not those of Brady v. McArgle, supra, and Ford v. Wiley, supra. It is suggested in some of the judgments that the requirements of the Irish cattle trade may make some difference; and O'BRIEN, C. J., particularly observed that the circumstance of the practice having been discontinued, or not being used, in England might be evidence that it did not serve any useful purpose there; whereas there was evidence that its suppression in Ireland would cost the country half a million of money.

AMERICAN NOTES.

It was held in Commonwealth v. Tilton, 8 Metcalf (Mass.), 232, that cockfighting is an unlawful game or sport. The court declined to pass on the contention that game-cocks are not "implements " used in gaming, but they said: "The game or sport of cock-fighting is unlawful because it is a violation alike of the prohibitions of a statute" (against "unlawful games or sports") "and of the plain dictates of the law of humanity, which is at the basis of the common law, and specially recognised in the Constitution, which makes it the duty of the legislature to 'countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity.'" "The Revised Statutes have prohibited cruelty to animals, under penalty of fine and imprisonment. But we think it is prohibited by the principles of the common law as a cruel and barbarous sport," citing Squires v. Whisken, 3 Camp. 141; Rex v. Howel, 3 Keb. 510. "As being barbarous and cruel, and tending to deaden the feelings of humanity, both in those who participate in it and those who witness it, it appears to us to stand on the same footing with bull-fighting, bear-baiting, and prize-fighting with fists or dangerous weapons, all of which, we think, would be considered as unlawful games or sports." In the same State it was held that loosing a captive fox to be hunted by dogs is "cruelty to animals." Commonwealth v. Turner, 145 Massachusetts, 296.

Many of the United States have statutes against cruelty to animals, among which is one in Massachusetts against mutilating live lobsters by severing their tails; one in Illinois against docking horses; one in Vermont against trap-shooting of live pigeons. On the other hand, in New York it is a misdemeanour to feed sparrows! See "Have Animals Rights?" 38 Cent. Law Journ. 160, citing the principal case; "The Animal Kingdom in Court," Browne's "Humorous Phases of the Law," 84; Stephens v. State, 65 Mississippi, 329. Some of the statutes prohibit cruelty to "any living creature;' and in considering a case of needlessly killing a trespassing hog (Grise v. State, 37 Arkansas, 456), the court said: These statutes "are the outgrowth of modern sentiment. They spring originally from tentative efforts of the New England colonies to enforce imperfect but well-recognised moral obligations. ... Society could not long tolerate a system of laws which might drag to the criminal bar every lady who might impale a butterfly, or every man who might drown a litter of kittens."

There does not seem to be any American adjudication directly in point. As to shooting pigeons from a trap for sport, it was held in Paine v. Bergh,

66

1 City Ct. Rep. (N. Y.) 160, to be within the statute against cruelty to animals; but the contrary was held in State v. Bogardus, 4 Missouri Appeals, 215, and very recently in Commonwealth v. Lewis, 140 Penn. St. 261. In the last case the court said that if the defendant had killed instead of merely wounding the bird, there would have been no doubt that he would not be liable; and as he was convicted he was "punished merely for his want of skill;" and they continued: Skill in shooting upon the wing can only be gained by practice. It is not so with inanimate objects. There accuracy of aim can be acquired by shooting at a mark. It is conceded that the sportsman in the woods may test his skill by shooting at wild birds. Why then may he not do the same with a bird confined in a cage and let out for that purpose? Is the bird in the cage any better, or has it any higher rights than the bird in the woods? Both were placed here by the Almighty for the use of man." The Court seemed to forget that the purpose can be and is often answered by shooting at glass balls flung or shot into the air.

The use of a dog on a treadmill (it does not appear for what purpose) was held not cruel. People ex rel. Walker v. Special Sessions, 4 Hun (New York Supreme Court), 441.

AN annuity given by will begins to run from the death of the testator; and, ordinarily, the first yearly payment is due at the end of the year from the death. But, if the annuity is directed to be paid monthly, the first monthly payment is to be made at the expiration of a month after the testator's death.

Houghton v. Franklin.

1 Sim. & St. 390-392.

Admiral Graves made two codicils to his will. In the [* 390] second codicil was contained the following bequest:·

"I give and bequeath unto Rebecca Houghton and her mother, the sum of £160 per annum, clear of all expenses; they are to be paid £13 68. 8d. monthly. In case her mother should die first, the same to be continued to the daughter; provided that she remains single." The testator bequeathed the residue of his personal estate to the defendants, Maria Franklin and Elizabeth Edwards.

The bill was filed by Rebecca Houghton and her mother, for the usual accounts of the testator's personal estate; and to have a sufficient part of the residue appropriated for securing the annuity of £160.

In the course of the cause, a question was made as to the time from which the annuity was to commence; and that question now came on to be argued.

Mr. Pemberton for the defendants:

-

An annuity given by will does not become payable until the end of a year after the testator's death. In Gibson v. Bott, (1802) 7. Ves. 89; 6 R. R. 87, the LORD CHANCELLOR says: "If an annuity

*

is given, the first payment is paid at the end of the year [*391] from the death." The same point came on again before the LORD CHANCELLOR in Fearns v. Young, 9 Ves. 549. See p. 553, in which case the LORD CHANCELLOR states, that it was not very well settled whether the tenant for life was entitled to interest from the death, or from a year afterwards; but that, at that time, the opinion of several of the masters was, that it was not to be paid until two years. Your Honour decided the point in Stott v. Hollingworth, 3 Madd. 161; and from what your Honour says in the beginning of your judgment in Storer v. Prestage, 3 Madd. 167, it must be inferred, that unless there are express directions for the commencement of the annuity, it is not to commence until the end of one year after the testator's death.

Mr. Heald, and Mr. Swanston, for the plaintiffs :

There is something in the report of Fearns v. Young which did not fall from the LORD CHANCELLOR; for his Lordship is made to say, that an annuitant is no more than tenant for life. But the contrary was decided in Bayley v. Bishop, 9 Ves. 6; 7 R. R. 132. There it was held that the direction to lay out £500 in the purchase of an Annuity for the life of the testator's son, was a gift of the £500; and that, upon a bill filed, he might have received the money, and the court would not have compelled the trustees to lay it out in the purchase of an annuity. The cases cited on the other side are cases of annuities charged upon the residue; but here the annuity is prior to the residue. The expressions of the will manifest an intention of immediate payment. The direction that the annuity is to be paid by monthly payments, means [392] that the annuitant is to receive the first payment at the end of the first month after the testator's death; and it is impossible that the testator could mean that the first payment was to be deferred until the end of thirteen months after the testator's decease.

*

Mr. Pemberton, in reply, said, that there was no difference be

No. 1.

Houghton v. Franklin, 1 Sim. & St. 392. - Notes.

tween an annuity and a legacy; for that it was as difficult to provide a fund for the payment of an annuity as it was for the payment of a legacy.

The VICE CHANCELLOR:

As a will speaks at the death of a testator, it must be intended. that the payment of an annual sum given by it is to commence from that period, unless there be some circumstances or expression in the will to control that intention. In this will there is no such circumstance or expression; and I am, therefore, of opinion, that the payment of this annuity ought to commence from the testator's death.

ENGLISH NOTES.

In the case of Gibson v. Bott, 7 Ves. 89, 6 R. R. 87, cited in the argument, there was a bequest of residue, which included a leasehold farm and stock to be converted into money as soon as conveniently might be, upon trust to pay the interest to J. D. for life, and after her death to pay the capital to her children. The farm and stock were sold within a reasonable time (about six months from the death, during which time the value had increased). As to the other premises a sale could not be effected, from a defect of title. It was held that the tenant for life should have interest on the proceeds of the farm and stock from the date of conversion; and, it being for the benefit of all that the other property should not be sold, a value should be put on it, and the tenant for life should have interest upon that value from the death.

In Williams v. Wilson (1865), 5 New Rep. 267, where a testator gave an annuity payable by four equal quarterly payments on the usual quarter days; V. C. STUART held that a proportional part only of the annuity was payable on the first quarter day after the decease.

In Irvin v. Ironmonger (1831), 2 Russ. & My. 531, the testator gave an annuity of £300 to his wife, the first year's annuity to be paid within one month after my death." He gave other annuities "payable quarterly, the first quarterly payment to be made within eighteen calendar months after my death.' It was held by Sir J. LEACH, M. R., that the annuity to the widow was to commence from the death, and that she was to have the payment for one year made in advance at the end of one month from the death, but that she was not entitled to have the payments for subsequent years made in advance; and that the other annuities did not commence to run until fifteen months from the testator's death, so that one quarter's payment only became due at the end of the eighteen months.

In Astley v. Earl of Essex (1871), L. R., 8 Ch. 898, a testator de