gency such an injunction may be moved for ex parte even after the defendants have appeared. (q)

568. In general it is no objection to the issuing of the injunction, that irreparable mischief is not shown to result from the proceeding of the company against which the party prays by his bill to be relieved. (r) But where the company are lawfully in possession of property, there it seems a case must be made of sudden grievous injury to the inheritance to entitle the reversioner to an injunction. (s) Where, indeed, it is shown that irreparable mischief is likely to result from permitting the company to go on with what they are about, that may be a ground for an injunction, even where the question as to the extent of the company's power is doubtful. (1)

569. Laches, or an express or implied acquiesence in the proceedings of the company, which induces a change in the company's position, may have the effect of depriving a party of his remedy by injunction. (u)

(q) Bell v. Hull and Selby Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 623, 624, and cases there cited.

(r) River Dun Navigation Company v. North Midland Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 135.

(s) Mouchet v. Great Western Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 567.

(t) See judgment of Vice-Chancellor in Bell v. Hull and Selby Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 632.

(u) Illingworth v. Manchester and Leeds Railway Company, 2 Railw. Cas. 187; Attorney-General v. Manchester and Leeds Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 436; Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Navigation, 1 My. & K. 154; Innocent v. North Midland Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 256; Gordon v. Cheltenham and Great Western Railway Company, 2 Railw. Cas. 800, 872; S. C. 5 Beav. 229; London and Brighton Railway

570. In general, on an application for an injunetion, the court acts only prospectively and with a view to keep matters in statu quo; though, where the circumstances render it requisite, it would seem to be competent for the court to grant an injunction restraining the company from allowing a thing to continue, and thereby indirectly compelling them to do some positive act for its removal. (x) Acquiescence, however, by the complainant in the acts of the company against which he seeks relief, may prevent the court from granting an injunction of the latter description. (y)

571. Sometimes the court is content to withhold an injunction, and in lieu thereof to accept of the company's undertaking touching their future proceedings, where this latter course promises to secure to the complainant all the substantial results of the former. (z) An undertaking thus entered into with

Company v. Blake, 2 Railw. Cas. 322; Company of Proprietors of Northam Bridge, &c. v. London and Southampton Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 681; see also Greenhalgh v. Manchester and Birmingham Railway Company, 3 M. & W. 784.

(x) Spencer v. The London and Birmingham Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 170; Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 192; see also Attorney-General v. Manchester and Leeds Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 451; but see Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Company, 1 Myl. & K. 184. In the Great North of England, &c. Railway Company v. Clarence Railway Company, 1 Coll. 507, an injunction was granted, in effect compelling a railway company to pull down walls which they had built in order to prevent another railway company from crossing their line.

(y) See Attorney-General v. Manchester and Leeds Railway Company, ubi supra.

(*) Attorney-General v. Manchester and Leeds Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 451; Jones v. Great Western Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 684; Proprietors of Northam Bridge, &c. v

a court of equity is equivalent to and has the effect of an injunction so far that any infringement thereof may be made the subject of an application to the court. (a) Where, in violation of an undertaking thus entered into, the company apply to parliament for leave to bring in a bill which may relieve them from the necessity of a compliance with such undertaking, still if the House of Commons entertain the bill, the court has no jurisdiction to restrain the company from further soliciting such bill, which is no longer to be viewed as the proceeding of the petitioners, but as that of the legislature. (b)

572. Where the extent of the powers given by the act is doubtful, and involves a question of legal right, the usual course pursued by a court of equity under such circumstances is to put the parties in a situation to try as quickly as possible the legal right, and in the mean time to protect the property to be affected, until the legal right be ascertained. (c) Or if the case be one of Southampton Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 653. And where it appeared that though the company had acted illegally in enter. ing on plantiff's land, yet that it was necessary that immediate steps should be taken to ensure the public safety, the court refused an injunction, but with the consent of the counsel for the company directed the latter to pay into court the probable value' of the land; Tower v. Eastern Counties Railway Company, 3 Railw. Cas. 374.

(a) The London and Birmingham Railway Company v. Grand Junction Canal Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 224, judgment of Master of Rolls.

(b) Attorney-General v. The Manchester and Leeds Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 436.

(c) Kemp v. London and Brighton Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 504; Bell v. Hull and Selby Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 616; Gordon v. Cheltenham Railway Company, 5

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extreme doubt, or the balance of inconvenience preponderates greatly on the side of the company, the court may suspend the injunction till the right is determined at law. (d)

573. After an injunction is granted on any of the grounds above suggested, it is open subsequently to be dealt with by the court, according to the merits of the case, and so as to do substantial justice between the parties. Where therefore an injunction was granted, restraining a company from continuing to stop up a road, it appearing that the road would be restored in a shorter period of time by permitting the company to complete their work, than by enforcing the terms of the order, the injunction was, with the assent of the plaintiffs, suspended for three weeks, to afford time accordingly. (e) And if the court clearly sees that they can secure to the plaintiff all the benefit to which he is entitled, without inflicting on the company so much injury as to continue the injunction, they are ready to listen to an Beav. 240; Attorney-General v. Eastern Counties and Northern and Eastern Counties Railway Companies, 2 Railw. Cas. 823. As to the nature of the order that a court of equity will make for trying the right at law, see Bell v. Hull and Selby Railway Company, ubi supra; Cory v. Norwich and Yarmouth Railway Company, 3 Hare, 593; Kemp v. London and Brighton Railway Company, ubi supra; Attorney-General v. Eastern Counties and Northern and Eastern Counties Railway Company, ubi supra.

(d) See Gordon v. Cheltenham Railway Company, 5 Beav. 240; Cory v. Norwich and Yarmouth Railway Company, 3 Hare, 593. See also Clarence Railway Company v. Great North of England, Clarence and Hartlepool Junction Railway Company, 2 Railw. Cas. 763; Great North of England, Clarence and Hartlepool Railway Company v. Clarence Railway Company, 1 Coll. 507.

(e) Spencer v. The London and Birmingham Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 159.

application for dealing with the injunction in such a manner as best to reconcile the interests of both parties. But before the court can thus interfere with a plaintiff's equitable right, evidence must be adduced to show that injury is likely to be caused to the company by the postponement of their proceedings, and means suggested by which the court can be sure that they shall not, in permitting the company to go on, subject the plaintiff to inconvenience and danger. (f)

574. Even although there may have been a clear infraction of the law on the part of the company, and that without any favourable circumstances, still, if no case of practical inconvenience is made out, the court will not necessarily feel itself bound to continue an injunction, which has been granted ex parte, but will exercise its discretion according to the particular circumstances of the case, and endeavour to do substantial justice to one party without imposing unnecessary hardships on the other, especially in a case where the legal tribunals are open. (g)

(f) Judgment of Lord Chancellor in Bell v. Hull and Selby Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 637.

(g) Attorney-General v. Eastern Counties Railway Company, 3 Railw. Cas. 337; S. C. 7 Jur. 806, judgment of Vice-Chancellor. In that case an information was filed at the relation of the trustees of a turnpike road against a railway company in order to compel them to remove a temporary bridge, which had been erected for the purpose of conveying spoil earth over the road, or to compel them to set out a new road; and it was held, on motion to dissolve an injunction granted ex parte, that the operation of the injunction should, on certain terms, be suspended for seven weeks or until further order, no case of practical inconvenience having been made out, although there had been a clear infraction of the law.