A Sketch of the State and history of Europe from the Pyrenean treaty in one thousand fix hundred and fifty-nine, to the year one thousand fix hundred and eighty-eight.

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HE firft obfervation I fhall make on this third period of modern hiftory is, that as the ambition of Charles the Fifth, who united the whole formidable power of Auftria in himself, and the restlefs temper, the cruelty, and bigotry of Philip the Second, were principally objects of the attention and folicitude of the councils of Europe, in the first of these periods; and as the ambition of Ferdinand the Second, and the Third, who aimed at nothing lefs than extirpating the Proteftant intereft, and under that pretence fubduing the liberties of Germa. ny, were objects of the fame kind in the fecond: So an oppofition to the growing power of France, or to speak more properly, to the exorbitant ambition of the house of Bourbon, has been the princi. pal affair of Europe, during the greatest part of the prefent period. The design of aspiring to universal monarchy was imputed to Charles the Fifth, as foon as he began to give proofs of his ambition and capacity. The fame defign was imputed to Lewis the Fourteenth, as foon as he began to feel his own ftrength, and the weakness of his neighbours. Neither of these princes was induced, I believe, by the flattery of his courtiers, or the apprehenfions of his adverfaries,

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adverfaries, to entertain fo chimerical a defign as this would have been, even in that falfe fenfe wherein the word Univerfal is fo often understood: and I mistake very much if either of them was of a character, or in circumftances, to undertake it. Both of them had ftrong defires to raise their families higher, and to extend their dominions farther; but neither of them had that bold and adventurous ambition which makes a conquerour and an hero. Thefe apprehenfions however were given wifely, and taken ufefully. They cannot be given nor taken too foon when fuch powers as these arife; because when fuch powers as thefe are befieged as it were early, by the common policy and watchfulness of their neighbours, each of them may in his turn of strength fally forth, and gain a little ground; but none of them will be able to push their conquests far, and much less to confummate the entire projects of their ambition. Befides the occafional oppofition that was given to Charles the Fifth by our Henry the Eight, according to the different moods of humour he was in; by the Popes, according to the several turns of their private intereft; and by the princes of Germany, according to the occafions or pretences that religion or civil liberty furnished; he had from his first fetting out a rival and an enemy in Francis the First, who did not maintain his caufe in forma pauperis, if I may ufe fuch an expreffion as we have feen the houfe of Auftria fue, in our days, for dominion at the gate of every palace in Europe. Francis the Firft was the principal in his own quarrels, paid his own armies, fought his own battles; and though his valour alone did not hinder Charles

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the Fifth from fubduing all Europe, as Bayle, a better philologer than politician, fomewhere afferts, but a multitude of other circumstances easily to be traced in history; yet he contributed by his victo. ries, and even by his defeats, to waste the strength and check the courfe of that growing power. Lewis the Fourteenth had no rival of this kind in the house of Auftria, nor indeed any enemy of this importance to combat, till the Prince of Orange became King of Great Britain: and he had great advantages in many other refpects, which it is neceffary to confider in order to make a true judgement on the affairs of Europe from the year one thoufand fix hundred and fixty. You will discover the first of these advantages, and fuch as were productive of all the reft, in the conduct of Richelieu and of Mazarin. Richelieu formed the great defign, and laid the foun dations: Mazarin pursued the defign, and raised the fuperftructure. If I do not deceive myself extremely, there are few paffages in hiftory that deferve your Lordship's attention more than the conduct that the first and greatest of these minifters held, in laying the foundations I fpeak of. You will obferve how he helped to embroil affairs on every side, and to keep the house of Austria at bay as it were; how he entered into the quarrels of Italy against Spain, into that concerning the Valteline, and that concerning the fucceffion of Mantua; without engaging fo› deep as to divert him from another great object of his policy, fubduing Rochelle and difarming the Huguenots. You will obferve how he turned himself, after this was done, to ftop the progrefs of Ferdinand in Germany. Whilft Spain fomented difcon

contents at the court, and diforders in the kingdom of France, by all poffible means, even by taking engagements with the Duke of Rohan, and for fupporting the Proteftants; Richelieu abetted the fame interest in Germany against Ferdinand; and in the Low Countries against Spain. The Emperour was become almoft the mafter in Germany. Chriftian the Fourth, King of Denmark, had been at the head of a league, wherein the United Provinces, Sweden, and Lower Saxony entered, to oppose his progrefs: but Chriftian had been defeated by Tilly and Valstein, and obliged to conclude a treaty at Lubec, where Ferdinand gave him the law. It was then that Gustavus Adolphus, with whom Richelieu made an alliance, entered into this war, and foon turned the fortune of it. The French minister had not yet engaged his mafter openly in the war; when the Dutch grew impatient, and threatned to renew their truce with Spain, unless France declared; when the King of Sweden was killed, and the battle of Nordlingen loft; when Saxony had turned again to the fide of the Emperour, and Brandenburg and fo many others had followed this example, that Heffe almost alone perfifted in the Swedish alliance: then Richelieu engaged his master, and profited of every circumstance which the conjuncture afforded, to engage him with advantage. For, firft, he had a double advantage by engaging fo late that of coming fresh into the quarrel against a wearied and almost exhausted enemy; and that of yielding to the impatience of his friends, who, preffed by their neceffities and by the want they had of France, gave this minister an opportunity of laying those claims,

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and establishing thofe pretenfions, in all his treatics with Holland, Sweden, and the princes and ftates of the empire, on which he had projected the future aggrandifement of France. The manner in which he engaged, and the air that he gave to his engagement, were advantages of the fecond fort, advantages of reputation and credit; yet were thefe of no fmall moment in the courfe of the war, and operated ftrongly in favour of France as he defigned they fhould, even after his death, and at and after the treaties of Weftphalia. He varnished ambition with the most plaufible and popular pretences. The Elector of Treves had put himself under the protection of France and, if I remember right, he made this ftep when the Emperour could not protect him against the Swedes, whom he had reafon to appre hend. No matter, the Governour of Luxemburg was ordered to furprize Treves, and to feize the Elector. He executed his orders with fuccefs, and carried this prince prisoner into Brabant. Richelieu feized the lucky circumftance; he reclaimed the Elector : and, on the refufal of the Cardinal Infant, the war was declared. France, you fee, appeared the common friend of liberty, the defender of it in the Low Countries against the King of Spain, and in Germany against the Emperour, as well as the protector of the princes of the empire, many of whofe ftates had been illegally invaded, and whofe perfons were no longer fafe from violence even in their own palaces. All these appearances were kept up in the negotiations at Munfter, where Mazarin reaped what Richelieu had fowed. The demands that France made for herself were very great; but the conjuncture