4. The testator's other cousin Henry Willoughby died on the 18th of November, 1849, leaving the above-named defendant his eldest son him surviving. 5. Afterwards and during the continuance of the disposition made of the said real property by the said will as before stated, and after the 19th of May, 1853, being the time appointed for the commencement of the Succession Duty Act, 1853, that is to say, on the 5th of November, 1856, the said Digby Willoughby, Baron Middleton, died; and upon his death the above-named defendant succeeded to the title, and became the eighth Baron Middleton, and also succeeded to the said real property, as tenant for life thereof in possession under the disposition thereof made by the testator's will as before stated. 6. The defendant is a descendant of a brother of the testator's father, and the Attorney-General says, on behalf of her Majesty, that the defendant is liable to pay duty, in respect of his succession to the said real property, after the rate of 51. per cent. per annum, upon the value thereof. But the defendant declines to pay any duty whatever in respect of the same, and wholly denies his liability so to do. The information concluded with the following prayer by the Attorney-General: 1. That the defendant may answer the premises and matters aforesaid. 2. That it may be declared that the defendant is chargeable with duty after the rate of 5l. per cent. or at some other rate in respect of his succession to the real property devised by the will of the said testator as herein before stated; and that the particulars of such succession and the *amount of duty payable by him in respect thereof may be ascertained (if necessary) under the direction of the Court, and that the defendant may be decreed to pay such duty to the Receiver-General of the Inland Revenue on behalf of her Majesty, and that for the purposes aforesaid all proper accounts and inquiries may be taken and made, the Attorney-General, on behalf of her Majesty, waiving · all pains, penalties and forfeitures which may have been incurred by the defendant, by reason of his neglect to give such notice, or to deliver such account as by the Succession Duty Act, 1853, is required in that behalf, or otherwise howsoever in regard to the said succession. 3. That the Attorney-General, on behalf of her Majesty, may have such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. To this information a general demurrer was filed. Wilde, C. Pollock and Parke [were heard] for the defendant. * * The Attorney General was not called on to argue. POLLOCK, C. B.: We are all of opinion that the Crown is entitled to judgment. The judgment of Vice-Chancellor KINDERSLEY, in Wilcox v. Smith (1), is undoubtedly a masterly and elaborate investigation of the subject, containing a critical examination, with great acumen, of the whole Act. But I do not think it necessary so to deal with the subject, in order to attain a right conclusion. This is not the first time that our attention has been called to it. Very recently a question arose as to exemption from duty under this Act. I allude to the case of The AttorneyGeneral v. Fitzjohn (2). There it was never suggested that any doubt existed as to the construction of the Act on this point. It was conceded by the opposing counsel and assumed by the COURT-I admit without argument, but certainly not without consideration; for time was taken to prepare the judgment, and *amongst ourselves we considered what was the meaning of the Act. The question is whether any person, on or after the 19th May, 1853, succeeding to property by reason of the death of any person, be his right vested or contingent, is liable to succession duty. I am of opinion that he is. The words of the second section are "every past or future disposition of property." This language must be considered as uttered by the Legislature on the last moment of the 18th May, 1853, so as to come into operation on the first moment of the 19th May, 1853, and then every past disposition of property means every disposition of property anterior to the 19th May, 1853"-" by reason whereof any person has or shall become beneficially entitled to any property or the income thereof, upon the death of any person dying after the time appointed for the commencement of this Act." Then if any estate be given to A. for life, remainder to B. in fee; if the testator made that disposition before the 19th May, 1853, and after that day A. died, B., who by reason of his death becomes entitled to the property or the income thereof, obtains a "succession," and is liable to pay the duty. That is the plain and natural meaning of the language used. If any commentary were wanted, the third section supplies it, even supposing that section to be surplusage, which I think it is not, because very subtle legal distinctions might have been taken with reference to the interest of joint. tenants, and the result if one of them died. But by the third (2) 2 H. & N. 465. (1) 113 R. R. 313 (4 Drew. 40). section it is plain, that though a person was absolutely entitled before the Act came into operation, so that in the natural order of events, if he lived long enough, he would be sure to get the whole property; yet if, by the death of his co-tenant, he gets a portion which he had not before, notwithstanding his interest was in one sense vestel, he must pay duty upon the half, or whatever share he thus obtains. The contention *on behalf of the defendant is, that though it is expressly said that if a person in a particular case gets half the property he shall pay the duty upon that half; yet if he gets the whole he shall pay no duty at all. I cannot conceive so absurd a piece of legislation. Since the third section is so plain, it seems to me to require an argument that it is impossible that the construction put by the Attorney-General on the second section can he correct. The utmost which the defendant's counsel have done has been to suggest a doubt, which I must say appears to me no doubt at all. The fifteenth section has been referred to. (His Lordship read the section.) But that is merely saying, that where a person would be liable to pay duty under the second section, if he has parted with his interest, the person to whom he has assigned it shall be liable to pay duty just as the original person would have been if he had retained his interest. I cannot see, as that refers expressly to the second section, how it furnishes any argument or carries the case further than that section. The word "past" in the second section, as I have already pointed out, must be read as if the Act passed on the last moment of the 18th May, 1853. The word has" is to be taken as if uttered at that time; and I cannot accept the argument that the word "has" has crept in to supply the interval between May and August. It must be taken with the comment which arises out of the third section. I entertain no doubt that it was intended that whenever any person obtained, by the death of another, any benefit under an arrangement, though made before the Act, that benefit should be liable to duty. The seventh section may be adverted to as throwing some light on the subject. (His Lordship read the section.) So that when an estate is left charged with an annuity, the person succeeding to it is to pay succession duty according to its then value; but when the annuitant dies, that is to be considered as so much more benefit, and duty is to be paid upon it. So also in every other case where an intermediate interest ceases; because the estate becomes of more value, by reason of some one dying after the Act came into operation, and therefore duty is payable on the increased value. Looking at these sections, although, like every other matter where language is used for the purpose of conveying ideas, it is open to criticism, I do not entertain the slightest doubt as to the construction of the Act. BRAMWELL, B.: I am of the same opinion. We are asked to put an unnatural or forced meaning on certain words, because some particular clauses are supposed to be inconsistent with the general tenor of the Act, which I think is quite consistent with the second section. First, it is argued that Acts of this kind ought not to be construed, so as to impose a tax on the subject, unless their meaning is clear. For my part, whenever I can decide on no other ground, I will decide in favour of the subject, but so long as I can come to a conclusion without having recourse to a rule of that description, I will not resort to it. Then it is argued, that the Act ought not to be construed so as to give it a retrospective effect. I agree that is an excellent rule; but I doubt whether it ought to be applied to a Tax Act, since the tax is imposed because it is absolutely necessary. However, the answer to the argument is, that some of the clauses are clearly retrospective, and no reason can be suggested why they should not have a retrospective effect. The principal argument was, that there was some doubt about the second branch of the second section, and that if it had the meaning ascribed to it, it was repugnant to the interpretation put by the Crown on the *first branch. I express no opinion as to the second branch of that section; and without saying that I agree with the defendant's construction, we certainly ought not to misconstrue the plain words of the first branch because the second is not so comprehensive. The question is, what is the meaning of the first branch of that section? It is argued that it means, where the party has become entitled to property after the passing of the Act. That construction gives no meaning to the word "has." In the course of the argument I asked Mr. Wilde what meaning it had; he answered, there was difficulty in saying it had any meaning, and suggested that it might apply to the interval between May and August. The LORD CHIEF BARON has answered that; and I will merely add that, in my opinion, not only was it needless to make any provision for the time between May and August, but that if it was necessary to do so, it ought not to have been done by such comprehensive words as "every past disposition of property," but simply "such dispositions of property as have taken place between the 18th of May and 4th of August." Then it was said that the word "has may mean where the becoming entitled, in one sense, is before the Act; but where the person who is to take the benefit is not known until after the Act; for instance, if the eldest living son of A. is to take at A.'s death, and that is certain before the Act, but A. does not die until after the Act, it could not be told who would be the eldest son of A. living at his death. That argument is in this dilemma; either the eldest son who is to take is not the person who has become entitled before the Act, and then the word "has " is not applicable to him; or he has become entitled before the Act, and then it is retrospective as to him. It would be strange if, where a sum of money was left equally between the children of A. and he died after the Act, the children would not pay in respect of their succession, but that if it were given to the eldest son of A., who should be living at his death, that eldest son would have to pay. Why is not the Act as retrospective in the one case as the other? Neither of these explanations has given any satisfactory solution to the presence of the word "has" in the second section; but in truth to my mind the section is singularly plain. "Every past or future disposition of property by reason whereof any person has or shall become beneficially entitled to any property "if it stopped there, there could be no doubt. But then it goes on-" upon the death of any person dying after the time appointed for the commencement of this Act," which it is argued points to the time when he becomes entitled. I feel satisfied that is not so. If the argument were well founded, this expression would be erroneous. If a person said, "I am entitled to an estate on the 1st of June next," according to the argument, that would be nonsense; he ought to say, "I shall be entitled to an estate on the 1st of June next." That is not so. If I say, "I am entitled now, but I am to have it on the 1st of June next,”- "I am entitled to an estate on the death of A. B." Both these expressions are perfectly intelligible. It may be that by exercising hypercriticism it might be shown that they are elliptical (though I am not sure that they are even that), and that it ought to be said, "I am now entitled to an estate, the benefit of which I shall get on the 1st of June, or on the death of A. B." But the truth is, in common parlance (and this Act speaks in common parlance, and does not use terms of art), any one would say, "I am entitled on the 1st of June next," "I am entitled on a future day." Therefore it is not wrong to say that a person has become entitled to property on the death of a person who will die on a future day. The meaning of the second section is, "every past disposition of property, by reason whereof any person has become beneficially entitled before the Act came into operation, to some |