whatever age, with necessaries when the children are in poverty, or when through infancy, disease, or poverty, they are unable to support themselves. And very slight circumstances will be sufficient to raise, on action brought, the presumption of a contract on the part of the parent to pay for necessaries provided to his infant children: (2 St. C. 292, 8th edit.) Prior to the Elementary Education Act (33 & 34 Vict. c. 75) parents could not be compelled to provide education for their children; but this Act has rendered the attendance of children at school compulsory.

Q.-Can a minor sue or be sued on a breach of a promise to marry ? State the reasons for your answer.

A. He cannot be so sued, although he or she may sue a person of full age on such breach; for it is a general rule that infancy is a personal privilege, of which no one can take advantage but the infant; and that therefore, though the infant may avoid the contract, it shall bind the adult party (Chit. Cont. 154, 11th edit.)(a)

Q.-Is an infant liable on a warranty of a horse sold by him if the horse is unsound?

A.-No; for it is a breach of duty arising out of contract: (see Chit. Cont. 148, 11th edit.; and see Burnard v. Haggis, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 320.)

Q. Can an infant ratify a contract made by him during infancy on his coming of age? Give a reason for your answer.

A.-Sect. 2 of the Infants' Relief Act, 1874, now provides that no action shall be brought upon any ratification made after full age of any promise or contract made during infancy, whether there shall or shall not be any new consideration therefor. See Coxhead v. Mullis (47 L. J. 76, C. P.); and Ditcham v. Worrall (49 L. J. 688, Q. B.), where it was held that a contract to marry is within the Act, and is incapable of ratification after full age. (b)

Q-Against whom should an action be brought for a debt contracted by a married woman before her marriage? and state what restriction, if any, there is to the liability of a husband to the debts of his wife contracted before marriage. And what is the effect if she dies before action brought?

A. If the marriage took place before the 9th August, 1870 (if after, see next answer), the action must be brought against husband and wife; for during the coverture the husband is liable jointly with his wife upon all the contracts entered into by her before the marriage, however improvident, even if he had no fortune with her. But upon her death he is no longer liable as husband; and unless he administer to her choses in action not reduced into possession in her lifetime, he cannot be sued at all; if

(a) This question is answered by the above: Can any other party to a contract except an infant take advantage of infancy to defend an action on the contract?

(b) Ratification was of two kinds, according to the kind of contract entered into. Some contracts were valid unless rescinded, others invalid until ratified. It can hardly be supposed that such an implied ratification as continuance in a partnership or retention of shares would be affected by the provisions of the section (see Anson, Contracts, 2nd edit., pp. 108, 110).

he administer, however, he will be liable to the amount of the sums received by him on account of the choses in action, but not further, even though he received a large property with his wife: (Chit. Cont. 157, 11th edit.)

Q.-Is a man liable to be sued for debts of his wife contracted before marriage? Has any and what alteration in the law on this point been recently made?

A.—He is liable as above stated unless the marriage took place between the 9th August, 1870, and 30th July, 1874, when, by the 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93, s. 12, he is not liable for the debts of his wife contracted before marriage. The wife, however, may be sued, and her separate estate is liable, and now by 37 & 38 Vict. c. 50, if married after the 30th July, 1874, he is liable to the extent that assets of the wife have or might have come to his hands; and by 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 14, if married after the 31st December, 1882, to the extent of all property whatsoever belonging to his wife which he shall have acquired or become entitled to from or through his wife.

Q.—If a man marry a woman to whom he is indebted, and to whom he has given a security for the debt, what becomes of the debt and of the security; and how can this be prevented?

A.-At law, and in equity also, as a rule, the debt and security were discharged by the marriage. To prevent this the debt should, before the marriage, be assigned to trustees for the separate use of the wife, free from the control of the husband, and the security should be deposited with the trustees: (Co. Lit. 264 b.; St. Eq. §§ 1370, 1371.) If married after 1882 this will be unnecessary: (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 2.)

Q. When is a husband liable for the debts of his wife contracted during coverture, and upon what principle; and in what case is he not liable?

A.—He is liable upon his wife's contract for necessaries suitable to his station in life, upon the principle of her being his agent, if they be living together; unless indeed the particular tradesman had notice not to trust her. And he is in general liable for necessaries even after a separation, if no provision be made for her, though the tradesman has notice not to trust her.

But if the wife depart from her husband against his will, and without sufficient excuse, or if she is dismissed by him for adultery, the husband incurs no such liability. Nor, if husband and wife are living separate, and he pays her a sufficient sum for her maintenance, even if the tradesman did not know of such allowance: (see Manby v. Scott, 2 Sm. L. C.; Montague v. Benedict, ib.; Seaton v. Benedict, ib., and notes thereto; 2 St. Č. 268 et seq.; 8th edit.) (a)

Q. How can the presumption involved in this principle be rebutted? A. The presumption may be rebutted by proof that he had forbidden her to take up goods on his credit (Jolly v. Rees, 33 L.J. 177, C.P.), or

(a) This question is answered by the above: Upon what principle does the liability of the husband upon his wife's contract rest, and in what case may a wife be regarded as the general agent of the husband?

that although he saw some of the goods which his wife had ordered, he disapproved of her conduct in ordering them; or by showing that the wife was already sufficiently provided with clothes, so that there was no necessity for her ordering the goods in question, and no implied authority from her husband to order them: (Chit. Cont. 162, 11th edit.)

Q.-Does it make any difference, or not, as to the husband's liability for necessaries supplied to his wife, if he be an infant at the time?

A.--A husband is liable for necessaries supplied to his wife, although he be an infant at the time: (Turner v. Trisby, 1 Str. 168; Chit. Cont. 142, 11th edit.)

Q.—Is a wife's authority to order necessaries revoked by the death of her husband, although at the time of the order the wife and tradesman were ignorant of the death of the husband?

A. Yes; for as the wife's power to bind her husband is founded on the presumption of authority, it follows that the husband's death revokes her authority; and she then ceases to have power to bind his estate in futuro: (Smout v. Ilberry, 10 M. & W. 1; Chit. Cont. 163, 11th edit.)

Q.-A butcher supplies A. with meat. A. goes abroad, leaving his wife (who had always conducted his house) at home; and, shortly after, dies. The butcher does not hear of his death for two months, but continues to supply the house. At A.'s death the butcher's bill was 201. Two months after, no payment having been made, it was 301. What are the butcher's rights, and against whom?

A.-In Smout v. Ilberry (10 M. & W. 1) it was held in a similar case to this that neither the husband's estate, nor the wife personally, would be liable for the goods supplied after the death. The butcher's claim would therefore be limited to the 201., and he might bring an action against the executor or administrator to recover that amount. If, however, the wife knew of the death, she would make herself personally liable for the remainder.

Q. When a husband wrongfully turns away his wife, and gives notice in the newspapers not to trust her, is he liable to tradesmen for necessaries supplied to her?

A.-The husband is still liable; for the tradesmen are considered as standing in the place of the wife and enforcing indirectly her right to be maintained: (Selw. Nisi Prius, 294, 11th edit.; Chit. Cont. 170, 11th edit.)

Q.-What rights as to property have been conferred by recent legislation upon wives deserted by their husbands, and how may they be secured?

A. By the Divorce Act, the wife may apply to a police magistrate (if one), or to justices at petty sessions, or to the Divorce Court, for an order to protect any money or property she becomes possessed of after such desertion (a) against her husband and his creditors, &c. And if the order

(a) This does not protect property acquired after the desertion by immoral practices: (Mason v. Mitchell, 3 H. & C. 528.)

be made such money or property belongs to the wife as if she were a feme sole. The order must, unless made by the court, be entered within ten days after with the registrar of the proper County Court. If the husband (or his creditors, &c.) seize and hold the property after notice of the order, he is liable to restore the property, and pay double its value: (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21.)(a)

Q-Name the contracts required by the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds to be in writing.

A.-In the following cases the 4th section of this statute requires that there shall be some note or memorandum of the agreement in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith, or his lawful agent, before any action can be brought upon the agreement:

1. Where an executor or administrator promises to answer damages out of his own estate.

2. Where a person undertakes to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another.

3. Where any agreement is made upon consideration of marriage.

4. Where any contract is made of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest therein.

5. Where there is any agreement that is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof: (29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4; 2 St. C. 54, 8th edit.)

Q.—When a simple contract is required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, or is reduced into writing by the parties, is it necessary that the consideration should appear on the agreement, or may it be supplied by parol testimony?

A.-It is necessary-except in the case of a guarantee, a bill of exchange, or a promissory note-that the consideration should appear on the face of the written contract, and it cannot be supplied by parol testimony, and this whether the agreement is required to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds or not; for the whole of the agreement must be contained in the writing: (Chit. Cont. 64, 11th edit.; Wain v. Warlters, 2 Sm. L. C. 251; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 3. But see Egerton v. Matthews, 6 East, 307.)

Q-Can an action be maintained on a verbal contract for a year's service to commence from a day subsequent to the making of the contract? Would it make any difference if the year were to commence from the making of the contract?

A.-In the first case given no action lies; as contracts which cannot be performed within a year from the making cannot be sued upon unless in writing signed by the party to be charged, or his lawful agent: (29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4; Peter v. Compton, 1 Sm. L. C. 351; Chit. Cont. 71, 11th edit.) The latter case is not within the statute, and, therefore, an action may be brought: (Peter v. Compton, sup., in notes; Chit. sup.)

Q.-Are these agreements respectively valid or not?

(a) An agreement to sell one hundred tons of oil" without anything to show what kind of oil is intended.

(a) See also stats. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, ss. 7-10; 27 & 28 Vict. c. 44.

(b) An agreement by a dealer in palm oil only, to sell "one hundred tons of oil."

A. In the first case the agreement would not be valid, it being uncertain what description of oil was the subject-matter of the contract; in the last it would be otherwise, as the agreement must be understood to refer to that oil in which the party solely dealt, viz., palm oil; but there is no direct authority on the point.

Q.-State some of the maxims by which contracts are construed or expounded.

A.-1. All contracts are construed according to the intention of the parties. 2. The construction should be liberal. 3. It should be favourable. 4. The contract should, in general, be construed according to the law of the country where made. 5. The construction is taken most strongly against the contractor or grantor. 6. Oral testimony cannot be given to vary, but may to explain, a written contract: (see Chit. Cont. 72, et seq., 11th edit.)

Q.-What is the general rule as to the law according to which contracts are expounded? If a contract to be performed in a foreign country be made in England, according to the law of which country will it be construed?

A.-Contracts are generally expounded according to the law of the country where they are made (lex loci contractus), except where the parties at the time of making the contract had a view to a different kingdom, for contracts are also to be considered according to the place where they are to be executed. A contract to be performed in a foreign country would be construed according to the law of that country (lex loci solutionis): (Chit. Cont. 92 et seq., 11th edit.; see P. and O. Co. v. Shand, 3 Moo. P. C. N. S. 272.)

Q.-Explain the meaning of the maxim Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur, and give an instance of its application.

A.-The maxim means that the subsequent assent or recognition of a person for whom another professes to act is equivalent to a previous authority. Thus, where A. and B. were jointly interested in a quantity of oil, and A. entered into a contract for the sale of it without the authority or knowledge of B., who upon receiving information of the circumstance refused to be bound by it, but afterwards assented, and samples of the oil were delivered to the vendees, it was held that B.'s subsequent ratification of the contract rendered it binding upon him: (Chit. Con. 16, 11th edit.)

Q.-Will a moral obligation be sufficient to support an express promise where no legal liability ever existed?

A.-No; courts of law do not take upon themselves to enforce moral obligations where no legal liability ever existed: (see Beaumont v. Reeve, 8 Q. B. 483; Chit. Cont. 37, 11th edit.)

Q. Can you question the legality of a consideration to a contract under seal?

A.—Although, as a general rule, a contract when under seal is binding