exemption to bring himself within it. Seth Turner's case (1) was (HILL, J. was absent.) Conviction quashed. REG. v. INHABITANTS OF CUDHAM. (1 El. & El. 409-413; S. C. 28 L. J. M. C. 105; 5 Jur. N. S. 269.) A woman married a man and resided with him in B., for less than five years, up to the time of his death, at which time he had resided in B. for more than five years: Held that she had not become irremovable from B. by the Poor Removal Act, 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 66), or the Poor Removal Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 111). ON appeal against an order of justices, removing Naomi White, the widow of William White, and her two children Laura and Arthur, from the parish of Bexley to the parish of Cudham, both in Kent, the Sessions confirmed the order, subject to a case which was, in substance, as follows. The respondents alleged and proved a settlement of the said William White, by hiring and service, in the appellants' parish, before his marriage, and when without child or children; and that he was legally settled there at the time of his death. The appellants proved that William White had, for twenty years before his death, which took place on 26th September, 1856, lived and resided exclusively in Bexley parish, and had been, for more than five years previous to and up to his death, irremoveable therefrom by reason of such residence. He was married to the pauper Naomi on 23rd April, 1854. She had not resided in Bexley parish before that time: but, from the time of her said marriage, she resided with her husband in that parish up to his death, and ever after continued to reside (1) 9 Q. B. 80. (3) Repealed, S. L. R. Act, 1875. (2) 5 M. & S. 206. in the same parish up to the time of obtaining the order of removal on 14th November, 1857. The pauper and her husband had issue the two children mentioned in the order, Laura and Arthur, who were both within the age of nurture, and resided with their mother up to and at the time of obtaining the order of removal, and were then with their mother chargeable to and receiving relief from the parish of Bexley. The question for the opinion of the Court is: Whether, under the above circumstances, the said Naomi White and her two children, Laura and Arthur, were, at the time of the obtaining the said order of removal, removeable from the said parish of Bexley. If the Court are of opinion that they were removeable, the said order is to be confirmed: if otherwise, the order is to be quashed. Denman (with whom was Digby), in support of the order of Sessions. * * * Deedes and F. Russell, contrà : While the pauper's husband lived, she could not be removed: the law therefore enforced upon her a status of irremoveability which could not be altered by his death. (LORD CAMPBELL, Ch. J.: Does not death look rather like a break of residence ?) The death of the husband does not break the wife's residence, as appears by Reg. v. Glossop (1). Reg. v. East Stonehouse (2) shows that the wife's irremoveability is identical with that of the husband: even five years' actual residence will not make her irremoveable if, during that time, she is married to a man who is removeable. *The proviso at the end of sect. 1 has been considered not intelligible; and a fresh proviso has been substituted by stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 111. (CROMPTON, J.: Is one enactment less intelligible than the other ?) LORD CAMPBELL, Ch. J.: The question is merely whether Naomi White, being settled in Cudham, acquired a status of irremoveability in Bexley. Her case is clearly not within the enacting part of stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 1. She herself had not resided five years in Bexley. But it is said that her deceased husband had acquired an irremoveability in Bexley: and she would, no doubt, be irremoveable while he lived, because husband and wife are not (1) 76 R. R. 225 (12 Q. B. 117). (2) 99 R. R. 817 (4 El. & Bl. 901), REG. v. INHABITANTS OF CUDHAM. [ .410 ]] [411] [ *412] REG. V. INHABI TANTS OF [ *413 ] to be separated. The proviso at the end of the section, and the amending Act of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 111, show that, while the husband is alive and irremoveable, the wife and child are not removeable. But the irremoveability which the wife or child derives from that of the husband or father can be claimed only while the husband or father is alive. The language of the enactment shows that it cannot be extended. After the death of the husband, he cannot be described as removeable or not, nor as a person having a wife. It is impossible, therefore, to say that the enactment is applicable after his death. Reg. v. Glossop (1) has no application. There the woman personally had resided for five years, and had acquired a status of irremoveability in her own right. (WIGHTMAN, J. was absent.) CROMPTON, J.: I am of the same opinion. The argument *for the appellants seems to rest on the words "status of irremoveability." I am not very conversant with this branch of the law; most of the decisions upon it took place before I came on the Bench. The question seems to be, whether the woman's status of irremoveability was permanent or temporary. I can only look at the statute: and the enacting part clearly gives irremoveability only to the person actually residing for the five years. If that stood alone, it would be preposterous to say that one person could reside by virtue of the residence of another person. Then comes the proviso at the end of the section. Whatever be the meaning of stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 111 (which I do not understand, being unable to see the effect of the change from "shall " to "should"), there is no provision for the case where a man, being irremoveable, dies, leaving a wife. All the difficulty arises from the use of the words "status of irremoveability," as if such a state of things, once created, were to last for ever. Of course, where the woman herself has resided for the five years, she is irremoveable altogether. HILL, J.: Naomi White had the status of irremoveability, not in respect of herself, but only through the irremoveability of her husband: and, upon looking at the statute, it is clear that her irremoveability continued only while she had a husband who possessed the status. Order of Sessions affirmed. (1) 76 R. R. 225 (12 Q. B. 117). BOOTH v. COLDMAN. (1 El. & El. 414–417; S. C. 28 L. J. Q. B. 137; 5 Jur. N. S. 844.) [Obsolete bankruptcy.] EX PARTE BRADFORD. (1 El. & El. 417-419; S. C. 28 L. J. Q. B. 138; 5 Jur. N. S. 648; 32 L. T. O. S. 254; 7 W. R. 188.) In order to enable a graduate of the Universities, named in sect. 7 of stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, to be admitted an attorney after three years service, he must have taken his degree before being bound by articles. It is not sufficient that, within the four years preceding such binding, he should have completed the time necessary to enable him to take his degree, but has been prevented by illness from doing so, and has in fact taken his degree within a few months after the binding. [Superseded by s. 2 of stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, repealing (by s. 5) stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 7.] FLETCHER v. FLETCHER (1). (1 El. & El. 420-424; S. C. 28 L. J. Q. B. 134; 5 Jur. N. S. 678.) Declaration for assaulting and imprisoning plaintiff. Plea: That, before and at the time &c., plaintiff had conducted himself as a person of unsound mind and incompetent to take care of himself, and proper to be taken charge of and detained under due care and treatment: that two medical certificates had been given, by persons duly authorized, according to the provisions of stats. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100 (2), and 16 & 17 Vict. c. 96 (2), certifying that plaintiff was of unsound mind and proper to be taken charge of and detained that defendant had notice of the certificates, and had reasonable and probable grounds for believing, and did believe, them to be true, and that plaintiff was of unsound mind &c. : and that defendant, being the uncle of plaintiff, and a proper person to cause him to be taken in charge and detained, did for the causes aforesaid cause him to be taken charge of and detained as a person of unsound mind &c. : Held, on demurrer, a bad plea; inasmuch as, at common law, defendant would be justified only if plaintiff were actually insane at the time, which the plea did not allege: and the protection given by stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100, s. 99 (2), to parties duly and bona fide acting under certificates and an order for confinement does not extend to the party making the order. THE declaration stated that defendant assaulted plaintiff, gave him in custody, and caused him to be imprisoned. Third plea. That, before and at the time of the alleged imprisonment, plaintiff had conducted himself as a person of unsound mind, and incompetent to take, and incapable of taking, care of himself, and as a person proper to be taken charge of and detained under due care and treatment; and, as such, two medical certificates had been given by persons duly authorized in that behalf, and according to the provisions of the statutes for the regulation of the care and treatment of lunatics, whereby it was certified by those last-mentioned persons that they had separately and personally examined plaintiff, Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 5). (1) This case is preserved owing to its importance as a declaration of the common law, but the decision itself is superseded by s. 330 of the Lunacy (2) Repealed, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 5, s. 342. See now s. 330 of the repealing Act. 1859. Jan. 17. 1859. Jan. 17. 1859. Jan. 18. [420] and that he was a person of unsound mind, and a proper person to be taken charge of and detained under care and treatment; and such certificates duly set forth *the grounds and facts indicating insanity, and the other matters and things required by the said statutes, according to the provisions of the said statutes; and defendant, before and at the time of the said imprisonment, had notice of the said several premises and certificates, and had reasonable and probable grounds for believing, and did in fact verily and bonâ fide believe, such certificates to be true, and that plaintiff was a person of unsound mind, and incompetent and incapable to take care of himself, and a proper person to be taken charge of and detained under due care and treatment as such, and that it was unfit and dangerous that he should be at large, and that it was necessary and proper for plaintiff to be confined. That defendant, being uncle to plaintiff, did, for the causes aforesaid, cause plaintiff to be taken charge of and detained under due care and treatment as a person of unsound mind, and incapable of taking care of himself, and a person proper to be taken charge of and detained according to the provisions of the statutes in that case made and provided: which is the alleged cause of action in the declaration mentioned. Demurrer. Joinder in demurrer. Lush, for the plaintiff : The plea is bad. The mere belief of the defendant that the plaintiff was insane would not justify the defendant in taking upon himself to give an order for the confinement of the plaintiff in a lunatic asylum. First, it would be no defence at common law. A man may take forcible measures to prevent a person of unsound mind from doing mischief to himself or others: Bac. Abr. Idiots and Lunaticks (C.); Com. Dig. Pleader (3 M. 22). But a plea justifying an imprisonment on this ground must allege *that the plaintiff was insane: it is not sufficient if it alleges, as this does, merely that he appeared to the defendant to be insane: Bro. Abr. Faux Imprisonment, pl. 28. Nor, secondly, does the plea raise any defence under the Lunacy Acts. * * (LORD CAMPBELL, Ch. J.: If the defendant had reasonable cause to suppose the plaintiff insane, the damages would be very small.) No doubt. But a plea to that effect would not be a bar to the action. Bovill, contrà: The plea states, and consequently the plaintiff must be taken |