancery, are exempted: (see Sug. Conc. V. 581.) (a)

Q.-In a register county is it necessary that the memorial of a deed should be executed by the granting party, and attested by one of the witnesses to the execution of the deed by a granting party, or can the deed be duly registered without either, and which, of these formalities?

A.-It is not absolutely necessary that the memorial should be executed by a granting party; it may be under the hand and seal of the grantor or grantee, &c.; but it is necessary that one of the witnesses who attested the execution of the deed must also attest the memorial: (Sug. Conc. V. 579.)

Q.-Is it necessary that a deed of appointment under a power of a valuable leasehold interest should be registered or not?

A. It is necessary that it should be registered, unless it comes within the exceptions above stated: (Sug. Conc. V. 577; Scrafton v. De Quincey, 2 Ves. 413.)

Q.-Will a person buying an estate in a register county, with notice of a prior incumbrance not registered, be bound by such incumbrance ?

A. Yes, he will be bound by it: for if he has notice he has got all the Act intended to supply: (St. Eq. § 497.)

Q.-If deeds relate to estates in a register county, when should such deeds be registered, and what would be the consequence from delay in doing so?

A. As no time is limited by the Registry Acts for registering deeds, they should be registered immediately after execution where the deeds relate to estates in a register county; because, if a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration register first, and without notice of the prior conveyance, the subsequent purchaser or mortgagee would prevail over the first vendee or mortgagee: (see Sug. Conc. V. 577.)

Q.-Is the non-registry of a lease cured by registering an assignment in which the lease is recited, or not?

A. The registering of the assignment in which the lease is recited does not cure the non-registry of the lease: (Sug. Conc. V. 578.)

Q. In a register county, where the vendor of real estate is both heirat-law and devisee, is it material that the will should be registered, and is it material if he should be devisee only ?

A. If the vendor is both heir-at-law and devisee, registration of the will is immaterial; for, if he sell to any subsequent purchaser, it must be either in the character of heir-at-law or in the character of devisee. If he sell in this character, the second purchaser must have notice of the will; if he contract in that, the first purchaser has already procured the legal estate. But if the vendor be devisee only, the will should be regis

(a) The city of London is not within the county of Middlesex for registration purposes.

tered: (1 Sug. V. & P. 550, 9th edit. ; see 37 & 38 Vict. c. 78, s. 8, ante, p. 324, if the will is not registered in due time.)

Q.-If a vendor claim leasehold estate in a register county as executor or legatee, can a purchaser from him insist upon the will being registered in either case? And state a reason.

A.-It seems clear that, if the vendor of leasehold estate is either executor or legatee, the purchaser need not insist upon the will being registered, because no subsequent purchaser can procure a title without notice of the will: (see 1 Sug. V. & P., ubi sup.)

Q.-If an estate lie in a register county, is a purchaser in any and what cases entitled that a will should be registered?

A.-If an estate lie in a register county, a purchaser from a devisee should not complete his contract till the will is duly registered, unless the vendor be both heir-at-law and devisee, or the estate is leasehold and the seller is either executor or legatee, or the term is expired: (see 37 & 38 Vict. c. 78, sup. ; see Sug., ubi sup.)

Q. What kind or description of deeds require enrolment to give them validity; and within what period from their date and execution must they be enrolled?

A.-A bargain and sale of freehold requires enrolment to give it validity, which enrolment must be made within six months (which means lunar months) from the date, in one of the courts of record at Westminster, &c.: (27 Hen. 8, c. 16.) A disentailing assurance must also be enrolled in Chancery within six calendar months after execution: (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 41.) So conveyances under the Statute of Mortmain must be enrolled within six months from their execution: (9 Geo. 2, c. 36.)

Q.-What would be the consequence of the omission to enrol a bargain and sale within the proper time?

A. The omission to enrol the deed within the proper time will render it inoperative: (2 Hughes' Pract. Sales, 159, 2nd edit.; Hughes' Conv. 189.)

Q.-In what case is enrolment essential to the validity of a grant of an annuity for life or lives?

A. It is now no longer necessary to enrol them in any case, as the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90, repealed the statute which required their enrolment. But if registered in a similar manner to a judgment, they are a charge on the lands in the hands of the purchaser thereof: (see 18 Vict. c. 15, s. 12.) Annuities given by will or settlement, however, are exempted from this Act (sect. 14; and see Hughes' Conv. 164.)

Q.-State the general effect of the statute 27 Hen. 8, c. 16, called the Statute of Enrolment, and to what species of deed it applies.

A. This statute requires every bargain and sale of any estate of inheritance or freehold to be made by deed indented, and enrolled within six months from the date in one of the courts of record at Westminster, or before the custos rotulorum and two justices of the peace and the clerk of the peace for the county in which the lands lie, or two of them at least,

whereof the clerk of the peace should be one: (see Will. R. P. 187, 13th edit.)

SETTLEMENTS.

Question. What is understood by the term voluntary settlement? Answer.-Conveyances or settlements made without any consideration whatever, or even those made for good, though not for valuable consideration, are said to be voluntary: (see 1 St. C. 495, 8th edit.; St. Eq. § 425, &c.; Hughes' Conv. 601.)

Q. What are the different kinds of consideration to support a voluntary settlement or conveyance?

A. The consideration known as a good consideration will support a voluntary conveyance as between the parties themselves (St. Eq. § 426, &c.); although not as against purchasers or mortgagees for value, or creditors (13 Eliz. c. 5; 27 Eliz. c. 4; Twyne's case, 1 Sm. L. C. 1.) A covenant by the voluntary grantee to discharge mortgage debts, &c., on the estate, is a sufficient consideration to take the grant out of the 27 Eliz. c. 4: (Townsend v. Toker, 11 L. T. Rep. N. S. 531, L.JJ.)

Q.-Is a voluntary settlement good against a purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration with notice of such settlement? (a)

A. The settlement is void as against a purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, although he has notice of it: (see 27 Eliz. c. 4; Goodright v. Moses, 1 Bl. 1019; Sug. Conc. V. 566.)

But if a purchaser has notice of a gift to a charitable use he takes subject to it, though, if he has no notice, he will have the same protection as in the case of an ordinary voluntary conveyance: (Sm. Man. sect. 195.)

Q.-Is a purchaser for a good consideration from a voluntary grantee in a better situation as to title than the voluntary grantee?

A. He is not. His title may still be defeated by a sale to a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration: (see Doe d. Newman v. Rusham, 21 L. J., N. S. 139, Q. B.; Humphreys v. Pensam, 1 Myl. & Cr. 580.)

Q.-A father made a voluntary conveyance of land to his son John, subject to his own life interest, and afterwards made a like voluntary conveyance of the same land to his son William, who forthwith sold his reversion for valuable consideration to a purchaser. Who will take the land on the father's death, and why?

A.-A voluntary conveyance is binding on the grantor and on all persons claiming under him, other than purchasers for value. Hence, after the father had conveyed to John, he had no estate left in him which he could convey to anyone but a purchaser; and as nothing, therefore, passed to William, his purchaser could be in no better position, and John takes the estate: (2 Prid. Conv. 192, 9th edit.)

(a) Also asked thus: A., an owner in fee simple, makes a voluntary settlement of his real property. He subsequently sells and conveys a portion for valuable consideration to a purchaser with notice of the settlement. Which will hold good-the settlement or the conveyance? Give reasons.

Q.-Will a voluntary settlement of all, or which, of the following classes of property be void as against a subsequent purchaser for value, viz. :-(a) real estate; (b) chattels real: (c) pure personalty?

A. (a) Under the 27 Eliz. c. 4, this would be void. (b) And this statute extends to chattels real: (Co. Litt. 3 b; 6 Rep. 72. See Price v. Jenkins, L. Rep. 4 Ch. Div. 483; Ex parte Hillman, 10 Ch. Div. 622.) (c) This settlement would be good, as the statute does not apply to pure personalty: (2 My. & Keen, 512.)

Q.-A. seised in fee of an estate, and wishing to provide for B., conveys it to trustees by voluntary settlement upon trust for himself for life, with remainder to the use of B. and his heirs, and without reserving any power of revocation; he quarrels with B. and wishes to revoke the settlement. Can he do so, and if he can, how can he do it? And have the trustees of the settlement any duty in the matter?

A.-A. cannot revoke the settlement, but he may defeat it by conveying to a bona fide purchaser for value: (27 Eliz. c. 4.) The trustees in the case put are mere conduit pipes, and have no interest or duty whatever.

Q.-Under what circumstances does a voluntary conveyance cease to be a flaw in a title ?

A. When the voluntary grantee conveys to a bona fide purchaser for value; or if a person is induced to marry the voluntary grantee, on account of the settlement: (Sug. Conc. V. 569; Prodgers v. Langham, 1 Sid. 133.)

Q.-So far as a voluntary settlement is voidable under the statute of Elizabeth, state under what circumstances of indebtedness, and in respect of its existing at the time or arising subsequently, such a settlement is liable to be set aside; and does the law extend to a settlement of personal as well as real estate ?

A.-All voluntary settlements made by one who, at the time, or shortly afterwards is indebted to such an amount that he has not sufficient to pay his debts, are, by the 13 Eliz. c. 5, void as against such creditors: (2 Sm. Comp. 839, 840, 4th edit.; Barling v. Bishop, 2 L. T. Rep. N. S. 651; Ware v. Gardner, L. Rep. 7 Eq. 137.)

The Act speaks of "lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods and chattels " (s. 1), and it seems that "goods and chattels " now include all kinds of personal property: (Will. P. P. 337, 10th edit.)

Q.-In what case can or cannot a settlement of land made after marriage upon a wife and children be set aside ?

A.-If the settlement be made in pursuance of articles entered into prior to the marriage, it will be as binding as if made before marriage, and cannot be set aside in favour of purchasers or creditors, for marriage is a valuable consideration. But if not so made it is a mere voluntary settlement, and may, as above stated, be set aside in favour of creditors (a)

(a) Under certain circumstances future creditors are within the 13 Eliz. c. 5: (see Barling v. Bishop, 2 L. T. Rep. 651; Ware v. Gardner, L. Rep. 7 Eq. 317.) In order to entitle a creditor of a living debtor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance under the 13 Eliz. c. 5, it is not necessary that the creditor should have any lien or charging order on the property comprised in the conveyance; but in the absence of such lien

and of bona fide purchasers, &c.: (13 Eliz. c. 5; 27 Eliz. c. 4; 2 Prid. Conv. 192, 9th edit.) (a) If the settlor be a trader and becomes bankrupt the settlement is void under the circumstances stated in note suprà and in next answer.

Q.-In what case will a voluntary settlement be void as against the creditors of the settlor? And is there any and what difference in this

respect between the case of a trader and a non-trader?

A.-First. Under 13 Eliz. c. 5, as against creditors at the time, if made when in insolvent circumstances, or with a view to insolvency.

Second. Under sect. 47 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, any voluntary settlement of property, unless of his wife's property, shall, if the settlor become bankrupt within two years after the date of the settlement, be void against the trustee of the bankrupt; and if the settlor become bankrupt at any subsequent time within ten years it shall also be void against such trustee, unless the parties claiming under the settlement can prove that the settlor was at the time of making the settlement able to pay all his debts without the aid of the property comprised in the settlement, and that the interest of the settlor in such property had passed to the trustee of such settlement on the execution thereof. There is now no difference between a trader and a non-trader, but the corresponding provision of the old law was confined to traders: (see sect. 91 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869.) As to policies effected after marriage for benefit of wife, husband, or children, see sect. 11 of Married Women's Property Act, 1882.

Q. What is understood by " uses in strict settlement?"

A.-When estates are limited to the use of the parent for life, and after his death to the use of his first and other sons successively in tail, the uses are said to be in strict settlement: (1 St. C. 328, 8th edit.)

Q.-To what extent can real property be settled without violating the rule against perpetuities?

A. During the existence of a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years after. It may, therefore, be settled upon an unborn child, but not upon the child of an unborn child: (Cadell v. Palmer, Tud. L. C. Con. 321; Will. R. P. 52, 13th edit.)

Q.-State and explain the laws against perpetuity. How is the duration of powers of sale and exchange attached to the settlements governed by these laws?

A. The policy of the law is now in favour of the free disposition of all kinds of property, and, as it allows estates tail to be barred, so it will not permit the object of an entail to be accomplished by other means, any further than can be done by giving estates to the unborn children of

the court will not apply the property in satisfaction of the creditor's claim. And it seems an action to set aside such a conveyance ought to be on behalf of all the creditors of the debtor: (Reese River Silver Mining Company v. Atwell, L. Rep. 7 Eq. 347.) (a) But care must be taken to distinguish between a mere voluntary conveyance and a purchase taken in the name of the purchaser's wife and children, the latter of which is not considered to be within the meaning of the 27 Eliz. c. 4, and therefore cannot be defeated by a subsequent bonâ fide purchaser for valuable consideration: (Sug. Conc. V. 567.)