To apply these remarks to the case now before us: The question is, whether the plaintiff is bound to produce his titledeeds. To compel him to do so would introduce a new rule, which certainly was never intended by this Act of Parliament, and would render a title-deed of no more importance than a bill of exchange or any other written document. I think that a man's title-deed is still protected unless it tends to prove the case of the opposite party; if it does not, it is irrelevant. The recent changes in the law have made no alteration in that respect. There is a power to call for documents: first, one party may inquire whether the other has in his possession or power any documents relating to the matters in dispute; that means, Have you any documents which I am entitled to see? If so, state them, and then I will call for them." If the party interrogated says on oath, "I have no such documents; you have no right to know how many deeds I have in my chest, but I swear that I have no documents which relate directly or indirectly to the matters in dispute," then the other party has no right to inquire any further. That is in accordance with the right of search in other cases. After a dissolution of partnership, one of the partners may have in his possession a book which the other wishes to inspect. The latter has a right to see such portions of the book as relate to matters *in which he is concerned; but he has no right to see the rest. Then the book is produced with those parts sealed up. But how is that determined? By the oath of the party. Such has always appeared to me to be the law, and I think that after this discussion it will no longer be looked upon as uncertain. MARTIN, B.: I am also of opinion that the rule ought to be discharged. I am glad that this discussion has taken place, for it has afforded much information on a subject somewhat difficult to deal with. My opinion is founded on the consideration that the defendants had no right to put to the plaintiff the questions, the answers to which are complained of; and that these interrogatories ought to have been disallowed, as I think they would have been if put in a bill in equity and demurred to. I think that if the proper questions had been put, the answers here given would have been evasive; but they were not put, and those which were ought not to have been allowed. The facts are these: In answer to a declaration in trespass the defendants say, they are entitled to the minerals below the land, the surface of which belongs to the plaintiff: they say further, that their title is derived from a person named Farkes Now, they had a right to interrogate the plaintiff as to whether BRAMWELL, B.: I am of the same opinion. I have always thought that the right to administer interrogatories was confined to those matters in respect of which the party might have a discovery, and I do not understand that the defendants' counsel dissent from that; and it is difficult to see what it is they do affirm, and which they say gives them a right to more information in this case. One point *made by them is something like this,-We do not ask for a discovery, but for a schedule of these deeds, and a schedule is no part of a discovery, because it is only some account of the deeds, in order to enable us to see whether (1) 91 R. R. 225 (1 D. M. & G. 656). ADAMS v. LLOYD. [ *366 ] [ *367 ] ADAMS v. LLOYD. [ *368 ] we are entitled to a discovery. But I think that the plaintiff's counsel have shown that giving a schedule of deeds is equivalent to a production of them. In former times, it seems to have been the practice in equity to set out the deeds in extenso, whereas now they are only described in a schedule. That shows to demonstration that the argument of the defendants' counsel cannot be true: and that where a party is not entitled to the production of a deed because it does not relate to his case, he is not entitled to a description of it. "But,” say the defendants' counsel, "still it must be assumed to be something we are entitled to see so soon as it appears to be relevant." But "relevant" means evidence affecting the case of the party applying. Again, the defendants' counsel say that the answers of the plaintiff are evasive. The reply to that is, that they answer in the words of your questions, and you cannot complain of them for not answering more than the questions put. If you wanted more precise and particular answers, you should have put more precise and particular questions. I do not wish to determine what questions might have been put, but this question would not have been unreasonable "I affirm that I have a title to the minerals through a former owner who granted away the surface and through whom you claim, is it true that you have any titledeeds which prove that case?" WATSON, B.: I am of the same opinion. The authorities are clear, that a person is not entitled in equity to a discovery of title deeds unless they contain evidence of his own title. Neither is he otherwise entitled under the recent statute. Though he has a right to the discovery of title-deeds, or any other writing material to his case, Sir James Wigram says (1)" The exercise of a jurisdiction of this nature cannot be otherwise than pregnant with danger to the interests of those against whom it may be enforced, unless careful provision were made for guarding against its abuse." The question whether a party has anything in his title-deeds material for his adversary's case, is always guarded in this way-" Have you title-deeds, and are they relevant?" Relevant to what? To the matter of inquiry, viz., to the plaintiff's title. Anything which shows a title in the opposite party is evidence for him, but when the party interrogated answers "I have certain deeds, but they relate exclusively to my own title," he cannot be compelled to go any further: otherwise you might get at the title deeds of (1) Wigram on Discovery, p. 2, § 5. every person in the kingdom. The rule on this subject is thus summed up in Taylor on Evidence, vol. 2, p. 1436, 3rd ed. "As in all cases where a discovery of the contents of papers is prayed, the onus is upon the plaintiff to prove his right thereto, and the only evidence on which he can rely is the defendant's admission; it follows that a court of equity will not make an order for inspection of documents unless the plaintiff can show from the defendant's answer, or from his affidavit in the nature of a supplemental answer, first, that the writings in question are in the possession or power of the defendant; and next, that they are relevant to his own case; or, in other words, that he has an interest in their production for the purpose of the trial about to take place, either as affording affirmative evidence of some right or title belonging to him, or as tending to disprove the title or case of his opponent, by showing some specific defect therein." Now let us see what took place here. These interrogatories are put in generalities. The first is, "Have you in your possession, &c., any deeds. or writings relating to the lands mentioned in the declaration?" &c. For a long time I did not understand whether this interrogatory related to the mines, or to the surface land. But I now see what the object was to do indirectly that which could not be done directly, viz., to get at the plaintiff's title deeds. The proper question would have been, "Have you any deeds or writings relating to the title to these mines?" The other interrogatories are open to the same objection. It was argued, however, that these interrogatories were put in these large and general terms in order that the defendants might get un account of the deeds and then call for their production; and that they have a right to say, "Although the plaintiff says that he has no deeds except those which relate exclusively to his title, we will not be content with his statement, but wish to see them and judge for ourselves." That is in fact an indirect mode of doing that which cannot be done by a bill for a discovery or under the provisions of this Act of Parliament. For these reasons I think that the rule ought to be discharged. ADAMS 2. LLOYD. [ *369] Rule discharged. CORT v. SAGAR. (3 H. & N. 370-373; S. C. 27 L. J. Ex. 378.) The plaintiff assigned to the defendant by bill of sale, "all and singular the 104 power looms and other effects and things belonging thereto, now being in, upon, or about the mill, particularly set forth in the schedule.' The schedule was as follows: 'Looms made by S." The looms were in use at the date of the execution of the bill of sale. Healds, reeds, weft and waste cans are attached to the 66 1858. May 27. [370] looms when in use, and the looms are not complete for the purpose of weaving till they are supplied, but they form no part of the looms as they come from the makers. They are made and often sold at sales separately from the looms. Different healds and reeds are used in weaving cloth of different degrees of fineness; they do not ordinarily belong to any particular loom, but can be detached and used with any loom indifferently: Held, that the healds, reeds, cans, &c., which were on the premises at the time of the execution of the bill of sale passed to the defendant. TROVER for healds, reeds, beams and weaving utensils and pieces of machinery for weaving, and articles belonging thereto, and strapping. Plea. That the goods were not the goods of the plaintiff. Whereupon issue was joined. At the trial, before Martin, B., at the Liverpool Spring Assizes, it appeared that the action was brought to recover certain healds, reeds, beams, oil cans and waste cans seized by the defendant. The plaintiff by indenture, dated the 4th of June, 1857, had sold and assigned to the defendant “all and singular the 104 power looms and other effects and things belonging thereto, now being in or upon or about the mill or iron foundry and premises late of one Thomas Cort, and more particularly set forth in the schedule at the foot or end hereof." The schedule was as follows: "In the top room of the mill. Fifty-two power looms 8-8ths, 36 whereof made by T. Sagar, and 16 made by Dickinson. "In the bottom room of the mill. Fifty-two other power looms 8-8ths, also made by the said Thomas Sagar." There were on the premises, but not actually attached to the looms, 55 sets of healds and reeds, 34 weft cans, 34 waste cans, 34 oil cans, 34 oil bottles, 15 spare beams, 30 brushes and 20 or 30 pounds of strapping. All these things were employed in weaving cotton; without them, in fact, the looms could not be used. The oil bottles are bolted to the looms; but all the other things are capable of being detached, and were in fact detached, from the looms at the time of the seizure. The looms were all of the same size, and the articles in question were capable of being used with any loom. Looms, when supplied by a machine maker, are not fitted with healds, reeds, beams, waste, or oil cans or oil bottles, which are made separately and often sold at sales without the looms, but the looms are not complete for the purpose of weaving without them. Different healds and reeds are used for different qualities of cloth. They are set up and attached to the looms as required. The plaintiff had two sets for each loom: a set of 44s, which she was using when the bill of sale was executed, and a set of 48s, which were in use at the time of the seizure, and which had been purchased by her subsequently to the date |