v. COOPER. [ *385 ] bankrupt. The bankrupt had conveyed the furniture in question NICHOLSON to the defendant, by a bill of sale bearing date the 9th of March, 1857. The bill of sale was *not duly registered in compliance with the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, s. 1 (1), the affidavit containing a description of the residence and occupation of only one of two attesting witnesses. Bowman committed an act of bankruptcy on the 20th of May, and was adjudicated a bankrupt on the 7th of July, 1857. Possession of the goods was taken by the defendant's agent on the 15th of June, and the goods were sold on the 7th of July. On the 21st of December, 1857, the usual declaration that all the goods, &c. (specifically enumerating those in the bill of sale), were in the possession, order and disposition of the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy, and the order to sell and dispose of the same for the benefit of the creditors, was made by the Commissioner in bankruptcy. On the 7th of July, before the sale, the goods were demanded of the defendant but he refused to give them up. The defendant's counsel called witnesses to prove that on the 19th of May, 1857, the bankrupt gave a bill of sale to one Digby, and contended that, admitting the bill of sale to the plaintiff to be invalid, nevertheless Digby's bill of sale prevented the goods from being in the order and disposition of the bankrupt at the time of his bankruptcy, and therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain the action. The learned Judge overruled the objection, and directed a verdict for the plaintiffs, giving leave to the defendant to move to enter a verdict for him. Montague Smith having obtained a rule calling on the plaintiffs to show cause why the verdict should not be entered for the defendant, upon the ground that the plaintiffs had no title to maintain the action on account of the prior title of Digby, Bovill and Prentice now showed cause: The defendant's bill of sale was valid until the bankruptcy. The 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, s. 1(1), only avoids unregistered bills of sale *as against assignees and execution creditors. The goods therefore at the time of the bankruptcy were in the order and disposition of the bankrupt, with the consent of the defendant, the true owner. The bill of sale conveyed the whole property in the goods to the defendant. Digby had no title, and could acquire none after the act of bankruptcy. (WATSON, B.: The defendant did not claim under Digby.) In Edwards v. English (2), which was an interpleader issue, it [ *386 ] NICHOLSON v. COOPER. 1858. June 3. [387] of sale made to a third party, but void under the statute, against a person claiming under a second bill of sale. Montague Smith, in support of the rule: The goods were not in the possession of the bankrupt with the consent of Digby, but of the defendant. (MARTIN, B.: The fact is that Digby never had any title at all. WATSON, B.: The property never reverted to the grantor for an instant, so as to give Digby, a title by estoppel. The defendant had a good title until the bankruptcy. Upon the bankruptcy the title at once passed to and became vested in the assignees. The defendant's title was then defeated absolutely and for all purposes.) MARTIN, B.: This rule must be discharged. The real fact is, that Digby never had any title whatever to the goods. WATSON, B.: I am entirely of the same opinion. There is another reason why the defendant must fail, and that is, that a defendant, in a case like the present, cannot set up the right of a third person except by the authority of such person. Rule discharged. BARTON v. GAINER (1). (3 H. & N. 387-390; S. C. 27 L. J. Ex. 390; 4 Jur. N. S. 715; 6 W. R. 624.) The 8 & 9 Vict. c. clv., s. 36, enacts, "that every transfer (of Bristol and Exeter Railway mortgages) shall be by deed duly stamped,” &c. A., having in his lifetime given by word of mouth and delivery to B. two such mortgages or debentures: Held, that, assuming the property in the mortgage debts did not pass by such a gift, nevertheless that A.'s executor could not maintain detinue for the documents against B. DECLARATION. That the defendant detains from the plaintiffs two mortgages or deeds under the common seal of the Bristol and Exeter Railway, numbered respectively 1,946 and 1,948, each for securing repayment of the sum of 1,000l. &c.; and also divers, to wit, eight coupons or interest warrants to each of the said mortgages or deeds respectively annexed, being the mortgages, &c., of the plaintiffs as co-executors, &c. Pleas: First, Non detinet. Secondly, that the said mortgages or deeds, and coupons or interest warrants, were not, nor was any (1) Followed, Rummens v. Hare (1876) 1 Ex. D. 169, 171, 46 L. J. Ex. 30, 34 L. T. 407. Referred to, In re Richardson (1885) 30 Ch. D. 396, 402, 35 L. J. Ch. 741, 33 L. T. 746. Dicta approved and followed, Swaney Coal Co. v. Denton [1906] 2 K. B. 873, 75 L. J. K. B. 1009. or either of them, the goods of the plaintiffs as alleged. Whereupon issue was joined. At the trial before Crowder, J., at the Bristol Spring Assizes, the plaintiffs' case was that the defendant detained two debentures. or mortgages of the Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, issued in pursuance of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. clv., each for the payment of 1,000l. to the testator. The defendant proved that the testator, about a year and a half before his death, gave her two debentures with the coupons attached, saying "Take them and keep them for yourself, but you must give me the coupons that I may have the interest during my life." The defendant then. took possession of the debentures and kept them locked up in her own drawer until after the testator's death. As the interest became due she cut off the coupons and handed them to the testator, who continued to receive the interest as long as he lived. It was agreed that the jury should find that there was such a gift of the debentures to the defendant as the evidence would warrant, and, by consent, a verdict was entered for the plaintiffs, leave being reserved to the *defendant to move to enter a verdict. for her if, upon the finding of the jury, the Court should be of opinion that the defendant was entitled to retain the debentures. Collier, in Easter Term, obtained a rule nisi for that purpose, against which Montague Smith and Prideaux now showed cause: The question is, whether the property in the mortgage debts passed to the defendant. (MARTIN, B.: Surely that is not the question. If the obligee of a bond gives it to a third person, the obligee's executors cannot claim back the paper on which the bond is written, though the gift may not operate as a valid assignment of the debt.) It is true that if a person gives to another a title-deed as a piece of parchment, the parchment would pass, but it would be otherwise if the intention of the donor was to give an estate and the gift of the estate failed. A court of equity will not give effect to an imperfect voluntary gift, such as that in the present case: Dillon v. Coppin (1). As there was not a good transfer of the debt, the gift fails; and as the intention of the plaintiffs' testator cannot be carried out, and the property in the debt remained in him, the defendant has no right to retain the documents which are merely accessory to the debt. (1) 4 My. & Cr. 647. See also Jefferys v. Jefferys, 54 R. R. 249 (1 Cr. & Ph. 138). BARTON v. GAINER. [ *388 ] (POLLOCK, C. B.: The owner may by grant sever the titledeeds from an estate. MARTIN, B.: In Sheppard's Touchstone, p. 242, it is said: "A man may give or grant his deeds, i.e., the parchment, paper and wax, to another at his pleasure, and the grantee may keep or cancel them. And, therefore, if a man have an obligation he may give or grant it away, and so sever the debt and it." WATSON, B.: Suppose a person grants to another a bond and the bond debt, the debt passes in equity. A debt may be granted by parol without *deed.) By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. clv., s. 36, it is enacted that "any party entitled to any mortgage granted under the power of the recited Acts, &c., may transfer his right and interest therein to any other person; and every such transfer shall be by deed duly stamped, wherein the consideration shall be truly stated." A transfer not in accordance with this Act is of no effect. (POLLOCK, C. B.: It does not follow that a stamped deed is necessary to transfer the document of title.) A chattel will not pass by a verbal gift without delivery: Irons v. Smallpiece (1): therefore the debt did not pass. The documents are merely accessory to the debt, and there was no intention to sever them by the gift. * * * Collier and Karslake, who appeared to support the rule, were not called upon. POLLOCK, C. B.: This rule must be absolute. Conceding that the construction put upon the section by the plaintiff's counsel is correct, I should consider that if a person gives the parchment on which the mortgage is written, we ought to give effect to his act as far as we can. MARTIN, B.: I think there is no doubt but that the defendant is entitled to retain the documents. What use she can make of them is a different question. The donor intended and hoped that the possession of the debentures would carry with it the property in them. But that does not alter the effect of the gift of the docuIf the defendant can avail herself of the documents in any way, either by compelling the executors to make a bargain with her or otherwise, she is entitled to do so. Mr. Smith says, because the gift fails the defendant gets no title to the docu(1) 21 R. R. 395 (2 B. & Ald, 351), ments which are accessory to it. But we think that the gift ought to be treated as effectual as far as it can be. WATSON, B.: I am of the same opinion. The finding of the jury shows that the debentures were given nearly two years before the testator's decease to the defendant, who always retained possession of them. I do not know what right the plaintiffs have to say that this was not a gift of them, though it may be that such gift and possession give no title to the debt. But the only question here is, whether the plaintiffs have a right to recover possession of the pieces of paper. Rule absolute (1). GARLAND v. ALSTON. (3 H. & N. 390-395; S. C. 27 L. J. Ex. 438; 4 Jur. N. S. 539; 6 W. R. 689.) The surrenderee of a remainder in a copyhold estate having died in the lifetime of the tenant for life: Held, that on the decease of the tenant for life the heir of the surrenderee was entitled to be admitted on payment of a single fine. THIS WAS a special case. The action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, to recover the sum of 120l., being the amount of a double fine claimed by the plaintiff to be due to him from the defendant on the admission of the defendant to certain customary or copyhold hereditaments held of the manor of Wix Hall or Abbey, in the county of Essex. The defendant contended that the plaintiff was 601., being the amount of a single fine, and no more. tiff is lord of the said manor, and the defendant is customary or copyhold tenants thereof. entitled to The plainone of the John Ham, a tenant of the manor, by his will dated the 26th day of April, 1824, gave and devised to his daughter Sarah, the wife of Joseph Cutting, all that his copyhold messuage or tenement and farm called Westlands, situate and being in Wix aforesaid, to hold the same unto his daughter, Sarah Cutting, for the term of her natural life, to and for her own sole and separate use and benefit (she committing no waste thereupon, and paying out of the rents thereof the annual interest upon the prin cipal money due and owing on a certain mortgage). And after the decease of his daughter, Sarah Cutting, he gave and devised the same messuage or tenement and farm, called Westlands, unto his sons Robert Ham and William Ham, to be equally divided between them as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants, and to their several and respective heirs and assigns for ever, (1) See Co. Litt. 232 a, b; Kelsock v. Nicholson, Cro. Eliz. 478, 496. But see Searle v. Law, 74 R. R. 27 (15 Sim. |